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Abstract
This portfolio demonstrates my on-going personal and professional development as 
a counselling psychologist over the period of three years. It contains dossiers that 
cover three different aspects of training namely academic, therapeutic practice and 
research. The Academic Dossier contains three essays illustrating the diversity of 
theoretical concepts explored throughout my training. The first essay examines the 
question of whether we now need to cognitively restructure or accept thoughts in 
cognitive behavioural therapy. The second essay considers the effectiveness of 
applying Fairbaim’s (1952) object relations theory when working 
psychodynamically with a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. The third 
essay looks at an existential-phenomenological approach to working with grief. 
The Therapeutic Practice Dossier relates to my clinical practice and provides the 
reader with a description of placements and client populations. This dossier also 
includes a final clinical paper providing an overview of my development as a 
psychotherapeutic practitioner. Finally the Research Dossier examines the 
relationship between mindfulness and attentional control. This dossier contains a 
literature review and two original research reports. The literature review examines 
the theoretical assumption that mindfulness interventions may enhance attentional 
control, a core determinant of psychological wellbeing. The first research report 
investigates whether dispositional mindfulness moderates the relationship between 
anxiety and attentional control. The second research report investigates whether 
state mindfulness moderates the relationship between threat and attentional bias.
Introduction to the Portfolio
Personal development and self-reflection are seen as key components of 
counselling psychology (Milton, 2010) and this ethos is reflected in each section of 
this portfolio. I am acutely a'ware that my academic, therapeutic practice and 
research interests have been influenced by both professional and personal 
experience. I therefore feel it necessary to first provide the reader with an account 
of the reasons that drew me into training. Before embarking upon becoming a 
counselling psychologist I had, for eight years, had a successful career in the food 
retailing industry. From the outside it may have seemed that I was a high achiever, 
climbing the corporate ladder and enjoying the materialistic trappings of success. 
However, internally I was unfulfilled and experienced profound periods of loss and 
anxiety. In my mid-twenties I decided to seek help in exploring my internal world 
and entered psychotherapy. My experience of the therapeutic process was rich and 
rewarding. Through the establishment of a strong and collaborative therapeutic 
relationship I was able to begin to understand how my early experiences as a child 
had impacted upon my day-to-day functioning in adulthood. I started to challenge 
deep rooted beliefs that I had developed about myself and stopped patterns of 
behavior that had become maladaptive. The profound impact that psychotherapy 
had on my life at that time convinced me to resign and to pursue a career that 
would enable me to help others experiencing mental distress. I chose the profession 
of counselling psychology due to it being an innovative branch of applied 
psychology concerned with the integration of psychological theory and research 
with therapeutic practice. I was attracted to counselling psychology’s relational 
framework and its promotion of philosophical pluralism. However, in not having an 
undergraduate degree in psychology at the time, I was aware that in order to reach 
my goal, I had to dedicate myself to a minimum of six years of study. My decision 
to begin studying psychology at the age of 28 started me on a journey that has 
proved the most fulfilling, challenging and enlightening period in my life to date. 
Now, at the end of training, I am immensely proud to present this portfolio as a 
record of my personal and professional development towards becoming a 
counselling psychologist.
Academic Dossier
The diversity of the work submitted for the academic dossier illustrates how I have 
embraced philosophical pluralism throughout training. As a scientific practitioner I 
have developed critical scrutiny of psychotherapeutic approaches to recognise that 
there is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to working with clients. Although I have 
come to appreciate and respect how each school of psychotherapy has a unique 
contribution to make in understanding human behavior, I am aware that there is not 
one theory that provides an overarching truth to elucidate everything. Having the 
opportunity to train in three schools of psychotherapy, I now have the knowledge 
and skills to apply a pluralistic perspective to my therapeutic practice, where I am 
open and tolerant of different worldviews and understand that there are lots of 
different things that can be helpful for clients. The three essays that make up the 
academic dossier are written from a cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), 
psychodynamic and existential phenomenological approach to psychotherapy 
respectively. In the first essay I pose the question of whether we need to 
cognitively restructure or accept thoughts in CBT. This became a pertinent question 
for me within the context of my therapeutic practice as whilst working from both a 
second wave and third wave approach to CBT I often found myself questioning 
whether to promote the idea that enduring improvements in suffering may result 
from changing subjective experience or accepting subjective experience with 
individual clients. I argue that it is important for practitioners to look beyond 
dichotomisation in order to identify how cognitive restructuring and acceptance 
based strategies can be unified into a flexible model. In the second essay, I examine 
the effectiveness of applying Fairbaim’s (1952) object relations theory when 
working psychodynamically with clients diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder. Having worked with clients with borderline characteristics in each year 
of my training, Fairbaim’s (1952) endopsychic stmcture has proved an invaluable 
framework in helping me to understand further their intemal and extemal worlds as 
it provides a concept of the mind in which split off and repressed parts of the self­
enter into object relationships with one another. I advance Fairbaim’s view that the 
therapeutic relationship is the most important factor in helping clients to repair ego 
splits and reintegrate the personality. In the third essay, I argue from an existential 
phenomenological perspective that grief should not be pathologized or
conceptualized as a series of stages. I propose that it is not possible to generalise 
across individuals for universal laws of behavior related to bereavement. I suggest 
that the quality of the therapeutic relationship and the consideration of van 
Deurzen’s (1997) four dimensions of human existence are of paramount 
importance in helping clients to explore and deal with core existential issues related 
to the loss of a loved one.
Therapeutic Practice Dossier
In the therapeutic practice dossier, the reader will find a short description of my 
placements and my final clinical paper. Over the course of my training I was 
fortunate to have the opportunity to work in the public sector, the private sector and 
the third sector. In each placement I have been challenged both personally and 
professionally and have learnt a great deal about myself and the therapeutic 
process. The final clinical paper provides an overview of my therapeutic approach 
to practice and an account of how I have developed as a counseling psychologist in 
training. Within the paper I discuss how loss has pervaded my journey on the 
course, being ever present in my therapeutic work and how I now view mourning 
as a developmental process, leading to growth and psychic transformation.
Research Dossier
This dossier contains a literature review and two quantitative research reports. I 
chose to conduct research on mindfulness meditation firstly, due to the positive 
effects that formal practice had in reducing my own anxiety and the anxiety of 
previous clients and secondly, due to becoming fascinated by the question of what 
was changing when people participated in mindfulness meditation to reduce 
anxiety. Before starting the research process I was aware that a great deal of 
empirical evidence was available to suggest that mindfulness-based treatments 
reduced symptoms of anxiety and distress. However few studies had examined the 
processes and mechanisms by which such beneficial outcomes were obtained. I 
decided to investigate the theoretical assumption that mindfulness interventions 
enhanced attentional control, a core determinant of psychological wellbeing 
(Bishop et., al 2004). I felt strongly that a comprehensive understanding of how 
mindfulness produced salutary effects was essential in order to improve clinical
efficacy and help tailor future interventions. The purpose of the literature review 
was to explore the relationship between mindfulness and attentional control, 
providing an overview of the theoretical frameworks and empirical research in 
regard to this relationship. In the two research reports I used experimental designs 
to investigate how mindfulness affects automatic processing mechanisms operating 
outside of conscious awareness related to attentional control. In both studies I used 
quantitative research methods as this provided me with a means to measure 
unconscious processes through the collection of quantitative data. In the first 
research report I used a cross sectional design to investigate whether dispositional 
mindfulness moderates the relationship between anxiety and attentional control. I 
was initially disappointed and frustrated by the non-significant results that the study 
yielded however during the write up of the report I came to realise that the 
implications of my findings were just as meaningful as if I were to have found 
significant results. Through an evolutionary process the research then progressed 
into my final year of training, where in Research Report 2 , 1 used an experimental 
design to investigate whether state mindfulness moderates the relationship between 
threat and attentional bias. Results indicated that even a brief mindfulness 
intervention is capable of changing the usual patterns of attentional bias towards 
high threat stimuli and away from mild threat stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). The 
findings are discussed in terms of their implications for psychological wellbeing.
Concluding Comments
I hope that the portfolio provides the reader with an impression of my ongoing 
development both personally and professionally as a counselling psychologist. It is 
my intention that the portfolio demonstrates my competence reflectiveness and 
resourcefulness as an ethically sound practitioner.
NB. Details of individual clients have been changed and pseudonyms have been 
used throughout this portfolio to protect anonymity.
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Academic Dossier
Introduction to the Academic Dossier
This dossier contains three essays which were written during the three years of 
training. The first essay examines the question of whether we now need to 
cognitively restructure or accept thoughts in cognitive behavioural therapy. The 
second essay looks at the effectiveness of applying Fairbaim’s (1952) object 
relations theory when working psychodynamically with a diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder. The third essay considers an existential-phenomenological 
approach to working with grief.
Do We Need to Cognitively Restructure or Accept Thoughts in Cognitive
Behaviour Therapy?
Within the field of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) a new movement has 
developed questioning the utility of employing cognitive restructuring as an 
intervention in relieving psychological distress. Proponents of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) promote the idea that enduring improvements in 
suffering may result fi*om accepting rather than trying to change distressing 
subjective experience. According to ACT, efforts to control or change experience 
may, instead of relieving distress, be actually causing and perpetuating suffering. 
In support of these claims Hayes, Follettee & Linehan (2004) have identified three 
empirical anomalies in the research literature supporting the use of cognitive 
restructuring as an efficacious intervention within CBT. Firstly, the authors suggest 
that treatment component analysis has to date failed to show that cognitive 
restructuring provides any significant added value to therapy. Secondly, they 
suggest that CBT treatments have been associated with a rapid symptomatic 
improvement prior to the introduction of specific cognitive interventions. Thirdly, 
they suggest that there is a paucity of data that changes in cognitive mediators 
instigates symptomatic change. Hayes et al., (2004) conclude that cognitive 
components of CBT, such as cognitive restructuring, are now not needed and 
propose that positive treatment outcomes can be achieved through behavioural 
treatment alone. However, in stark contrast to this view, several studies have found 
that cognitive based treatments demonstrate superior outcomes over behaviour 
treatment (Clark et al., 2006) and that cognitive restructuring does mediate positive 
outcome (Hofmann, 2008). A question arising fi"om these inconsistencies within the 
literature is whether thoughts now need to be cognitively restructured or accepted 
within cognitive behavioural therapy? The general aim of this essay is to further 
our theoretical understanding of cognitive restructuring and acceptance-based 
interventions and examine how they can be utilised effectively within 
psychotherapy. Firstly, the essay introduces the concepts of cognitive restructuring 
and acceptance and how they are applied. Secondly, the essay considers the 
fundamental differences between the two interventions and discuss’ criticisms 
aimed at their application. Thirdly, the essay examines how cognitive restructuring 
and acceptance-based interventions share common ground and how they may both
be considered emotional regulation strategies. Fourthly, the essay considers how 
cognitive restructuring and acceptance-based interventions may be integrated into a 
flexible model and how therapists can determine when to implement them when 
working with clients. Finally, the essay concludes by calling for future research 
into the potential mediating mechanism that cognitive restructuring and acceptance- 
based interventions are impacting upon.
Cognitive restructuring within the context o f CBT
Within traditional cognitive and cognitive behavioural therapy, restructuring 
maladaptive cognitions, changing the way we interpret and think about situations 
and experiences, constitutes a vital element in the treatment of psychological 
distress (Beck, 1976, Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery 1979, Clark & Beck 1999). Beck 
et al., (1979) propose that pathological conditions should be conceptualised as the 
result of persistent patterns of dysfunctional or maladaptive appraisals in relation to 
emotional salient stimuli. Subsequently, one aim of CBT is to enable clients to 
develop a new associate network of adaptive thoughts and behaviours that compete 
with or modify maladaptive fear based networks and memories (Arch & Craske, 
2008).
Cognitive restructuring is a technique, allowing for a potentially emotion-eliciting 
situation to be construed in a way that acts to change its emotional impact. It is a 
way to deal with and challenge aversive emotions, allowing for the 
reconceptualisation of a situation in a way that facilities mastery or coping. 
Cognitive restructuring is not a technique to teach clients positive thinking or to 
persuade clients that their thoughts are faulty or erroneous. Instead, it is employed 
to help clients to get a more relativistic perspective of their subjective experience 
by means of testing hypotheses against logic and experimental evidence. By 
treating thoughts as hypotheses, clients are encouraged to place themselves into the 
role of scientist or detective rather than remaining in the role of victim. By 
challenging the absolute truth of maladaptive thoughts, clients are able to examine 
the evidence for and against a specific assumption in order to generate rational 
alternatives that better reflect the full range of their experience. Through practising 
this skill both before and during difficult situations, previous automatic and
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habitual patterns of negative thoughts become replaced by responding in a more 
balanced and accurate way.
Acceptance within the context o f ACT
No consensus definition of psychological acceptance has emerged within the ACT 
literature, although existing definitions share common themes such as a willingness 
to experience psychological events (thoughts, feelings, memories) without having 
to avoid them or let them unduly influence behaviour. According to Hayes 
Strosahl and Wilson (1999) chronic attempts to engage in experiential avoidance of 
negative private experience is a strong predictor of psychopathology. Subsequently, 
ACT attempts to foster acceptance of unwanted thoughts and feelings and stimulate 
action tendencies to enable clients to pursue their values and goals in life.
Within ACT, clients are taught acceptance via experiential exercises and use of 
metaphor whenever language thwarts action in available valued life directions. 
Clients are encouraged to ‘lean into’ and embrace unwanted thoughts and feelings 
and to end their struggle with them instead of challenging them or attempting to 
supress them. Specifically ACT discourages experiential avoidance promoting 
techniques that increase psychological flexibility.
Cognitive defusion, an acceptance based intervention in ACT, allows clients to 
recognise that previous attempts to control or change private events have actually 
been part of the problem and not the solution. Cognitive defusion teaches clients to 
experience thoughts, sensations and memories for what they really are (thoughts as 
thoughts, sensations as sensations, memories as memories) and not as “real” or 
“true” events that are linked to action or inaction. Cognitive defusion involves 
clients distancing themselves from the literal meaning and content of language and 
that any attempt to control private events is part of the problem, not the solution. 
Therefore clients are encouraged not to act upon thoughts and feelings and 
ultimately to ‘let go’ of control.
Theoretical differences and disputes between cognitive restructuring in CBT vs. 
acceptance based strategies in ACT
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From an ACT perspective, the belief underlying traditional cognitive and CBT, that 
one must control, alter or respond to thoughts, self-talk, verbalisations and images 
actually runs the risk of maintaining an inner struggle with these private events. 
The focus of treatment in ACT is not on cognitively restructuring cognitive content, 
but rather on teaching the client to gain distance from the literal meaning and 
content of cognitions, and developing cognitive flexibility to live as fully as 
possible in the present moment. The goal of ACT is not to change cognitions or 
symptoms as in CBT, but to develop mindful tolerance and acceptance of 
cognitions and symptoms.
Stark philosophical and theoretical differences exist between ACT and CBT in 
regards to the role of cognition. CBT adopts a tripartite model of psychological 
functioning, distinguishing between cognition (thought processes), emotions 
(subjective experience), and behaviour (overt action). In contrast, ACT assumes 
that cognitions are another form of behaviour. As a result, ACT’s focus is on 
identifying and modifying the function rather than the content of cognition. ACT is 
therefore not an extension or modification of traditional CBT, because the notion 
that cognition can cause change in emotion and behaviour is rejected. Within ACT 
behaviour alone is targeted for content change.
Many ACT oriented manuals often resort to comparing ACT to traditional CBT, 
focusing on presumed weaknesses in applying cognitive restructuring within the 
earlier models approach (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005, Hayes, 2005). The frequent 
criticism levelled at CBT within these manuals is that cognitive restructuring may 
be counterproductive. Hayes and colleagues (Hayes et al., 1999, Hayes, 2004, 
Hayes Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis, 2004) have constituently put forward two 
critiques in regard to adopting cognitive restructuring within treatment. The first 
critique is that cognitive restructuring focuses too much on cognitive content (first 
order change) instead of cognitive function (second order change). The second 
critique is that cognitive restructuring communicates to the client that maladaptive 
thinking should be suppressed.
In their first critique, Hayes and colleges (Hayes et al., 1999, 2004) propose that 
cognitive restructuring is purely a symptom-focused technique that is only 
concerned with first order change (the examination of the accuracy of perception
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and the application of the opposite of the problem behaviour). Hayes et al., (2004) 
assume that this technique is a significant limitation within CBT and depict how 
ACT has successfully shifted the focus for treatment away fi*om first order change 
strategies towards second order change strategies through an examination of the 
functional utility of different ways of thinking and behaving. By using acceptance- 
based interventions such as cognitive defusion, Hayes et al., (2004) argue that 
clients can extract themselves fi*om the self-reflective trap inherent in first order 
change attempts.
In their second critique, Hayes and colleagues (Hayes et al., 1999, 2004) highlight 
research into thought suppression in order to justify the importance of abandoning 
cognitive restructuring and adopting an acceptance orientation towards intemal 
experience. Hayes et al., (1999) argue that CBT may encourage thought 
suppression by encouraging the cognitive restmcturing of thought content and by 
labelling certain thoughts as “faulty”. Hayes et al., (1999) propose that cognitive 
restmcturing in CBT often leads to a diminished sense of reality and control where 
supressed thoughts become ever more accessible.
In response to Hayes et al’s., (2004) first critique that cognitive restmcturing is 
only concerned with first order change and symptom reduction, Hofmann & 
Asmundson (2008) argue that effective cognitive restmcturing involves 
engagement with cognitive defusion techniques, where distance is created from 
habitual patterns of thought within present moment experience. The authors 
propose that cognitive restmcturing should incorporate both first order and second 
order change strategies. Furthermore in contrast to Hayes et aTs., (1999) second 
critique, that cognitive restmcturing promotes thought suppression. Gross (1998) 
argues that cognitive restmcturing is effective in its distress reducing capacities 
related to suppression. According to Gross (1998), cognitive restmcturing acts to 
decrease the intensity and behavioural expression of negative emotion and does 
not, as Hayes et al., (1999) suggests produce negative effect. According to Gross 
(1998), cognitive restmcturing like acceptance involves coming into contact 
directly with previously avoided or supressed cognitive material and can be viewed 
as a form of exposure.
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Just as with Hayes et al’s’ (1999) critique that cognitive restructuring within CBT 
risks thought suppression, CBT theorists have now accused the acceptance of 
thoughts within ACT (specifically the notion of “letting go” of thoughts during 
experiential exercises) of encouraging thought suppression (Hofmann & 
Asmundson, 2008). CBT theorists argue that the emphasis to “let go” of thoughts, 
inherently emphasises the wish to avoid or supress them as opposed to allowing 
them to be accepted in awareness non-judgmentally (Arch & Craske, 2008). ACT 
has subsequently been accused as offering nothing new (Hofmann & Asmundson, 
2008) of being merely a fad and of representing a pseudoscientific cult of personal 
will (Cloud 2006).
Recent comparisons of cognitive restructuring in CBT and acceptance-based 
interventions in ACT have lead towards generalisation as well as the amplification 
and dichotomisation of the differences between these approaches. Emphasizing 
differences has limited the capacity for researchers to investigate common 
mechanisms that may underlie these treatment components and has restricted their 
integration into a flexible model to aid clients.
Sharing common ground: similarities between cognitive restructuring in CBT and 
acceptance based strategies in ACT
Arch and Craske (2008) have proposed that cognitive restructuring and acceptance 
may in fact have more in common that what appears at first glance. They argue that 
in order to work with cognitive restructuring in CBT, clients need to first accept 
and deal with previously avoided or suppressed cognitive material. The processes 
that clients employ during cognitive restructuring such as catching, monitoring and 
challenging cognition, actually function to expose clients to experience the aversive 
cognitive material that has previously been avoided. Cognitive restructuring also 
helps clients towards a realisation that their thoughts are not undisputed fact, but 
rather can be viewed as hypotheses that can be tested against logic and 
experimental evidence.
Cognitive restructuring also shares important aspects with the concept of cognitive 
defusion as distance needs to be developed between the client and the contents of 
his/her thoughts. According to Arch and Craske (2008) both cognitive restructuring
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and acceptance focus on increasing awareness of thoughts, feelings and physical 
sensations and seek to facilitate emotional expression. Both emphasize clear 
articulation of goals and target improvements in quality of life.
Hofmann and Asmundson (2008) also suggest that cognitive restructuring and 
acceptance-based interventions share common ground as both may be impacting 
upon Gross’s (1998) process model of emotion regulation at different time 
durations. Gross’s (1998) model broadly distinguishes between antecedent focused 
emotion regulation, which involves attempts to alter emotional experiences before 
the emotion is generated, and the response focused emotion regulation, which 
involves attempts to alter emotional responding after the emotional response 
tendencies have been generated. Hofmann & Asmundson (2008) propose that 
cognitive restructuring can be viewed as an effective antecedent emotion regulation 
strategy in that by modifying the interpretations of events clients can effectively 
reduce their emotional impact. Whereas acceptance-orientated intentions of ACT 
notably cognitive defusion may be effective “response focused” emotional 
regulation strategies, counteracting maladaptive response focused emotion 
regulation and discouraging experiential avoidance.
Towards an integration o f cognitive restructuring and acceptance to reduce 
suffering
Ciarrochi and Bailey (2008) in their manual A CBT Practitioners Guide to ACT, 
propose that CBT techniques such as cognitive restructuring and ACT techniques 
such as cognitive defusion can be integrated into a coherent and effective treatment 
program that provides options for therapists when working with clients 
experiencing distressing thoughts and feelings. The authors hypothesise that 
techniques that aim to change the content and frequency of cognitions (form) can 
be as empowering for clients as those techniques that aim at targeting the context in 
which these cognitions are experienced (function). Using both cognitive 
restructuring and acceptance-based techniques means that interventions can be 
administered flexibly and effectively depending on context and the client’s 
preferences.
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By integrating cognitive restructuring and acceptance-based techniques into a 
flexible model for treatment, a challenge arises for the therapist in deciding when to 
implement them with clients. Farmer and Chapman (2008) have put forward three 
principles to aid therapists when deciding when to incorporate cognitive 
restructuring or acceptance-based techniques into treatment. These principles are 
based upon whether a thought, emotion or event is (1) justified or unjustified, (2) 
changeable or unchangeable and/or (3) effective or ineffective.
Firstly, Farmer and Chapman (2008) propose that it is important for a therapist to 
pose the question to him or herself of whether acceptance is justified. A justified 
response is one that is warranted by the situation. If the response is justified then 
acceptance is in order. If the response is not justified then the client is helped to 
change the response or to change the behaviour elicited by the response. For 
example. Farmer and Chapman (2008) suggest that distressing thoughts about 
being overweight can be justified in an obese individual but the same thoughts are 
unjustified in an individual suffering from anorexia. Therefore the determination of 
whether a thought is justified requires at least some degree of analysis of the truth 
value of the thought.
Secondly, the therapist needs to pose the question to him or herself of whether the 
reaction of the client to a situation is changeable or unchangeable. Changeable 
problems are readily modifiable by therapist and client, in contrast, unchangeable 
problems are not easily changeable and so acceptance is preferred. It is important 
for the therapist to explore which aspects of the client’s responses or situation 
might actually be changeable. For example a woman cannot change the fact that 
she was raped in the past, however she can reduce or learn to regulate her fear of 
men and sexual encounters in the present.
Finally, the therapist should pose the question to him or herself of whether the 
client’s responses are effective or ineffective? According to Farmer and Chapman 
(2008), effective responses should be conceptualised as consistent with a client’s 
values and goals whereas ineffective responses are inconsistent. When responses 
are ineffective, acceptance is called for. For example a women whose father had 
recently died might temporarily distract herself from thoughts of her father in order 
to get through a challenging day at work (an example of effective responding).
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whereas chronic avoidance or escape from such thoughts is unlikely to allow her to 
come to terms with her father death (an example of ineffective responding)
In accordance with the above principles Farmer and Chapman (2008) have 
produced a table to aid therapists in determining whether to employ acceptance 
oriented methods or change oriented methods when working with clients (see Table 
1).
Table 1.
Considerations in determining whether to use acceptance versus change oriented 
methods when working with client, taken from Farmer & Chapman (2008) p.259.
Justified?
Yes No
Changeable? Yes Accept the emotion, 
thought or event
Change the emotion of 
thought
Solve the problem or 
change the event
The event does not need 
to be changed, as the 
emotion or thought is not 
justified
No Accept the emotion, 
thought and/or event
Accept the emotion, 
thought and/or event
When therapists are determining whether to use change oriented methods or 
acceptance oriented methods in accordance with Farmer and Chapman’s (2008) 
three principles, it is vital for them to consider what the client will respond to most 
successfully. Some clients respond well to interventions that almost solely involve 
changing thoughts and behaviour, others may feel that this approach is invalidating 
and unpalatable. Similarly, a therapist applying a purely acceptance based approach 
might find that they do not match the seriousness of their clients problems. Many 
clients with complex needs have been found to require a balance between
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acceptance and change based methods (Swales & Heard, 2009). Linehan’s (1993) 
work on Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) introduces the tension, or dialectic, 
between acceptance and change in treating clients with Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD). In DBT, the therapist’s goal is to find the best balance of synthesis 
of acceptance and change based methods in order to reduce suffering.
Conclusion
It is now time to look beyond dichotomisation and move away from arcane and 
petty debates, in order to identify how cognitive restructuring and acceptance-based 
interventions can be unified into a flexible model. Both aim at reducing the 
avoidance of uncomfortable intemal thoughts, emotions and physical sensations 
and it is important for researchers to begin investigating whether specific cognitive 
and attentional mechanisms are mediated by these interventions in similar or 
distinct ways. The advancement of science and practice will now be better served 
by posing the question, how do cognitive restmcturing and acceptance- based 
interventions work?
If we are to obtain a better understanding as to what mechanisms cognitive 
restmcturing and acceptance-based interventions are mediating, we can increase 
their effectiveness by targeting them in therapy more efficiently. Experimental 
paradigms that are able to isolate the effects of cognitive restmcturing and 
cognitive defusion will allow researchers to determine whether these therapeutic 
elements produce similar reductions in cognitive and behavioural avoidance. One 
possible area of future investigation is an examination of how cognitive 
restmcturing and cognitive defusion serve to reduce experiential avoidance. 
Experimental paradigms such as the dot probe task and the antisaccade task would 
enable researchers to test the effects of cognitive restmcturing and cognitive 
defusion on specific cognitive mechanisms related to experiential avoidance. A 
further area of investigation would be to test Hofmann and Armundson’s (2008) 
hypothesis that cognitive restmcturing and acceptance-based interventions target 
Gross’s (1999) emotion regulation model at the antecedent focused and response 
focused level respectively. Furthermore, an empirical investigation into how much 
of cognitive restmcturing actually exists in cognitive defusion and vice versa is also
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important in order to determine whether the two interventions are significantly 
correlated.
It is hoped that the present discussion will contribute towards a more empirically 
based focus on the use of cognitive restructuring and acceptance within the 
cognitive behavioural therapies. Despite the differences between cognitive 
restructuring in CBT and acceptance-based interventions in ACT it is now possible 
to use these techniques together in a philosophical and theoretically coherent 
fashion to help clients to live vital lives.
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Working Psychodynamlcally With a Diagnosis of Borderline Personality 
Disorder: Applying Fairbairn’s Object Relations Theory in Practice
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) developed as a psychoanalytical construct 
through the work of American psychoanalyst Adolph Stem (1938) over eighty 
years ago. Since that time there have been many competing definitions of BPD 
offered from within the discipline of psychoanalysis (see Dmck, 1989 for a review) 
each attempting to understand its origins and guide future interventions. The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition Text Revised 
(DSM-IV-TR) characterises BPD as a significant instability in interpersonal 
relationships, self-image, mood and impulsive behaviour. It also states that 
symptoms of BPD include rapid fluctuation between confidence to despair, fear of 
abandonment and rejection, and a strong tendency towards suicidal thinking and 
self-harm.
Recently, the contributions of the Scottish psychiatrist and psychoanalyst William 
Ronald Dodds Fairbaim have received increasing if not belated recognition within 
the literature for working with clients with a diagnosis of BPD (Greenberg and 
Mitchell, 1983; Grotstein, 1994; Kemberg, 1980; Rinsley, 1977). By presenting a 
case example of psychodynamic work with a borderline client, this essay aims to 
advance the application of Fairbaim’s object relations theory of the personality in 
future work with BPD.
The essay will begin with a comprehensive account of a client with a diagnosis of 
BPD. This account provides information about the client, her relationships and her 
levels of functioning. The essay will then move on to outline in brief Fairbaim’s 
object relations theory of the personality (1952), before offering a formulation in 
respect to the aforementioned client. The essay will then present the application of 
Fairbaimian theory and technique in practice, focusing on three specific areas of 
the work: the importance of establishing a therapeutic relationship; working with 
the client’s intemal world; and working with the client’s extemal world. The essay 
concludes by discussing the advantages of applying Fairbaimian theory and 
technique when working with BPD.
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The case of Dawn
Dawn is a forty-four year old single mother of five adult children and six 
grandchildren. Dawn was initially referred by her General Practitioner (GP) to the 
local Community Mental Health Team (CMHT). Following a joint assessment by a 
Consultant Psychiatrist and a Community Psychiatric Nurse (CPN), the client was 
subsequently referred with a diagnosis of BPD to the charitable organisation where 
I work as a Counselling Psychologist in training. I have seen Dawn for 46 sessions 
and we continue to work together.
Dawn is just over five foot in height, is obese and has long dark brown hair. At our 
first session together I was struck by how tired and unkempt she was. Wearing 
stained tracksuit bottoms, a tom puffer jacket and trainers. Dawn appeared visibly 
anxious to be sitting opposite me. Shuffling her feet and playing with the cords on 
her jacket, the client stated that all she wanted in life was for her five children to 
“stop shouting” at her and to “start loving her”. Upon enquiry. Dawn reported to 
having current suicide ideation to be self-harming repeatedly by cutting and to 
having thoughts of wanting to harm others.
Dawn had been unable to work for over a year and had been experiencing a 
depressed mood, anger, irritability, difficulty sleeping and a decrease in appetite. 
Dawn told me that she often isolated herself in her family home that she shared 
with her youngest son and insisted that the curtains were constantly closed in order 
“to shut the outside world away”. Dawn stated that her children and grandchildren 
were the “centre” of her life. She disclosed that she would speak to each of her 
children at least twice a day by telephone and would visit them all frequently 
throughout the week. It soon became apparent that although Dawn had a strong 
attachment to her children, often praising their achievements and sharing her hopes 
for their future, she was also greatly frustrated by them. She recounted how she 
often felt “manipulated” and “rejected” by her daughters, and “disgusted” by their 
promiscuous behaviour and dmg-taking habits. She also disclosed that all of her 
children were regularly in trouble with the law, known to the social services and 
were a danger to themselves. Dawn would become tearful when she spoke about 
the neglectful behaviour that her children displayed towards her grandchildren and 
feared that their behaviour was all her “fault”.
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Dawn described her childhood as unstable and chaotic, stating that whilst growing 
up in a small Victorian house in east London with her adopted parents and two 
younger adopted brothers she was regularly abused and neglected. Dawn told me 
that her adopted mother, a foster carer, was controlling and manipulative and would 
take out her “inner rage” on the family. Dawn stated how she would often feel 
rejected by her mother who would constantly dote on new-born babies, whom she 
fostered for short periods. Dawn also disclosed that her adopted father repeatedly 
sexually abused her over a 12 year period. When asked how she felt about her 
parents now (both of whom are dead), she stated that although she loved them 
dearly she also feared them.
Dawn’s early adult life was dominated by the birth and the raising of her five 
children. Her eldest daughter Pauline was bom when she was sixteen and her 
youngest Carl when she was twenty seven. All five children were conceived by 
different fathers who were all violent and had little to do with the children’s 
upbringings. Dawn explained that although her children had always come first in 
her life, throughout her twenties and thirties she regularly abused alcohol and 
would self-harm repeatedly. Dawn disclosed that her children would often witness 
much of this self-destmctive behaviour. In respect to her grandchildren. Dawn 
stated that she took on the responsibility for “the mothering role” in their lives, 
often having them at her home for weeks at a time. Dawn explained that this was 
due to her “fear” for the welfare of her grandchildren and her “need to be close to 
them”. However, Dawn explained how her children would often use threats of 
taking away her grandchildren if she did not conform to their every need. Dawn 
told me how this made her feel rejected and that on occasions she would lash out at 
her children, only to be left isolated and alone.
The therapeutic approach adopted in working with Dawn has been psychodynamic, 
drawing upon Fairbaimian theory and technique (1952). The reasons for tuming 
toward the work of Fairbaim were due to the discovery that three relationships had 
been dominating the early stages of therapy. The first of these relationships was the 
therapeutic relationship between Dawn and myself, as ‘the good’ therapist. The 
second relationship was Dawn’s intemal relationships with her ‘ego stmctures’. 
The third relationship was with her ‘parental and displaced-parental objects’ in her
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extemal world (Modell, 1994). Fairbaim’s (1952) theory of the personality has 
subsequently aided my therapeutic work.
Fairbaim’s object relations theory o f the personality
Fairbaim produced a paradigm shift in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, 
developing what he called an “object relations theory of personality” (1952): a 
psychoanalytic metapsychology based upon the splitting of the ego and its objects. 
This reconceptualization of psychoanalysis radically departed from classical theory, 
viewing the goal of libido not as the discharge of tension, but as the creation of 
gratifying relationships. This theory has since been supported by psychoanalytic 
developmental research (Stem, 1985, Fonagy, 2001) and by neurobiological 
research (Siegel 1999) respectively.
For Fairbaim (1952), psychopathology emanates from the ego’s self-fragmentation 
as it attempts to maintain connection to an extemal object (often parental) and gain 
control of its unsatisfying elements in the face of trauma and stress. Fairbaim 
subsequently came to view the mind as organised by splits into several sub systems 
(termed the endopsychic system), each formed by relationship between a self­
component and an object-component
Fairbaim (1952) suggests that a child faced with an abusive or neglectful early 
relationship is faced with a difficult conflict, for they find themselves angered and 
fi*ustrated by the very figures that they so desperately need. In order to protect 
themselves from negative emotional consequences related to un-met relational 
needs, the child separates off good from bad experiences related to their parental 
objects, relocating them intemally.
The good aspects of the object become intemalised as the central ego (the self that 
we like to think of ourselves as). This tolerable part of the self develops in 
association with an ideal object, that is, the part parental object which did not fail. 
The intolerable aspect is split into two components, one that tantalises (the libidinal 
ego) and the other that frustrates (the antilibidinal ego (originally named the 
intemal saboteur), both of which are repressed into the unconscious. The libidinal 
ego is concemed with unbearable neediness and is filled with hope, intolerable
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longing and the promise of gratification. It is attached to the split part object termed 
‘the exciting object’ that is associated with remembered potentially rewarding 
events. In contrast, the antilibidinal ego is contemptuous of neediness. It is attached 
to the split part object termed ‘the rejecting object’ and is associated with thousands 
of remembered rejecting events. The size of each of the subegos are based on the 
actual interpersonal events that occurred between the child and the object.
The endopsychic structure becomes a constraining entity which shapes all further 
extemal relationships. Fairbaim (1944) proposes that the stmctural foundation of 
our subsidiary selves leads to the seeking out of relationships that are consistent 
with early experiences, acting as a template for a repetition compulsion in 
adulthood. Figure 1 illustrates the original splitting of the ego which results in a 
series of complex intemal relationships.
Pcs.
OB
Ucs.
LE
EÔRO
Këÿ:
CE: Central ego; IS: Internal saboteur; LE; Libidinal ego; RO; Rejecting object; EG: Exciting object; 
Cs;: Conscious; Pcs.: Preconscious; Ucs : Unconscious
Figure 1. Fairbaim’s endopsychic stmcture (1952, p 105).
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This tripartite model of inner dynamics provides the therapist with an outline that 
has significant clinical applications for working with borderline clients. It is a 
framework with which to explain relationships that the client has with the intemal 
sense of self but also extemally with the parental objects and with the therapist.
Fairbaim’s contributions to understanding the borderline
Fairbaim’s (1952) object relations theory of the personality and his writings on the 
endopsychic stmcture (1944) have provided me with a framework with which to 
understand Dawn’s developmental deficits as well as her potential for growth. My 
formulation with regard to Dawn’s object relationships has been shared with her as 
part of the therapeutic process.
Dawn’s sense of purpose in life has become focused solely on winning the love of 
the people who have hurt her endlessly. Dawn has had three sets of “rejecters” 
throughout her life: her biological parents, who abandoned her; her adoptive 
parents, who abused her, and her own children, who manipulate her. All three sets 
of rejecters continue to have an almost magical grip over her. Although Dawn has 
been constantly rejected by these parental and displaced parental objects (her 
children), she frequently attempts to retum to them in a bid to win their love. This 
self-destmctive pattem appears to be at the heart of her problems. Dawn appears 
caught in a developmental time warp, lost and reaching out to be saved by her 
frustrating-rejecting parental and displaced parental objects, in fear of complete 
annihilation.
Through the stmctural defence of splitting. Dawn has divided her parental and 
displaced parental objects into frustrating and rejecting part objects and intemalised 
these into her two subegos (libidinal and antilibidinal respectively) located within 
her unconscious (see Figure 1). By intemalising her parental objects Dawn is able 
to own them. Dawn’s splitting of her objects and ego stmcture is so extreme that 
her central ego seems almost extinct. Her libidinal ego also seems to have no 
memory of being rejected at all, instead it consists only of memories of when her 
parental objects and displaced parental objects indulged her and promised to love 
her if she behaved in a certain way. This part of Dawn’s self leads her into making 
decisions in relation to her objects that have little relation to reality or her own
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interests and she becomes consumed by the fantasy that her extemal objects will at 
last gratify her needs.
In contrast, Dawn’s antilibidinal ego has developed full of anger and desire for 
revenge against her rejecting part objects. This appears to have grown with every 
rejection that she has encountered. This stmcture also feels the need to attack the 
libidinal ego in an effort to destroy hope of gratification. Dawn has described this 
conflict inside herself as an “intemal war” that is observed through excessive 
drinking and self- harm by cutting. Paradoxically however, this self-destmctive 
behaviour, while fending off Dawn’s neediness, also makes her more dependent on 
her children who tend to take more care of her.
According to Fairbaim (1952), positive mental health can be reclaimed by the 
integration of the two repressed subegos. This is achieved, in part, by helping 
clients give up their attachments to the bad objects which have power over them, as 
well as by introducing a good objects (the therapist) which allows the central ego to 
grow. The therapeutic relationship between Dawn and it has been the essential 
therapeutic factor in our work to date
The importance o f establishing a therapeutic relationship
According to classical psychoanalysts, it is technique that makes psychoanalysis 
effective (Ogden, 1994). The analytic setting provides the client with a blank 
screen on to which to project their unconscious conflicts. The analyst then 
interprets the transference related to the client’s childhood relationships with 
significant others. The therapeutic relationship is not in itself viewed as important 
and often remains neutral in order for projections to be shown clearly (Ogden 
1994). Fairbaim’s (1952) view of the primacy of the therapeutic relationship in 
effect challenges classical technique. Fairbaim proposes that the most important 
factor in helping the client to repair ego splits and reintegrate the personality is not 
the transference relationship but instead is the real relationship with the analyst. 
According to Fairbaim, therapy involves the freeing of the client from their 
attachment styles and the development of a good object relationship with the 
analyst.
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The relationship between Dawn and I acts to reduce the splits in her ego structure 
by reducing her dependency on parental objects. The therapeutic hold (Winnicott, 
1968) has the effect of loosening Dawn’s part egos, freeing them up to integrate. 
The relationship allows for the integration of the extemal parental part objects 
(exciting and rejecting) to produce a single constant object.
Throughout our work I have encouraged Dawn not to hide from reality and split off 
her experiences of her objects. The rage stored in the antilibidinal ego has been 
expressed in the therapy room without affecting our relationship. Similarly, Dawn 
has come to recognise that she does not have to rely on her fantasy dominated 
libidinal ego since she has access to a good object in reality. However, therapeutic 
efforts have been met with strong resistances. The level and intensity of Dawn’s 
attachment to her frustrating-exciting objects has throughout our work been 
excessive. It remains my task as the good therapist to become intemalized by 
Dawn, allowing her to sever ties with her bad objects.
Working with the client’s internal world
In the initial stages of my work with Dawn, it was necessary for me to form a bond 
with the part of her that was aware of her parental abandonments, namely her 
antilibidinal ego. This alliance developed mainly due to exposure of this side of 
Dawn repeatedly in early sessions. Her feeling of anger towards her objects was so 
great that at the start of sessions she would launch into a rage about the damage 
done to her.
In forming an alliance with Dawn’s antilibidinal ego, it was possible to contain all 
goodness inside the consulting room and project all badness outside of the client 
therapist dyad. By collecting information about the faulty parenting Dawn 
experienced, this allowed me to reflect just how frustrating and rejecting her 
objects really were. By recognising that she had suffered abuse and maltreatment in 
the past Dawn was slowly able to challenge her views of her objects.
However this challenge was met with a moral defence (Fairbarin, 1944), stemming 
from an intense fear of abandonment and intemal disequilibrium. Dawn 
subsequently did not attend 4 scheduled sessions in succession. Upon Dawn’s
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return to therapy, her unrealistic and fantasy filled libidinal ego was shown to me 
explicitly through the heaping of praise and admiration upon her children. I now 
found it necessary to shift my position as therapist, to ally myself with Dawn’s 
libidinal ego in order to maintain a relationship with her. I came to experience 
working with Dawn as almost a balancing act between uncovering memories of 
object failures within her antilibidinal ego and staying in contact with the libidinal 
ego to ensure she did not to experience attachment panic and flee therapy; all the 
time remaining mindful that neither of these subego’s have a true grasp of reality.
In an effort to confront Dawn’s moral defence, I repeatedly reflected back how she 
appears to have taken “badness” into herself from others. This was intended to 
enable Dawn to eventually come to locate the “badness” in the original object and 
not herself. Dawn however continued to reiterate how she was responsible for the 
abuse that she had suffered. Dawn would regularly defend her parents and blame 
herself for the maltreatment experienced at the hands of her own children. Dawn’s 
internalisation of the badness of her parental and displaced parental objects results 
in her sabotaging herself while transforming them into good objects.
In working with Dawn’s inner world I have remained the “good object therapist”, I 
have been calm and reliable and I have contained her uncontrolled emotions. By 
constantly locating Dawn’s sense of badness away from her ego structure and 
toward her parental objects this continues to act as a healing effect on intemal 
splitting. Ultimately the stmctural goal of the therapy is to heal the rift between 
Dawn’s two subegos, and two part object representations whilst promoting their 
integration.
Working with the client’s external world
The behaviour of Dawn’s children (her displaced parental objects) towards her 
reinforces her own belief that she is essentially bad. Dawn is constantly blamed for 
all that goes wrong in the family and is often attacked with accusations of being a 
bad mother. Her children also often withdraw contact with her grandchildren, 
leaving her feeling rejected and abandoned. Subsequently, Dawn frequently 
becomes overwhelmed by her children’s actions and attempts to defend herself by 
either verbally retaliating or punishing herself in self-harming behaviour. Her
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actions are often a failed enterprise as the retaliation and punishment becomes 
evidence of her own badness and her children’s goodness.
In an attempt to strengthen Dawn’s ability to separate from her dependent 
relationship with her displaced parental objects we have focused on developing 
interpersonal tactics. This has involved teaching Dawn not to respond to the attacks 
from her children and instead to contain her responses. Educating Dawn on the 
motivations for her children’s behaviour and the manner in which they keep her in 
a dependent and unstable position has been of helpful to her.
As a consequence of these techniques, Dawn has begun to re-experience her 
displaced parental objects differently observing how predictable their attacks can 
be. Dawn is now improving the way in which she manages her relationships with 
her children. We have begun to explore the cost in desperately needing to hold onto 
her displaced parental objects for a display of unconditional love. The goal in 
working with Dawn’s extemal world is to enable her to recognise her assumed 
badness has come, not from her being faulty, but as a consequence of fighting for 
her psychological life with her parental objects and displaced parental objects.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of psychodynamic psychotherapy hinges on the ability to 
communicate (Casement, 2006). Fairbaim’s concept of the mind as an inner world, 
in which split off and repressed parts of the self enter into an object relationship 
with one another, provides the analyst with an incredibly rich understanding in 
communicating with the borderline client. Fairbaim’s revision of classical theory 
also places psychopathology firmly within a developmental context and promotes 
the therapeutic relationship as the principle factor for psychological change. 
Fairbaim argues that the analytic relationship is the only possible exit from the 
solipsistic world of intemal object relationships found in the client. It is hoped that 
mental health professionals from different approaches will tum to Fairbaim’s 
theories when working with clients with a diagnosis of BPD and come to recognise 
the primary need for building a therapeutic relationship with them.
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Moving Beyond the Myths of Coping With Loss: An Existential- 
Phenomenological Approach to Working With Grief
Within the bereavement literature there have been sustained efforts to depict the 
human experience of grief as a healthy reaction to loss (Stroebe, Stroebe & Hanson, 
1993). Grief reactions have systematically been characterised as greatly 
heterogeneous and idiosyncratic in terms of intensity, duration and adaptation. 
Concurrently, many theorists have attempted to make categorical distinctions 
between normal and complicated grief (e.g. Bowlby 1980, Wordon, 1982) and have 
called for the latter to be considered a separate psychopathological diagnostic 
entity. As a result of the discord in these two potentially opposing views, Breen and 
O’Conner (2007) propose that three tensions arise for therapists when working with 
bereaved clients. The first tension is whether grief needs to be pathologised. The 
second tension is to what extent classic grief theories and the understandings of 
grief that arise firom them can be applied to all grief experiences. The third tension 
is what intervention should be considered when working with the bereaved. The 
aim of this essay is to address these tensions, demonstrating how the adoption of an 
existential-phenomenological approach to grief by counselling psychologists might 
be effective in understanding a client’s lived experience. Before discussing each 
tension in tum, the essay first examines the phenomenology of grief and the myths 
that have arisen within dominant grief discourse influencing the tensions. The essay 
then discusses the tension of whether grief should ever be medicalised, outlining 
the proposals for including prolonged grief within the forthcoming Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual fo r  Mental Disorders (DSM) Vol. 5, and highlighting difficulties 
with this from an existential perspective. The essay then considers the tension of 
applying stage models arguing why, fi*om an existential perspective, grief should be 
perceived as an idiosyncratic experience. Next, the essay explores the tension of 
what intervention to apply, proposing that van Deurzen’s (1997) four existential 
dimensions should be considered as central in any approach to grief. The essay 
concludes by advancing how an existential-phenomenological approach to working 
with the bereaved may have positive therapeutic implications.
The phenomenology ofgrief and the myths o f coping with loss
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The nature of grief has been considered extensively through the ages by novelists 
(Lewis, 1961), dramatists (Shakespeare, 1967), philosophers (Heidegger, 1927), 
theologians (Garrett, 2008) and more recently by behavioural scientists (see 
Stroebe 2008 for a review). The fact that so much has been written about grief from 
so many perspectives is testament to the level of interest that people have in 
understanding this complex universal phenomenon. Grief varies widely in its 
manifestations and includes physical, cognitive, social and spiritual disturbances. 
The intensity of these manifestations varies between individuals, across cultures 
and within the same individual over time. The grieving process cannot be 
understood from a static or linear perspective and a full appreciation requires 
attention to its diverse multidimensional perspectives. Schuctner and Zisock (1993) 
propose that “grief is such an individualised process, that attempts to limit its scope 
or demarcate its boundaries by arbitrarily defining it are bound to fail” (p.23).
Despite the fact that grief is widely perceived as a unique experience, Wortman and 
Silver (1989) identify five reductionist assumptions about the grieving process that 
have become firmly entrenched within western culture, influencing 
psychotherapeutic interventions. The first assumption is that bereaved individuals 
are expected to exhibit significant distress following a major loss, and that failure 
to experience such distress tends to be seen as indicative of a problem. The second 
assumption is that positive emotions are implicitly assumed to be absent during the 
grieving period and if they are expressed, they tend to be viewed as an indication 
that people are denying or covering up their distress. The third assumption is that 
following the loss of a loved one, the bereaved must confront and ‘work through’ 
their feelings about the loss. Efforts to avoid or deny feelings are maladaptive in the 
long run. The fourth assumption is that it is important for the bereaved to break 
down their attachment to the deceased loved one. The final assumption is that 
within a year or two, the bereaved will be able to come to terms with what has 
happened, recover from the loss, and resume their earlier level of functioning.
In their assessment of these assumptions, Wortman and Silver (1993) suggest that 
there is little support for their validity and reliability and label them the “myths of 
coping with loss” (p 405). Research suggests that these assumptions continue to be 
drawn upon by grief researchers, service providers, the media and laypeople
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(Bonanno, 2010). Despite rigorous empirical and conceptual challenges, these 
strong cultural norms have remained pervasive and resistant to change.
What many of these assumptions neglect, is that reflection on life following the 
death of a loved one frequently takes the form of reflection on human existence, in 
particular on human existence as limited and contingent. From an existential 
perspective, death illuminates the concrete existence of the individual. 
Philosophical reflections of death lead to an examination of being and the meaning 
of it. In Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), death is always present at the core of 
human existence; it is what makes existence the clearing in which things appear. 
The existential approach to psychotherapy seeks to understand the unique meaning 
of a clients lived experience. Such understandings do not depend on abstract 
theorizing or diagnostic conceptualisations forming assumptions, but instead on the 
exploration of a client’s implicit understanding of their own experience. According 
to van Deurzen (1997) existential therapy does not seek to cure or explain; it 
merely seeks to understand the human predicament.
Tension 1: Should grief be pathologised?
The concept of complicated or pathological grief has gained momentum in the 
literature over the past two decades with two distinct groups of researchers -  
Horowitz and his colleagues (Horowitz et al., 1997) and Prigerson and her 
colleagues (Prigerson et al, 2009) calling for its inclusion as a separate diagnostic 
entity within the forthcoming DSM V. Both Horowitz et al., (1997) and Prigerson 
et al., (2009) propose that prolonged grief disorder is an appropriate diagnosis for 
between 10 -15% of bereaved individuals who develop severe long term reactions 
to loss. According to Prigerson et al., (2009), diagnostic criteria include the 
experience of yearning and at least 5 of 9 symptoms experienced at least daily or to 
a disturbing degree.
There is now rigorous debate within the literature as to whether we need a separate, 
multifaceted taxonomy of grief reactions. From an existential perspective there is 
reason to oppose the tendency to pathologise grief. The loss of a loved one is an 
event that belongs to the normal spectrum of human life, and as such it should not 
be considered a disease. For professionals to diagnose any form of grief as a
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psychiatrie disorder verges on stigmatising and medicalising a normal, if difficult, 
bereavement experience. Rather than heing an intemal reality, the médicalisation of 
grief becomes an extemally imposed social role with cultural and historical origins 
(Jacobson, 2006).
The conceptualisation of grief as a disorder supports a predominantly extemal view 
of disfunction, even if subjective experience is considered. It tells a therapist very 
little about a client’s unique way of being (Wong, 2007). There is also potential 
once a label has been attached for therapists to reduce their openness and 
sensitivity, to question a client’s potential and to neglect the holistic view of the 
person (Waldo & Bauman, 1998). From an existential perspective it is neither the 
circumstances of the bereavement nor the symptoms that matter, it is the clients 
inner reception of the experience and their ability to reflect and act on it that are of 
importance.
Tension 2: Can classic grief theories he applied to all grief reactions?
Freud (1917) proposes, in his seminal paper Mourning and Melancholia, that grief 
is a process which has to be ‘worked through’ with the possibility of recovery 
coming only as a result of adaptation and accommodation. This view of the 
grieving process has dominated the bereavement literature over the past century 
and has provided the foundation from which to build a number of frameworks for 
comprehending grief and loss from a stage/phase model perspective (Bowlby 1961, 
Bowlby & Parkes, 1970, Horowitz, 1976, Kiibler-Ross, 1969, Lindemann, 1944, 
Parkes, 1972, Ramsay & Happee, 1977 & Sanders, 1989). The most widely quoted 
of these stage/phase models are those of Bowlby (1961) and Kübler-Ross (1969).
Bowlby’s (1960) phase account was originally based on an analogy with young 
children’s reactions to separation and was later extended upon in order to 
conceptualise grief as a reaction to a dismption of an attachment bond between an 
adult and their loved ones. Initially three stages were suggested: protest, despair, 
and detachment, with numbness and disbelief being added later to form four phases 
of grief (Bowlby and Parkes, 1970).
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A similar systematic account of grief is proposed by Kübler-Ross (1969) in her 
seminal book On Death and Dying. Kübler-Ross suggests five distinct stages: 
denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression and finally acceptance. Any 
person who is bereaved, facing his or her own death, or dealing with loss should 
move through these stages, sequentially working through the struggles inherent in 
each stage. According to Kübler-Ross, a person could get stuck at one of these 
stages, impeding their movement to the next stage and thus obstructing resolution 
of their grieving process.
Both Bowlby and Kübler-Ross’s understandings of bereavement assume that grief 
is based upon a predictable template that can be observed by mental health 
professionals. However, detailed follow up studies indicate that there is little 
support for the view that there are systematic stages to grieving (Bonnano, 1998, 
Bonnano & Kaltman, 1999). With the possible exception of the initial grief reaction 
of shock and disbelief, the process of change through time appears much more of a 
mixture of reactions that wax and wane in relation to outside events that may be 
delayed, prolonged or exaggerated. However stage models of grief continue to be 
uncritically drawn upon and applied by service providers (Rando, 1993). Such 
theories neglect the idiographic, dynamic and choice-filled qualities of grieving and 
reinforce the idea that the grieving individual is helpless in responding to 
bereavement (Neimeyer, 2000, 2001), restricting the ability to find meaning in 
interpersonal loss (Attig, 1996, 2000). There is subsequently a need for counselling 
psychologists to address the shortcomings of applying stage models when working 
with the bereaved and to gather empirical evidence as to how existential therapy 
may allow clients to make sense of their grief experience.
Tension 3: What intervention should be applied when working with the bereaved?
The results of several meta-analytic studies of bereavement interventions lead to 
questions about the effectiveness of grief therapy (Allumbaugh and Hoyt, 1999 
Kato & Mann, 1999, Neimeyer, 2000, Schut, Stroebe, Van den Bout & 
Temheggen). In contrast to the generally robust effect sizes observed for 
psychotherapeutic outcomes, grief therapies have been consistently found to 
produce only small and inconsequential effects. Alarmingly Niemeyer (2000)
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found that 38% of individuals receiving grief therapy grew worse relative to no 
treatment controls. So why have grief therapies been so ineffective?
One explanation is the assumption that ‘one size fits all’ in terms of the type of 
interventions required by mourners. Although some interventions may be 
customised to the extent that they target specific kinship losses (e.g. the death of a 
child) or cause of death (e.g. natural disasters), it is rare that the content or the 
process of an intervention is tailored to address the specific issues faced by the 
individual client.
van Deurzen (1997) proposes that the way a person is in the world at any particular 
time can be charted on a general map of human existence encompassing four 
dimensional fields of force namely physical, personal, social and spiritual. All of 
these dimensions have their own paradoxes and tensions that together encompass 
the major aspects of human experience. These interrelating dimensions remind the 
therapists of the simultaneous multidimensionality of existence and provide a 
framework for recognising the aspects of existence that clients talk about and 
perhaps more importantly the aspect they do not talk about.
Unlike stage models of grief, the four existential dimensions allow the therapist to 
facilitate the client’s journey through grief and encourage expansion into new 
territory rather than restricting or limiting them to certain qualities and 
characteristics that confine them to set positions (van Deurzen, 1997). Each of 
these dimensions will be considered in tum to examine how they offer 
understanding, aiding intervention with the bereaved.
Physical dimension
An exploration of a client’s relationship to the stmcture of their natural world and 
their physical body is a cmcial step in the full understanding of their way of being 
(van Deurzen, 1997). Merleau-Ponty (1968) calls our attention to the way our body 
is dynamically interconnected with our natural world, proposing that the flesh of 
the world and the individual’s flesh are enveloped in reversal double belongings. 
According to Ponty (1968), the body is a site full of implicit meaning and relational 
understandings and not merely a functional machine that elicits an appropriate
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reaction to an environmental stimulus. Embodiment is for him an essential element 
of human existence.
The death of a loved one fundamentally concerns the absence of presence, and the 
loss of the living embodied other. The bereaved person not only metaphorically, 
but literally has lost a part of their natural world (Bollnow, 1966). The loss of an 
embodied connection may be attested by the raised mortality rates and somatic 
disorders among the bereaved affecting the immune system, stress hormones and 
sleep. Physiological functioning of the body is also altered following loss and what 
is striking when considering embodied relationally is that physical pain is 
commonly felt in quite specific parts of the body notably the heart and the chest 
(Hirsch, Hofer, Holland, & Solomon, 1984).
Social dimension
We need others for our physical and emotional survival and when a loved one dies 
we miss them and feel lonely without them. The assumption within dominant grief 
discourse that the bereaved should break down their attachment with the deceased 
has been challenged by Klass, Siverman and Nikman (1996) who argue for the 
importance of maintaining an ongoing connection. In their work Continuing Bonds 
(1996), the authors propose that the prevailing model of bereavement emphasises 
our separateness from each other, putting a positive value on autonomy and 
individuation while devaluing interdependence. Klass, Silverman & Nikman (1996) 
do not view bereavement or grieving as ever fully resolved, culminating in closure 
or recovery. They believe it involves negotiating and renegotiating the meaning of 
the loss over time allowing the deceased to remain a transformed but ongoing 
presence in the lives of the bereaved.
Sociologist Tony Walter (1996) suggests that grief should not be considered a 
process carried out in private, but rather a social process where survivors are able to 
talk to others about the deceased. In his article A New Model o f Grief (1996) he also 
points out that bereavement should be considered a never-ending and reflective 
conversation with self and others through which the individual tries to make sense 
of their existence. According to Walter (1996) the work for the bereaved person in 
therapy is therefore to weave the loss into their altered life, both personal and
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social. His model emphasises the significance of cultural differences in mourning 
and the need for therapists to be both aware and respectful of cultural diversity. 
Psychotherapy can help the bereaved to share their personal story and reflect upon 
their families, friends and communities.
Personal dimension
Following the death of a loved one, the bereaved individual faces an existential 
crisis, losing part of their own life and hence part of themselves. The loss of a 
relationship results in the loss of part of the self-concept and a loss of identity 
attached to the other person. Boss (1994) claims that in grief a humans existence is 
‘ruptured and broken in a certain sense’ (p. 114). A reconstruction of identity 
subsequently ensues within the context of therapy.
Niemeyer (2001) suggests that like a novel that loses a central character in the 
middle chapters, life stories disrupted by loss must also be rewritten, to find a new 
strand of continuity that bridges the past with the future in an intelligible fashion. 
The therapeutic relationship can provide a safe context in which to tell personal 
stories and struggle with the meaning of loss and its significance. Ultimately by 
assimilating the multiple personal meanings of loss into an overarching story of life 
clients may foster fresh perspectives on their loss.
Spiritual dimension
Evidence suggests that where we find meaning in the experience of loss we are 
more likely to experience positive adaptation (Bonanno, 2010). Yalom (1980) 
proposes that although bereavement can cause a rip in the fabric of our assumed 
world it can also lead us towards existential opportunities. Yalom (1980) argues 
that death awareness leads to a questioning of self-concept and an examination of a 
personal value system. According to Yalom (1980) a growing sense of self- 
awareness results from an increasing awareness of the ‘wound of mortality’. 
Jacobson (2006) also proposes that bereavement can become a personal tuming 
point and a new life opportunity that can initiate intensive self-reflection.
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Conclusion: Therapeutic implications o f an existential-phenomenological
approach to grief
From an existential-phenomenological perspective, grief should not be 
pathologised nor conceptualised as a series of stages. People react differently to 
loss and there is no single trajectory which plots a linear path of grief. To date, 
grief therapy has been heavily imbued with a medical ‘treatment’ approach and 
many practitioners consider themselves as experts in tracking the progress of the 
‘grief process’, alleviating and curing a client’s distress. The existential therapist 
gives up the pretence of knowing in advance about the client’s experience and does 
not predict appropriate outcomes for clients. It is not the function of the existential 
therapist to normalise clients’ situations against social standards.
A core theme within existentialism and the related field of phenomenology is 
concern for the uniqueness and irreducibility of human experience. There is 
subsequently little interest in the counselling psychologist generalizing across 
individuals for universally valid laws of behaviour. The quality of the therapeutic 
relationship and the consideration of the four dimensions of human existence are 
therefore of paramount importance in helping clients adequately explore and deal 
with core existential issues related to bereavement.
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Introduction to the Therapeutic Practice Dossier
The Therapeutic Practice Dossier relates to clinical practice and contains a brief 
description of the placements undertaken during training. It also contains a final 
clinical paper’ which gives an account of my therapeutic approach to practice and 
my development as a counselling psychologist.
Names and any other identifying information relating to clients’ placement 
locations and placement supervisors have been altered or omitted to preserve 
confidentiality.
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Placement I (a): Independent Counselling Charity
This placement was in a counselling charity which received referrals from 
professionals working in community mental health teams, general practitioners and 
psychotherapists working in primary care services. The charity employed fifteen 
accredited and in-training counsellors, psychotherapists and psychologists all 
working from a person-centred approach. Both short-term and long-term 
counselling was offered by the organisation and clients could be seen within one or 
two weeks from their assessment date. As a result, I had the benefit of working 
with some clients with complex needs over a 44-week period. The client group that 
I saw was varied with presenting issues including anxiety, depression, personality 
disorders, underlying psychosis and unresolved trauma. Weekly meetings, 
presentations and away-days provided continuing professional development. I also 
undertook an audit of the service, presenting information and statistics to potential 
fimders and co-wrote a 6 week group therapy course for anxiety and depression. 
Weekly supervision was provided by a chartered clinical psychologist.
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Placement I (b): Private Psychological Practice
This placement was in a private psychological practice that specialised in medico­
legal assessment, expert witness and treatment services including child protection, 
care proceedings and private law cases. The psychological practice also offered 
private psychotherapeutic services for adults and children employing an open 
referral policy. The practice was owned and managed by a chartered clinical 
psychologist with over 30 years experience who supervised me throughout the 
year. A child clinical psychologist, psychotherapist and psychiatrist were employed 
by the practice on a part time basis. I had the opportunity to observe court 
proceedings, multidisciplinary team meetings and family therapy. I also conducted 
individual and family assessments and psychometric testing using the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS IV). I gained experience in writing reports for the 
courts and liaised with solicitors, social workers and foster careers on a regular 
basis. My therapeutic work at the practice was time limited as I saw clients for up 
to 12 sessions. Presenting problems included trauma, depression and bulimia 
nervosa. My positive experiences during this placement have resulted in me 
wanting to pursue expert witness training in the future.
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Placement II: NHS Secondary Care Psychological Service
This placement was in a secondary care psychological service, part of a community 
mental health team. This service employed a range of mental health professionals 
including chartered clinical psychologists, chartered counseling psychologists, 
psychotherapists and counsellors. Clients referred to the service had previously 
been clustered by the community mental health teams access team into care clusters 
4, 8 and 12 for complex mood and anxiety conditions, complex personality 
disorders and early intervention psychosis, respectively. Assessments by the service 
were subsequently conducted to ascertain clients’ suitability for long term 
psychotherapy. Therapeutic contracts were typically offered in access of 30 weeks. 
The service typically provided psychodynamic psychotherapy for individuals and 
groups including art therapy. I conducted psychological assessments and provided 
individual psychodynamic psychotherapy under the supervision of the principle 
psychodynamic psychotherapist. I was required to write care plans and discharge 
reports for general practitioners and liaise with other healthcare professionals. 
Weekly meetings, presentations and seminars provided continuing professional 
development and time was devoted to single case discussion.
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Placement III (a): Private Psychological Practice
This placement saw me return to the private psychological practice that I had 
previously worked in during my first year of training. The practice had grown 
significantly and now employed a number of psychologists, psychotherapists and 
psychiatrists. This placement provided me with further opportunities to leam about 
medico-legal work as a psychologist and I gained experience in family assessments 
for child care proceedings, assessments for custody and access disputes and 
cognitive and psychometric assessments of adults and children. My therapeutic 
work was supervised by a chartered clinical psychologist and I was encouraged to 
work from a third wave approach to cognitive behavioural therapy incorporating 
schema therapy, acceptance and commitment therapy and compassion-focused 
therapy into my practice. Referrals were received by the local community mental 
health team, general practitioners and solicitors. Clients presented with a range of 
psychological and management issues and many had complex needs. Throughout 
the year I developed and ran a program of career professional development 
workshops for mental health professionals and assisted in marketing the services of 
the psychological practice locally.
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Placement III (b): NHS Secondary Care Psychological Service
This placement was in a secondary care psychological service which was part of a 
community mental health team. The service was headed by a consultant clinical 
psychologist and was staffed mainly by part time psychotherapists and trainees. 
Clients were referred by general practitioners and the service provided a number of 
different interventions including: individual psychotherapy, couples therapy, sexual 
therapy and group psychotherapy. The client group was a varied one and a wide 
range of problems were referred to the service including anxiety and depression 
and histories of trauma and abuse. Clients were either offered short-term cognitive 
behavioural therapy or long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy depending on 
their needs. I, together with three other practitioners, formed the cognitive 
behavioural team for the service. I saw clients on a short-term individual basis and 
was supervised by the senior cognitive behavioral psychotherapist weekly.
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Becoming a Counselling Psychologist: A Journey of Developmental Mourning
Reflecting on my experience of training as a counselling psychologist over the past 
three years I am mindful of how this journey has acted as a parallel process of my 
experiences in life. Throughout the course of my life and throughout my 
counselling psychology training I have had to adapt to significant losses 
experienced along the way, and as a result, have learnt how mourning can be a 
positive process, facilitating psychic change. So much of my own life has been 
about enduring losses, including the loss of loved ones, homeland, role, identity, 
and missed opportunity. The experiences of such losses have repeatedly challenged 
my own view of self, others, and the world around me. Loss, for me, has been 
natural, unavoidable and inexorable, and as I have grown and developed I have 
given up, changed and transformed parts of myself as well as deep attachments to 
others.
The theme of loss has also been present in my therapeutic work. I have frequently 
seen individuals experiencing emotional distress because they can no longer live 
under the illusion that things can remain constant and unchanging in their lives, and 
this realisation often occurs as a result of them experiencing significant loss in life. 
I have come to recognise how those of us who are able to mourn loss can continue 
to grow. While those of us who are unable to mourn loss can often become stuck in 
childhood enactments that sabotage and arrest life.
I now view mourning as a lifelong developmental journey of connecting, 
internalising and letting go that provides the key experiential factor necessary for 
growth and true psychic transformation. The paradox of mourning is that loss 
actually becomes a gain. My own personal experience of mourning has become a 
road towards self-integration, a state which has spurred creativity, connectiveness 
with others and a greater awareness of my internal life.
Looking back, embarking on my journey to become a counselling psychologist 
appears to have come from an unconscious drive to use my skill and knowledge of 
relating to those experiencing arrested development and psychic pain. Throughout 
my adult life I had personally experienced particularly painful periods of emotional 
distress, which came at times of key developmental stages. My inability to tolerate
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anxiety, felt in progressing developmentally, led me to regress in an attempt to 
repair problems experienced in the early ego state of seeking recognition from my 
primary other. Psychology provided an explanation for what were at times were 
very confusing and debilitating moments in my life, and I wanted to explore 
counselling psychology due to its emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and the 
promotion of psychic health. Melanie Klein’s (1940) model of infantile self­
protection -  denying feelings of fear and anxiety, and the defense of splitting whole 
into parts became heavily influential, and enabled me to make sense of how I 
‘managed’ my own anxiety. It was only when I felt supported in analysis that I was 
able to face my fragmented ego-state and begin the process of consciously re­
living, re-experiencing and ultimately tolerating my early repressed childhood 
trauma, bringing the experience to a symbolic level of thought and allowing a 
mourning process to ensue. The following account of my journey will explore the 
process of developmental mourning as experienced by me throughout my three 
years on the course and within the context of my therapeutic work with clients. 
Using Klein’s theory of development, starting from birth and moving to the 
paranoid schizoid and depressive positions, I will illustrate my own progression 
towards becoming a counselling psychologist.
Birth into counselling psychology: new beginnings and learning to relate 
psychotherapeutically.
The start of my journey to becoming a counselling psychologist began, as it did 
with birth, with learning to relate to others. I was initially attracted to counselling 
psychology due to its humanistic underpinnings and its conceptualisation of 
humans as relational beings. Placing a central focus on the therapeutic relationship 
in the promotion of wellbeing was something that appealed to me. Clarkson (1992) 
describes the concept of ‘relationship’ as the first condition of being human. She 
states that a relationship
‘circumscribes two or more individuals and creates a bond in 
the space between them which is more than the sum o f the 
parts ' (p.294).
I believe that as human beings we are motivated by the need for relatedness, we are
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nurtured through relationships with our caregivers and our survival is inextricably 
linked to, and dependent upon, the capacity to establish and maintain emotional ties 
to others (Bowlby, 1960). It is my view that the therapeutic relationship, when 
acting as a secure base, can allow clients to explore their inner world of thoughts, 
feelings and emotions, and is central to therapeutic change. Indeed efforts to heal 
via the nature of relationships have been part of human culture for thousands of 
years (Ellenberger, 1970). The Greek physician Hippocrates suggested that the 
relationship between a physician and a patient was key to the process of healing. 
Many years of therapy-based research has also shown that the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship is one of the strongest predictors of successful outcomes in 
therapy (Horvath & Symonds, 1991). Without the establishment of a good quality 
therapeutic relationship I believe no model of therapy is likely to be received well 
or applied successfully.
Humanistic psychotherapies have traditionally understood the therapeutic 
relationship as central to the therapeutic endeavor (Gillies, 2010). According to 
Rogers (1951) the therapist’s qualities of unconditional positive regard, congruency 
and empathy provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for therapeutic change 
to occur. Training within the person-centered model in my first year of study 
allowed me to develop my skills in relating to another. I now regard Rogers’ core 
conditions to be the foundation of my therapeutic work.
With each client I have worked with to date I have endeavored to offer 
unconditional acceptance, positive regard and caring for the person that they are. 
This attitude has not been simulated and I have been able to offer it due to the 
development of acceptance for my own self that has been cultivated through the 
process of my personal analysis. I am now mindful, particularly after discussions in 
supervision, that genuine acceptance of another has to be totally unaffected by 
differences in background or belief systems. I have attempted to be congruent in all 
therapeutic encounters through my capacity to be genuine and authentic. Being 
‘real’ with another has been dependent upon the attendance to my own feelings, 
sensations and intuitions in moment-to-moment interactions. In my desire to be 
deeply and fully involved in a relationship I have learnt to follow the flow of my 
own experience and to communicate this where appropriate, expressing my own
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uniqueness as a human being. I believe that it is important that clients experience 
my essential humanity and to feel my emotional involvement with them. Being 
congruent has allowed me to be viewed as a person of real flesh and blood who is 
willing to be seen and known, and not as a clinical professional who is all knowing. 
My willingness to enter the private and perceptual worlds of my clients has also 
developed my skill of empathie understanding. By listening attentively and being 
attuned during the 50 minute hour, I have found myself often being taken on 
emotional and intellectual journeys into clients' internal worlds of memories, 
perceptions, feelings, and perspectives. While following empathically and being 
sincere, responsive, and wholly present I have acted as a reliable companion.
Working within the person-centered model has also highlighted that the criterion 
with which an individual evaluates the self (termed the locus of evaluation) is also 
of critical importance in influencing psychological heath and functioning. Rogers 
(1951) defines locus of evaluation as “the extent to which (one’s) values and 
standards depend upon the judgments and expectations of others, or are based upon 
(one’s) own experience” (p. 156). An internal locus of evaluation is reflected in 
motivation and behaviours that arise from within and are a result of the individual’s 
intrinsic directional force (i.e. their actualizing tendency). An external locus of 
evaluation is reflected in motivations and behaviours that arise from outside of the 
individual and are the result of perceived influence of other people, whether real or 
imagined.
My work with Karen, a forty four year old client who I saw for thirty-eight sessions 
as part of my first year placement at a counselling charity, was centered on helping 
her shift from an external locus of evaluation to an internal locus of evaluation. 
Karen was referred to the charity for depression and low self-esteem. She presented 
as a shy and timid person who desperately craved positive regard from her 
significant others. The abuse and neglect that she suffered as a child from both her 
parents had led to her developing an internalised sense of shame and self-criticism, 
and I was often struck by the intensity of the hostile thoughts that she had about 
herself. Karen was unable to generate feelings of warmth, or reassurance for herself 
and craved loving acceptance from others in order to feel soothed. Karen appeared 
to lead her life dependent on figuring out what others wanted from her and
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conforming to their wishes, irrespective of her own wants and needs. I found 
myself experiencing feelings of warmth and compassion towards Karen throughout 
our work together. I hoped that through our relationship, Karen would be able to 
become more reliant on her own capacity to generate warmth and compassion for 
herself. By offering Karen unconditional positive regard, congruency and empathy 
she began to open up to me and started to process the unresolved trauma and loss 
that she experienced as a child in her attachment with her caregivers. In my 
provision of a secure holding environment, Karen was able to go through a 
mourning process for the losses experienced in childhood, allowing her to 
recognize how she had become reliant on the evaluations of others for her feelings 
of acceptance and self-regard. Mourning these losses provided an avenue for Karen 
to start developing positive self-regard and she became more reliant on her internal 
locus of evaluation.
Entering the paranoid schizoid position: Developmental arrests in the capacity to 
mourn
Having developed a strong foundation of relating to others psychotherapeutically in 
my first year of study, my progression to working from a psychodynamic approach 
initially filled me with anxiety and uncertainty. Before embarking on my training in 
counselling psychology I had undertaken a number of placements both in private 
mental health hospitals and psychological practices where the dominant model of 
psychotherapy was cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). I learnt how to focus on 
clients’ conscious mental processes in the ‘here and now’, to identify symptoms 
and to use cognitive and behavioural skills effectively. My experiences led me to 
be defended against the notion that human behavior could be determined by forces 
derived from unconscious processes. CBT’s positivist epistemological stance 
initially sat well with me and I arrogantly and unrealistically held on to a belief that 
it was the panacea to rapidly alleviate mental distress. In managing my anxieties 
about working within the psychodynamic model I employed a splitting defense 
viewing CBT as “all good” and psychodynamic psychotherapy as “all bad”. 
Splitting these models of psychotherapy in such a way resulted in me initially 
identifying strongly with CBT and to perceiving psychodynamic psychotherapy as 
dangerous and persecutory. I vividly recall when asked by an academic tutor at the
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start of the second year what my views were about Freudian theory stating that I 
agreed with Hans Eysenck (1985), that Freud’s place in history should not be with 
“Copernicus and Darwin but with Hans Christian Andersen and the Brothers 
Grimm, tellers of fairy tales” (p. 208).
I am now aware, looking back, that these anxieties and defences towards the 
psychodynamic approach came from me being in the paranoid schizoid position at 
this stage in training. My relationship with a psychodynamic approach changed 
dramatically as a result of my year working in a secondary care service with clients 
experiencing long-term difficulties with mental health issues, together with 
discoveries within the context of my own analysis at that time. I was introduced to 
the theoretical world of object relations by my inspirational and supportive 
supervisor, and was encouraged to immerse myself in the writings of Klein, 
Fairbaim, Bion and Winnicott. My readings and discussions within supervision 
resulted in me coming to view ‘the self as a personal sphere which develops and 
exists within the context of relationships, and is itself made up of internal 
relationships between different aspects of the person. Working from an object 
relations stance with clients further strengthened my view that all people have 
within them an internal, often split off unconscious world of relationships that is 
different and in many ways more compelling than what is going on in their external 
world of interactions. I was now able to examine with clients, not only the quality 
of their real, external interpersonal relationships but also the nature and quality of 
their internal self and object representations.
Exploring, with clients, their object relations I was encouraged by my supervisor to 
adopt what Freud (1912) terms “free floating attention” and what Bion (1963) calls 
“the absence of memory and desire”. Adopting this way of being in the room 
allowed for me to listen to clients attentively and for them to share their thoughts 
and feelings of their inner world through free association. I began to develop an 
awareness of the language of the unconscious that Reik (1956) has termed 
“listening with the third ear” and gained confidence in interpreting client’s material 
guiding them towards increased insight into their underlying object relations.
My use of transference and countertransference aided me in being able to interpret 
clients’ often fragmented, internal world of split off, caricatured representations of
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self and other. I view transference as repetitions in the present of clients’ object 
relation patterns, based on early experiences that have been internalised in the 
psyche and become the structures that determine their experience of relationships. 
Countertransference acted as my compass, guiding me towards understanding the 
transference of clients within the context of the therapeutic relationship. Monitoring 
my own internal states of feelings, ideas, associations and fantasies also allowed 
me to make sense of my relationship with clients. Working in the transference and 
countertransference has subsequently provided me with a living example of the 
way a client copes with forbidden thoughts and feelings and has acted as an 
expression of internal object relationships, experienced externally within the 
therapeutic relationship through projective identification. With guidance in 
supervision, my interpretations took the form of linking clients’ early relational 
experiences with their experiences and/or fantasies of the therapeutic relationship 
in the room.
When working with clients diagnosed with borderline characteristics, object 
relations theory helped me to address the extreme pattern of split off, unresolved 
conflict between love and hate in their intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships. 
The writings of Ronald Fairbaim (1952) have provided me with a rich framework 
with which to understand how split off and repressed parts of the self enter into an 
object relationship with one another. Fairbaim (1952), building upon Kleinian 
theory, suggests that a child, when faced with an abusive or neglectful relationship 
with their parental objects, faces a difficult conflict, for they find themselves 
angered and fmstrated by the very figures they so desperately need. In order to 
protect themselves from negative emotional consequences related to un-met needs, 
Fairbaim (1952) proposes that the child splits good from bad experiences, 
relocating them intemally. The good aspects of the parental object become 
intemalised as the central ego and the bad aspects are further split into two 
components, one that tantalizes (the libidinal ego) and the other that frustrates (the 
antilibidinal ego), both of which are repressed into the unconscious. The libidinal 
ego is concemed with unbearable neediness and is filled with hope, intolerable 
longing and gratification from the parental object. The antilibidinal ego is 
contemptuous of neediness and is hostile and derisive toward any possible contact 
or gratification from the parental object. Fairbaim (1952) recognised that
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throughout life, the love of the libidinal ego is often in direct conflict with the hate 
of the antilibidinal ego, leading to psychic conflict. This conflict is then often 
enacted in troubled relationships in the external world with parental and displaced 
parental objects becoming split into exciting and rejecting part objects. According 
to Fairbaim (1952), positive mental health can only be reclaimed by the integration 
of the libidinal and antilibidinal ego into the central ego through the intemalization 
of a good object. Through integration a client no longer has to split off love and 
hate for their parental objects. Mouming allows clients to relinquish their 
dependency on seeking gratification from their parental objects and leads to the 
development of a more pronounced sense of separateness.
Fairbaim’s (1952) model of inner dynamics with sub egos and their associated 
objects provided me with a powerful roadmap in therapy with Dawn, a 44 year old 
mother of five, who was referred for resistant depression and borderline 
characteristics. Our work together was dominated by addressing Dawn’s split off 
intemal world and resolving conflicts she experienced in relating to her parental 
objects in her extemal world. Dawn had a history of severe neglect and abuse by 
both of her adopted parents and since a young age had engaged in self-harm 
behavior. Dawn told me that her entire sense of purpose in life had become focused 
on winning the love of her adopted parents, who appeared to manipulate, reject and 
hurt her endlessly. Fairbaim’s sub egos were easily observable within the 
consulting room when working with Dawn as she appeared to go through an 
endless series of shifts between her libidinal ego and antilibidinal ego, expressing 
both disappointment and hope in relation to her adopted parents. At times I would 
experience Dawn operating out of the antilibidinal ego as any mild frustration 
encountered in her life would provoke a torrent of rage that would tap into the 
hundreds of remembered events of frustration that she suffered at the hands of her 
adopted parents. At other times I would experience Dawn operating out of the 
libidinal ego where she would lose access to the memories of the antilibidinal ego 
and instead live in the false hope of receiving unconditional love from her adopted 
parents, often misperceiving them as filled with potential goodness.
I came to experience working with Dawn as almost a balancing act between 
uncovering her parental object failures within her antilibidinal ego and staying in
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contact with her libidinal ego to ensure that she did not experience attachment 
panic and flee from therapy. Forming an alliance with Dawn’s antilibidinal ego 
made it possible to contain all goodness inside the consulting room and project all 
badness outside of the client therapist dyad. Collecting information about the faulty 
parenting Dawn experienced allowed me to reflect with Dawn just how frustrating 
and rejecting her parental objects had been. By recognising that she had suffered 
abuse and maltreatment in the past. Dawn was slowly able to challenge her view of 
her parental objects. Dawn no longer had to split off memories of hate-filled 
behaviors that emanate from her parental objects and was no longer dependent 
upon them for her psychological life.
Aligning myself with Dawn’s libidinal ego and acting as the “good object 
therapist” allowed her to reduce her desire to return to her parental objects in the 
hope of winning over their love. This proved to be challenging, as Dawn would 
repeatedly defend her adopted parents and blame herself for the abuse and 
maltreatment she experienced. In developing an understanding of how she had 
intemalised badness into herself and relocated badness away from herself and 
towards her parental objects this further acted as a healing effect on intemal 
splitting and allowed for a mouming process to ensue.
The depressive position: The mourning process towards self-integration
Advancing into my third year of training, my rich and positive experiences of 
working within the psychodynamic approach had resulted in me developing a lesser 
need to employ the paranoid schizoid defenses of splitting, denial and projection in 
regard to my view of psychotherapeutic modalities that had previously kept 
persecutory anxiety at bay. My continued progress throughout my final year has 
been a process of working through Klein’s depressive position that has represented 
an important developmental advance for me not just in my views and practice of 
psychotherapy but also in understanding myself as a person.
Within the context of my therapeutic work, I have become aware of my personal 
transition of working from purist therapeutic approaches, to developing a more 
integrative way of working that has allowed me to grow and expand as a 
counselling psychologist. As a scientific practitioner I have developed a critical
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scrutiny of purist psychotherapeutic approaches to recognise that there is not a “one 
size fits all” approach to working with clients. This has allowed me to embrace a 
pluralistic approach to my work and I have learnt to live with the ambivalence that 
although each school of psychotherapy has a unique contribution to make, each 
school does not provide an overarching truth to elucidate everything. It therefore 
proved somewhat of a challenge to work in a secondary care service that had a 
philosophy of mental health provision entrenched in a ‘pathologising’ medical 
model promoting CBT as the treatment of choice over all others. Sitting in 
multidisciplinary meetings and having discussions within supervision in which 
CBT was advanced as the omnipotent quick fix solution to treating clients clinical 
aliments against diagnostic criteria caused me to critically examine the current CBT 
trend promoted through the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE). Whilst appreciating CBT‘s usefulness I began to question the 
epistemological underpinnings and the methodological validity of its ‘evidenced 
based ideology’ and felt suspicious of the motivation behind political and social 
institutions promoting this model of therapy as the most efficacious method of 
treatment. I felt at times deflated that within the context of my placement, CBT was 
acting as the antithesis to pluralistic practice. My previously held view that CBT 
could act a panacea to mental health difficulties changed radically. In line with 
Klein’s conceptualisation of the depressive position I developed a more mature, 
balanced recognition of CBT for its strengths and weaknesses allowing me to adopt 
my own way of working within the model that was not manualised or prescriptive 
but instead relevant to the individual experience of clients.
My approach to working within the CBT model became less about “doing to” the 
client and more about “being with” them, where the core relation values of 
empathy unconditional positive regard and congruence allowed for the 
establishment of a strong therapeutic relationship in which collaborative 
empiricism (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) was encouraged. While 
emphasising the role that thoughts and beliefs had in maintaining states of mind 
and affecting mood and behaviour, I allowed theory as well as cognitive and 
behavioural technique to float gently on a sea of core relational values in my work. 
I was adamant never to become controlling, overly technical and medicalising but 
to be active, approachable and emotionally attuned to the needs of my clients at all
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times. I recognised the importance of not fitting the CBT model to a client’s 
experience but instead employing the model to promote an open space in which 
clients were able to develop personal meaning in their lives and share knowledge 
within a collaborative relationship.
I found the theoretical concepts and framework of CBT, with its emphasis on 
assessment and case formulation, extremely valuable in the time-limited, solution- 
focussed work that I was encouraged to practice in my third year. Working with 
clients for between 10 to 21 sessions, the collaborative, straightforward and action- 
orientated style that CBT promoted became a welcome edition to my therapeutic 
tool-kit. I witnessed many clients profiting from practical CBT interventions and in 
learning CBT theory and skills, many were able to develop the capacity to become 
their own therapist.
I will never forget working with Richard who was referred for depression and low 
self-esteem and the dramatic impact that our collaborative CBT formulation had on 
him conceptualising and targeting his difficulties. Using Fennell’s (1997) CBT 
model of low self-esteem as a skeleton to flesh out Richard’s experience I was 
struck by how relieved and empowered Richard became in understanding his issues 
in an uncomplicated fashion. Richard became enthused that through a combination 
of cognitive and behavioural methods there appeared a logical way to tackle his 
underlying core beliefs, dysfunctional rules for living, and negative automatic 
thoughts that had hampered him in life for so long. Therapy with Richard turned 
out to be a highly collaborative endeavor in which we shared the responsibility for 
setting goals and agendas in sessions, both giving and receiving feedback about the 
therapeutic process and together putting CBT methods into practice in everyday life 
through the employment of homework tasks. Richard made remarkable 
breakthroughs in the 18 sessions that we worked together, relaxing his core belief 
of not being good enough, and at the end of therapy was adamant that he wished to 
maintain using techniques such as thought records and daily activity diaries in 
order to help himself in the future.
In contrast to my experiences of working with Richard in which second wave CBT 
proved to be a model of therapy that was highly effective in helping to modify 
thoughts and underlying beliefs in relieve psychological distress, I found that other
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clients had difficulty engaging with this model. The incorporation of third wave 
CBT approaches, with an emphasis on mindfulness based treatment, into my 
therapeutic repertoire proved to be highly effective in helping clients who struggled 
to modify their thoughts and beliefs to focus more on changing their relationship to 
them. By promoting acceptance strategies and teaching mindfulness meditation I 
encouraged many clients to distance themselves from their cognitive processes and 
foster acceptance of unwanted thoughts and feelings stimulating action tendencies 
to enable them to pursue their values and goals in life. Encountering and practicing 
third wave approaches such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), Schema Therapy (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003) 
and especially Compassion Focused Therapy (Gilbert, 2009) has allowed me to 
develop a flexible approach to working within the CBT model.
Midway through my final year I experienced a personal breakthrough in the context 
of my own analysis that has had a dramatic impact on my theoretical and 
therapeutic approach to practice, as I underwent my own developmental mouming 
process that proved painful but transformative. I feel it necessary to include details 
of this process within the context of this paper as the experience has resulted in me 
developing a greater depth to my work allowing me to appreciate how mouming 
can be fundamental to healing and self-integration. Uncovering with my analyst 
traumatic experiences in my childhood that had previously been split off from 
consciousness due to their overwhelming nature, I discovered my personal 
“unthought known” (Bollas, 1989) related to parental abandonment. Whilst 
continuing with my progress in training I found myself having to tolerate the grief 
and loss experienced for my loved, lost parental object, both in my intemal world 
and within extemal reality. In line with Klein’s depressive position I experienced 
considerable emotional pain and intemal tension as I became caught in a paradox 
between feeling persecuted by, while also pinning for, my lost parental object. As I 
began a process of withdrawing projections from my object in analysis I started to 
feel more separated and aware of my self. I was in effect undoing a relationship 
that had historically tied me to a phantasy of oneness with my parental object. This 
period of mouming led to a dismption to my mental equilibrium and I experienced 
what Betty Joseph (1989) has described in her paper ‘Towards the experiencing of 
psychic pain’ as a visceral indefinable pain located in the lower chest. Although I
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was experiencing emotional pain that at times proved to be debilitating I was held 
within analysis and was able to process my experience. My daily mindfulness 
meditation practice, begun in my first year of training as a result of mindfulness 
being my research topic, also aided me in managing this difficult juncture in my 
life. I was encouraged by my analyst to read papers from authors adhering to the 
Kleinian School of psychoanalysis such as Joseph (1989), Steiner (1993), Britton 
(1998), and Riesberg-Malcolm (1999) in order to further assist me during this 
period. Their work related to Klein’s depressive position provided me with a rich 
and illuminating theoretical understanding in regard to the experiential journey that 
I was undertaking. The working through of the pain and anguish related to 
mouming my primal object loss subsequently opened up a road for me towards 
self-integration. Through facing and feeling aversive affect states related to my 
traumatic loss, I began to develop more of a capacity to be creative and connect 
with others on a sustained and loving basis, something that was previously lacking 
in my life. Developing an understanding of my own wounds and navigating my 
joumey of recovery I have found myself now, at the end of training, in a better 
position to guide others through such a process while recognizing that each 
person’s joumey is unique. My own suffering has prepared me to appreciate the 
suffering of others and has facilitated a deeper empathie connection with clients. 
The wounded healer is an archetype proposed by Guggenbul-Craig (1971) that I 
now identify with strongly, particularly his notion that healing power emerges from 
the healers own woundedness.
In conclusion, the topic of mouming has pervaded my joumey to becoming a 
counselling psychologist. Working within three different psychotherapeutic models 
over the past three years, I have come to discover, day in and day out, the impact 
that loss has on clients’ lives and how mouming can be a life-giving, rebirthing, 
developmental process. I now believe that my training has enabled me to form a 
coherent theoretical practice in which the therapeutic relationship plays a central 
role in order to help me to guide others on their joumey towards transformative 
change.
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Introduction to the Research Dossier
This dossier consists of a literature review and two pieces of original research. The 
literature review examines the relationship between mindfulness and attentional 
control. The first research report is an empirical study investigating whether 
dispositional mindfulness moderates the relationship between anxiety and 
attentional control. The second research report is an empirical study investigating 
whether state mindfulness moderates the relationship between threat and attentional 
bias.
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The Relationship Between Mindfulness and Attentional Control: Implications 
for Psychotherapy and Emotional Wellbeing
Abstract
Mindfulness interventions have been shown to be efficacious, improving the 
psychological wellbeing of individuals suffering emotional distress. However, little 
is known about the processes and mechanisms of action underlying mindfulness 
interventions. A comprehensive understanding of how mindfulness provides 
salutary effect is essential in order for mental health professionals to tailor 
interventions towards an individual’s needs. One theoretical assumption is that 
mindfulness interventions may enhance attentional control, a core determinant of 
psychological wellbeing. The purpose of the current literature review is to explore 
the relationship between mindfulness and attentional control in order to address the 
question of how mindfulness-based treatments work. This review provides an 
overview of the theoretical frameworks and empirical research in regard to this 
relationship and how it may account for improvements in psychological wellbeing. 
The review also advances future directions for research to further our 
understanding as to how mindfulness may lead toward transformative change.
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Introduction
Interest in mindfulness among mental health professionals has grown since the 
beginning of the new millennium, with research on the topic increasing 
exponentially over the past decade. The number of published papers on 
mindfulness has risen from less than 200 in the year 2000 to well over 2200 at the 
time of writing. This burgeoning interest has seen researchers focusing their efforts 
upon answering the first order question: “are mindfulness based treatments 
effective?” (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin & Friedman, 2006, p. 373). Empirical findings 
from studies addressing this question suggest that mindfulness is an efficacious 
psychological intervention for a number of mental health problems (Brown, Ryan, 
& Cresswell, 2007). However, little attention has been paid within the literature to 
address the equally important question: “how do mindfulness based treatments 
work?” (Shapiro & Carlson, 2009 p. 93). An answer to this second order question 
would not only increase treatment effectiveness by refining components 
responsible for therapeutic change but it would also de-emphasize and eliminate 
components of treatment found to be non-effective (Baer, 2011).
Recently, theorists have proposed that mindfulness interventions may be effective 
in enhancing executive cognition, especially in relation to attentional control 
(Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Anderson, Segal et al 2003, Carmody, 2009). In testing 
these theoretical predictions, a small body of quantitative research has begun to 
emerge, investigating the relationship between mindfulness and specific 
subcomponents of attention. However, almost no studies to date have investigated 
the cognitive functions perceived to be controlling attentional resources. 
Attentional control concerns the ability to exert influence over the focus of 
attention, allowing one to choose between which stimuli to attend to within ones 
environment and when to attend to stimuli (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011).
The main focus of this literature review is to overview the empirical evidence from 
experiemental research regarding the theoretical assumption that attentional control 
is a central mechanism through which the benefits of mindfulness occur. This 
review examines how improvements in attention and attentional control skills are 
observed as a result of mindfulness interventions, and how mindfulness may be a 
core determinant of psychological wellbeing. This review is particularly pertinent
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to the discipline of counselling psychology as it attempts to inform both theory and 
practice as to how an individual’s experience of mindfulness may lead towards 
transformative change. Whilst clarifying experimental research grounded in 
positivist epistemology, the author appreciates the importance of tailoring effective 
therapeutic practice to individual clients with particular difficulties in specific 
contexts. The aim of this review is therefore to advance therapeutically meaningful 
research questions and aid practice innovation.
The structure of this review is as follows. Initially, to provide context, the review 
explores the term ‘mindfulness’, provides an overview of the empirical research 
supporting the effectiveness of mindfulness based treatments and presents an 
operational definition of mindfulness based on the faculty of attentional control. 
Then, an outline of the subsystems of attention and mediators of change related to 
attentional control are postulated, before discussing the cognitive theories related to 
attention and well-being and the effects of anxiety on attentional control. Next, the 
review examines the empirical evidence, published to date, concerning the 
relationship between mindfulness and attention, and comments on the limitations of 
the research investigating the relationship between mindfulness and attentional 
control. Finally the review discusses friture directions for research.
Mindfulness
Mindfulness: The capacity to direct attention
Mindfulness is widely considered to be a universal human capacity to direct 
attention to present moment experience (Baer, 2003). The construct can be 
contrasted either with states of mind in which attention is focused elsewhere on 
mental events outside of present experience such as worries, memories and 
fantasies, or with behaving automatically without awareness (Brown & Ryan, 
2003).
Mindfulness can be cultivated. Just as we are able to improve upon our physical 
fitness through exercise, so we are also able to develop mindfulness through 
intentional practice. Mindfulness is cultivated through both formal and informal 
meditative practice. Formal practice involves sustained and disciplined meditation
75
on a daily basis in order to develop mindfulness skills. Informal practice refers to 
the application of mindfulness to everyday daily life in order to develop a greater 
sense of one’s moment-to-moment experience. Both formal and informal 
mindfulness practice enable one to develop the skills of directing and sustaining 
attention.
Attention in the context of mindfulness practice involves intentionally paying 
attention to one’s moment to moment internal and external experiences as they 
unfold. Mindful attention is therefore not entangled in the past, or caught up in the 
future, instead it is harnessed within the present moment. Typically, during 
mindfulness meditation, one’s attention is maintained on a particular focus such as 
the rhythm of the breath. When attention wanders to other thoughts and feelings, 
one attempt’s to acknowledge and observe these experiences nonjudgmentally and 
then gently shift attention back to the focus of the breath. As a result of practice, 
meditators are able to learn to habitually inhibit elaborate processing of thoughts 
and feelings and cultivate greater attentional control to process information in the 
present moment
From eastern origins to western clinical practice
Mindfulness developed out of eastern spiritual traditions and is most often 
associated with the 2,600 year old tradition of Buddhism. However its 
phenomenological nature is also embedded in western philosophical, religious and 
psychological schools of thought. Mindfulness therefore is not a new phenomenon 
instead it refers to the centrality of human experience in the capacity to be 
conscious and aware in order to uproot harmful habits of mind.
The term “Mindfulness” is an English translation of the Pali word Sati, which 
connotes awareness, attention and remembering and first appeared in the English 
dictionary as far back as 1921. However, much of the momentum for the recent 
surge of interest in mindfulness stems from the work of the American physician Jon 
Kabat-Zinn, who brought it into the mainstream of modem medicine in the early 
1980’s. Kabat-Zinn (2003), has offered a generally accepted conceptualisation of 
this phenomenon as “the awareness that emerges from paying attention on purpose, 
in the present moment, and to the unfolding of experience moment by moment”
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(pp. 145 -146). Mindfulness has subsequently come to be viewed as both an 
outcome (mindful awareness) and a process (mindful practice, Shapiro & Carlson,
2009).
Recently, adaptations of traditional eastern mindfulness practice have been 
incorporated into numerous western psychological interventions including 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn 1982, 1990, 1993, 1994) 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strasahl & Wilson, 1999, Hayes & Strasshl,
2005) and Compassionate Focused Therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2005).
Mindfulness and wellbeing
For decades there has been an interest in discovering common curative factors 
uniting various schools of psychotherapy. Kabat- Zinn (2005) argues that 
mindfulness is a core perceptual process that underlies all effective therapy. 
Mindfulness provides clinicians with an answer to the common therapeutic 
question, how can I help the client be more aware and accepting of his or her 
experience in the present, moment? Mindfulness-based treatments have now 
become one of the most widely studied psychotherapeutic methods available and a 
shift has occurred within cognitive therapy away from an emphasis on challenging 
maladaptive patterns of thought, feelings and behaviour towards a more 
acceptance-based approach to experience. In the near future, mindfulness may 
prove to be a trans-theoretical construct much like the therapeutic alliance (Hick,
2010). Some authors have even gone so far as to speculate that mindfulness may 
become a model of psychotherapy within its own right (Kabat- Zinn, 2005).
Studies over the past three decades which examine the relationship between 
mindfulness-based treatments and psychological wellbeing can be divided into four 
groupings namely correlational studies, uncontrolled studies, case-controlled 
studies and Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT’s). Correlational studies have 
sought to investigate the relationship between mindfulness skills (using a measure 
of mindfulness) and wellbeing (using outcome measures). Uncontrolled studies 
have examined the differences in wellbeing among participants both pre-and post­
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mindfulness-based treatment. Case-control designs have draw inferences about the 
effects of mindfulness on the well being of experienced meditators by comparing 
them to controls matched on a number of key factors. Finally, RCT’s have 
allocated naïve meditators at random to either a mindfulness-based treatment group 
or a control group, and have compared outcomes measures of wellbeing.
Meta-analytic reviews of published and unpublished investigations employing all 
four of these study designs support the effectiveness of mindfulness-based 
treatment to enhance psychological wellbeing (Coelho, Canter & Ernest, 2007, 
Toneatto & Nguyen, 2007, Hayes, Musuda, Bissett, Luoma & Guerro, 2004, 
Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, Walach, 2004, Ost, 2008).
There is also a sufficient body of evidence to suggest that mindfulness-based 
treatments may help to alleviate a variety of mental health problems including 
relapse from major depression (Teasdale & Williams, 2000; Ma & Teasdale, 2004), 
current depression (Bamhofer, Crane, Hargus, Amarasinghe, Winder & Williams, 
2009), anxiety (Evans et al 2008), psychosis (Back & Hayes, 2002), substance 
abuse (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Bissett, Piasecki, Batten et al., 2005), eating 
disorders (Fairbum, Cooper, Shafran, 2003), trauma (Faulette, Palm & Pearson,
2006), body image problems (Stewart, 2004), borderline personality disorder 
(Linehan, 2003) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Zylowska, Ackerman, 
Yang, Futrell, Horton, Hale, Pataki & Smalley, 2008).
Experimental studies continue to examine the effects of mindfulness across diverse 
populations, adding to the growing body of literature in regard to its effectiveness. 
However, few studies examine the processes and mechanisms by which positive 
outcomes are obtained. It is now important for researchers to examine the 
psychological processes that account for the beneficial effects of mindfulness, in 
order to answer the question how do mindfulness-based treatments work?
Operationalized definitions o f mindfulness: The faculty o f attentional control
Currently, one of the most prominent issues in mindfulness research is how to 
operationally define it in a comprehensive and quantifiable way. By developing a 
consensual definition, researchers are attempting to create a more valid and reliable
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measure of mindfulness. However as mindfulness continues to be adopted into 
Western psychology and psychotherapy, its meaning has expanded to become a 
multifaceted construct. Subsequently, there is widespread disagreement within the 
literature about how to operationally define its components and processes. Despite 
these difficulties most definitions agree on two points; firstly that mindfulness 
concerns attention regulation, and secondly, that it concerns an accepting 
orientation to experience.
Bishop et al., (2004) have offered perhaps the most comprehensive operationalized 
definition of mindfulness in the literature to date, putting forward several testable 
predictions to validate the constructs specificity. The authors describe mindfulness 
as having two overarching components namely, self-regulation of attention, and the 
attitude of an open and accepting orientation towards current experience. Bishop et 
al., (2004) hypothesise that the self regulation of attention involves four specific 
skills; sustained attention, switching, inhibition and non-directed attention. 
Sustained attention refers to the skill of maintaining a state of vigilance over a 
period of time (Posner & Rothbart, 1992). Switching refers to the flexible skill of 
shifting focus from one object to another. Inhibition of elaborate processing refers 
to the skill of regulating thoughts, feelings and sensations that arise in response to a 
stimulus. Finally non-directed attention is the skill of enhancing awareness of 
present experience unfiltered by assumptions or expectations. Bishop et al., (2004), 
predict that the development of mindfulness is most directly associated with 
improvement in the skills of sustained attention and switching, and propose that 
this can be objectively measured. According to the authors, mindfulness training 
may lead to an improvement in specific cognitive abilities such as the ability to 
stabilize the contents of attention. Bishop et al’s., (2004) operational definition has 
advantages for use in clinical settings by firstly providing a parsimonious starting 
point for clinical research and secondly by employing a definition that can be 
commonly understood by clients. The definition also allows researchers to identify 
and test empirically implicated psychological processes underlying attentional 
control.
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Attention
Subsystems o f attention
Attention is a phenomenon within cognitive science that has posed major 
challenges for psychologists for over a century. Broadly defined, it refers to any 
cognitive process which results in the selection of some information over other 
information (Posner, 1988). Since the 1950’s there have been various psychological 
theories offered to explain the mechanisms of attention. Recently functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) has provided evidence to suggest that there 
are separate but collaborative attentional networks in which attention can be viewed 
as an organ system (Posner, 2005). Posner and Peterson (1990) have proposed a 
three component theory recruiting individual cognitive processes. These three 
voluntary dimensions forming their tripartite model of attention are:
1. Alerting
2. Orienting
3. Executive Attention
Alerting involves sustained attention, creating the ability to maintain a high state of 
readiness to respond to incoming stimuli. This subsystem can be phasic, meaning 
specific to a given task, where a general state of control of arousal level can be 
achieved. Imaging studies support the idea that the alerting system relies on the 
fi*ontal and parietal regions especially on the right side of the brain and has been 
linked to the neurotransmitter norepinephrine (Posner, 1994).
Orienting involves selective attention and is the capacity to select information 
among multiple sensory stimuli. The neuroanatomy of orienting seems to involve 
the superior parietal region, the temporal parietal junction and the superior parietal 
cortex and is linked to the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (Posner, 1994).
Executive attention involves supervisory attention controlling where attention is 
directed according to goals or desires. Conflict resolution among competing stimuli 
is an essential aspect of executive attentional control. Habitual responses can 
therefore be inhibited through effective executive attention providing an important
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pathway for changing maladaptive behaviour. This subsystem seems to rely on the 
anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) which is considered the ‘chief operating officer’ 
of the brain due to its ability to determine the distribution of attentional focus, as 
well as being involved in the regulation of emotional arousal (Rueda, Posner & 
Rothbart, 2005) Although there is disagreement about how much overlap and 
interaction these subsystems have with each other, there appears to be a consensus 
that these three domains function as aspects of the attentional subsystem (see 
Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Posner and Peterson’s (1990) subsystems of attention model 
Components underlying attentional control
Kane and Engle (2002) propose that the third component of Posner and Peterson’s 
(1990) model, the executive attention component, is similar to the concept of the 
central executive component of the working memory system developed by 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Kane and Engle (2002) argue that executive attention 
is a top down, executive control capacity that maintains the ability to control 
attention within working memory in an active and quickly retrievable state .The 
authors suggest that individual differences in Working Memory Capacity (WMC) 
reflect differences in the ability to control attention in the presence of internal and 
external distractions over short intervals. Despite consensus within the literature
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about the central executive’s role in controlling attention, little is known about the 
precise executive functions effecting control abilities.
Recent psychological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that the central 
executive may be made up of a collection of correlated but semi-independent 
abilities each responsible for different aspects of behaviour. Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki and Howerter (2000), using a latent variable approach, have 
advanced three basic control functions of the central executive in their tripartite 
model, namely:
1. The Inhibition Function
2. The Shifting Function
3. The Updating Function
The Inhibition function concerns one’s ability to restrict attentional resources being 
allocated to task-irrelevant stimuli. A common inhibition task is the stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) where one needs to inhibit the dominant over-learned response of 
reading to make a required naming response (the colour of a word).
The shifting function involves shifting attention between tasks or mental sets in 
order flexibly preserve the focus on the most task-relevant stimuli. This function 
involves the disengagement of irrelevant stimuli and the active engagement of 
relevant stimuli. A cognitive task in which two digit numbers are presented and 
multiplication or divisions are performed involves the shifting function (Allport & 
Wylie, 2000).
The updating function concerns the monitoring and transient storage of 
information. A representative cognitive task involving updating is the letter 
monitoring task (Morris & Jones 1990) where various letters are presented and 
participants keep a note of the most recently presented letter.
With confirmatory factor analysis, Miyake et al., (2000) found that these three 
constructs were clearly distinguishable and concluded that each component 
demonstrated a unity and diversity of executive function (see Fig 2). Support for 
Miyake et al’s., (2000) tripartite model has been found in a wealth of studies
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investigating a wide variety of populations (see Friedman, Miyake, Young, 
DeFries, Corley & Hewitt, 2008 for a review). Findings from neuropsychological 
studies (Collette, Van der Linden, Laureys, Delfiore, Degueldre, Luxen & Salmon, 
2005) also support Miyake et al’s., (2007) theory. This empirical evidence 
provides validity for the inhibition, updating and shifting functions, and highlights 
the importance of considering a number of executive functions impacting upon 
attentional control. In treating attentional control as a multidimensional construct 
researchers are able to specify the nature of executive involvement in individuals 
experiencing emotional distress. Miyake et al’s (2007) tripartite model also enables 
researchers to investigate whether psychological interventions such as mindfulness 
strengthen executive functions responsible for controlling attention.
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Fzgwrg 2. Miyake et aFs., (2000) tripartite model of executive functions
incorporated with Posner and Peterson’s (1990) subsystems of attention model.
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Attention and wellbeing
In ‘Principles of Psychology’, William James (1890) proposes that the “The faculty 
of voluntarily brining back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very 
root of judgment character and will.... An education that should improve this 
faculty would be the education par excellence.” (p 401) This often quoted statement 
reminds us that the direction and training of attention can impact upon the 
developing faculties of mind.
The extent to which we are able to cognitively control the focus of our attention has 
significant implications for psychological wellbeing (Carmody, 2009). Conversely, 
there is also a wealth of research on the association between the dysregulation of 
attention and the etiology and maintenance of emotional distress (Williams, 
Watts, Macleod, and Matthews 1997). Many cognitive models of emotional 
disorders argue that attentional biases for negative stimuli are correlated with 
elevated states of anxiety (Beck, 1979, Bower, 1981). In support of these theories, a 
number of studies over the past three decades have sought a greater understanding 
as to the association between attentional biases and emotion using a variety of 
experimental methods (see Bar Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & 
Van Ijzendoom, 2007, for a review). From these findings, several theoretical 
models have been put forward to account for the observed components of 
attentional bias (Beck & Clark 1997, Matthews & Mackintosh 1998, Mogg & 
Bradley 1998, Ohman 1996, Wells & Matthews, 1994, Williams, Watts, MacLeod 
and Matthews, 1988) resulting in a general lack of agreement about its measurable 
characteristics.
Theorists have recently proposed that training methods designed to improve aspects 
of attentional control could significantly improve wellbeing by changing attentional 
responses to threat (Tang & Posner, 2009). Empirical evidence supporting these 
theoretical predictions suggest that attentional control can be trained with frequent 
practice to target attentional biases and reduce anxiety (Amir, Weber, Beard, 
Bomyea & Taylor 2008, Reese, McNally, Najmi & Amir, 2010). Recent 
experimental research also seems to suggest that meditative interventions may be 
the optimal attention-based training method available (Walinger & Isaacowitz, 
2011).
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Attentional control theory
In order to provide a more consistent and coherent account of the affects of anxiety 
on emotional distress, recent cognitive theories have begun to explain the exact 
cognitive mechanisms that comprise and underlie attentional biases towards threat. 
According to attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo,
2007), anxiety affects cognitive performance via its adverse effects on the central 
executive component of the working memory system (Baddeley, 1986). The theory, 
a major development from the earlier processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992), assumes that anxiety impairs the efficiency (but not the 
effectiveness) of two specific attentional control fimctions of the central executive, 
namely the inhibition and shifting functions (Miyake et al., 2000). Attentional 
control theory also takes the view (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002, Yantis, 1998) that 
there exist two major attentional systems. The first of these systems is voluntary 
and goal-directed (top down control of attention), and the second is involuntary and 
stimulus-driven (bottom up control of attention). The theory argues that anxiety 
disrupts the balance between these two systems, increasing the influence of the 
stimulus-driven system over the goal-directed system, therefore reducing 
attentional control. This in turn has an effect on the efficiency of the inhibition and 
shifting functions performance on cognitive tasks. Eysenck et al. (2007) argue that 
this effect on attentional control is a direct result of anxiety increasing attentional 
resources towards threat-related stimuli, resulting in difficulties disengaging from 
it.
Recently, the antisaccade paradigm and the mixed antisaccade paradigm have been 
employed to test directly, the efficiency of attentional control, involving the 
inhibition and shifting functions respectively. Saccadic eye movement tasks 
provide a precise assessment of top down cognitive control processes that influence 
attentional allocation (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). The antisaccade task, first 
introduced by Hallett (1978), requires an observer to fixate their gaze on a fixation 
point in the centre of a display and then on presentation of a peripheral stimulus to 
shift their eyes in the opposite direction to it. This task therefore pits a stimulus 
driven influence against the goal of the observer to move their eyes in the desired 
direction (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). Correct performance on this task requires the
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observer to inhibit a reflexive saccade (eye movement). Impaired performance is 
indicated by erroneous saccades towards the abrupt stimulus. This task also 
involves a control condition, namely the prosaccade, where observers are simply 
told to look directly at the stimulus where no inhibition is required.
Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoer and Eysenck (2009) recently employed the 
antisaccade task in two experiments to investigate the inhibition of neutral and 
emotional stimuli (i.e. angry, neutral and positive faces). The two dependent 
variables across both experiments were firstly, the latency of the first correct 
saccade, which measured processing efficiency, and secondly, the percentage of 
incorrect saccades, which measured performance effectiveness. It was found that 
participants high in trait anxiety had longer correct antisaccade latencies than 
participants low in trait anxiety and that this effect was greater involving 
threatening cues than with neutral or positive cues. There was no significant 
difference between high and low anxious groups in terms of saccade latency on the 
prosaccade task and on saccade error rate within conditions across both 
experiments. These findings support the attentional control theories assumptions 
that anxiety impairs processing efficiency of the inhibition function on cognitive 
tasks, and that in the presence of threat related cues, the stimulus driven system 
prevails over the goal-directed system.
Using a cue task in which both anti- and prosaccade trials are mixed, one is able to 
examine the effect of anxiety on task switching performance. This task requires 
participants to randomly switch between anti- and prosaccade trails within mixed 
task blocks as well as performing either the antisaccade or prosaccade task 
repeatedly in single task blocks. Performance evaluation is based on comparing the 
mean first correct saccade latencies between single trials with mixed trials. When 
participants are required to switch between trials within mixed blocks, faster 
correct latency within antisaccade trails are typically observed. Furthermore, within 
mixed task blocks, participants have also been found to display faster antisacaade 
latencies as a result of switching between tasks as opposed to repeating them. This 
paradoxical improvement has become known as “switch benefits” (Nieuwenhuis, 
Broerse, Nielen & De Jong, 2004), and are thought to be due to the allocation of 
more attentional resources being invested during switch trials to accommodate for
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the changing nature of the task demands. Anxiety interferes with the allocation of 
attentional resources to implement goals relevant to the task and so irradiates the 
switch benefits typically observed for low anxious individuals (Cherkasova, 
Manoach, Intriligator, & Barton, 2002).
Ansari, Derakshan and Richards (2008), used a mixed antisaccade paradigm to test 
the prediction that anxiety impairs the functioning of the shifting function. Using 
neutral stimuli as cue, the researchers found that participants high in trait anxiety 
did not show the paradoxical improvement on saccade latency typically observed in 
low anxious individuals, but instead they demonstrated a switch cost. Low anxious 
individuals had faster antisaccade latencies within mixed trials compared to single 
trials as well as faster antisaccade latencies within switch trials compared to repeat 
trials. High trait anxious individuals showed no improvement in latency. The 
results of this study provide support for the prediction made in the attentional 
control theory that anxiety affects the efficiency of the shifting function.
These research findings begin to provide empirical support for some of the 
theoretical predictions made by attentional control theory. Eysenck et al., (2007) 
have provided a universal framework to explain the executive functions underlying 
attentional control and how anxiety is a moderating factor responsible for differing 
levels of performance on cognitive tasks (see Fig 3). Future research is required in 
order to examine other possible moderating factors that may be affecting executive 
functions. Another possible avenue of investigation is to ask whether there are 
factors such as mindfulness that may reduce the adverse effects of anxiety on 
executive functions, strengthening attentional control.
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Figure 3. Eysenck et al’s., (2007) attentional control theory incorporated with 
Miyake et al’s., (2000) tripartite model of executive functions and Posner and 
Peterson’s (1990) subsystems of attention model.
Research Examining the Effects of Mindfulness on Attention
Practices to develop facility in the use of attention are a central and common factor 
in mindfulness training. In formal practice, mindfulness comprises of bringing 
attention to awareness in the present moment (alerting), noting when distractions 
arise and letting go of those distractions (executive attention), and refocusing
attention back to the present moment experience (orienting). Recent empirical 
research employing both case-control studies and RCT’s demonstrate that all three 
attentional subsystems can be modified by mindfulness training. Research is also in 
its infancy in regard to investigating the effects of mindfulness on attentional 
control.
Alerting
In examining the effects of mindfulness on alerting (sustained attention), Valentine 
and Sweet (1999) compared the abilities of three groups (experienced participants, 
novice participants and a control group) on the Wilkins Counting Test. The 
researchers were interested in the differences among the groups to count rapidly 
presented beeps, as well as differences in identifying unexpected tones that had 
varying repetitive frequencies. As hypothesised, experienced and novice 
practitioners were more alert to beeps as a result of mindfulness practice compared 
to the control group. Experienced practitioners were also significantly better at 
detecting unexpected tones. The findings of this study suggest that mindfulness 
allows flexibility in the distribution of sustained attention allowing for a greater 
sense of awareness in the present moment.
Recently, Hodgins and Adair (2010) compared expert mindfiilness practitioners to 
a control group using the Change Blindness Flickering Task (Rensink, O’Regan & 
Clark, 1997). The researchers found that the experts were more alert to a greater 
number of flickering scenes compared to controls and that they noticed these 
changes more quickly. These findings suggest that regular meditation practice may 
be associated with more accurate efficient and flexible attentional processing. Two 
further case control designed studies (Josefsoon and Broberg, 2010 & Pagnoni and 
Cekic, 2007) that compared long term mindfulness meditators with matched 
controls, also observed significantly higher performance on tasks examining 
sustained attention among meditators.
Chambers, Lo and Allen (2008) employing the Internal Switching Task (1ST) 
found that novice participants taking part in a 10 day intensive mindfulness retreat, 
reported significant improvements in self-reported mindfulness and performance- 
based measures of sustained attention compared to a control group receiving no
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training. However McMillan, Robertson, Brock, Chorlton (2002), and Tang, Wang, 
Fan, Feng, Lu, Yu, Sui, Rothbart, Fan & Posner (2007) found no significant 
differences between mindfulness meditators and controls in their RCT studies 
measuring sustained attention. It is important to note that of these studies, one 
focused on a sample of traumatic brain injury patients (McMillian et al 2002) and 
the other tested the effects of mindfulness training in novices after a very short 
induction (Tang et al., 2007). Therefore, other confounding variables may have 
affected outcome.
Orienting
To date the only study to suggest significant improvement in orienting (selective 
attention) as a result of mindfulness comes from Jha, Krompinger and Baime 
(2007). The authors investigated how mindfulness training influences the 
functioning of all three attentional subsystems (alerting, orienting and executive 
attention) by employing the Attention Network Test (ANT, Fan, McCandiss, 
Fosella, Flombaum & Posner, 2005).
Attentional efficiency was assessed before and after an eight week MBSR 
mindfulness training course for novice participants, a one month mindfulness 
retreat for experienced participants and an eight week no training control group. 
Results showed that the MBSR group significantly improved their selective 
attention performance compared to the control group after training. The 
experienced mediators also showed significant improvements in selective attention 
compared to controls. Results from this study also indicated that experienced 
practitioners demonstrated better executive attention at baseline compared to 
participants in the MBSR and control groups.
Importantly no significant differences in selective attention between mindfulness 
meditators and controls were found within studies conducted by Hodkins and 
Aldair (2010), McMillan et al., 2002, Tang et al., (2007) and Van den Hurk, 
Giommi, Gielen, Speckens and Barendregt, 2010).
Executive attention
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Slagter, Lutz, Greischar, Francis, Nieuwenhuis, Davis and Davidson (2007) 
compared the performance of experienced meditative practitioners to a matched 
control group using an attentional blink paradigm measuring executive attention. 
This paradigm involves participants being asked to first notice target stimuli (such 
as letters) presented in close temporal proximity to a second target stimuli (such as 
numbers). The attentional blink deficit refers to the effect wherein the second target 
stimuli are not reported due to the competition for attentional resources from the 
first stimuli. Slagter et al., (2007) found that the experienced meditators showed 
higher detection rates for the second target compared to the control group, 
suggesting that they had increased control over the allocation and distribution of 
attention.
In an RCT, Tang, et al., (2007) found improvements in executive attention among 
participants assigned to five days of 20 minute meditation training compared to a 
control group assigned to five days of 20 minute progressive muscle relaxation 
when they were measured on the ANT. The experimental group demonstrated 
increased conflict monitoring as well as a greater ability to prioritize among 
competing tasks. Wenk-Sormaz (2005) demonstrated that a brief mindfulness 
induction among a group of novice meditators led to improvements in their control 
of attention by observing less interference on a stroop task post induction compared 
to a control group. Chan and Woollacott (2007), and Moore and Malinowski (2009) 
also found that experienced mindfulness practitioners demonstrated less 
interference on the stroop task, providing support that mindfulness meditators show 
more effective regulation of attentional processes compared to controls.
In a further RCT, Arch and Craske (2006) assigned participants to one of three 
experimental conditions for a fifteen minute period. The first experimental group 
took part in a mindfulness breathing exercise while the other two experimental 
control groups received inductions of unfocused attention and worrying 
respectively. Relative to the experimental controls those in the mindfulness 
breathing group reported less negative effect when asked to shift their attention to 
negative picture slides and were more willing to remain in contact with this 
aversive stimuli. In sum. Arch and Craske (2006) found that emotion regulation
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capacities were enhanced in the experimental group after only a brief exposure to 
the practice of mindfulness
Erisman and Roemer (2010) used a multi-modal assessment to examine the effects 
of a brief mindfulness intervention on executive attention in response to distressing, 
positive and affectively mixed film clips. Participants were first randomly assigned 
to either mindfulness or a control condition and were asked to individually watch a 
set of three film clips lasting approximately 12 minutes in duration. Participants in 
the mindfulness condition then took part in a 10 minute mindfulness exercise. The 
control group were required to complete a word-search puzzle. Participants then 
watched another set of three film clips similar in content to those of the first and 
completed a series of self report measures. The results indicated that the 
mindfulness group reported significantly greater positive effect in response to the 
positive film clip, and in regard to the affectively mixed clip, had significantly less 
negative affect compared to controls. However there were no significant 
differences in emotional responses to the distressing film clip.
Collectively these studies provide evidence to suggest that mindfulness training 
may improve executive attention by decreasing automatic responding and negative 
affect towards aversive stimuli. It should also be noted that Josefeson and Broberg, 
(2010) recently observed no differences in executive attention between mindfulness 
meditators and controls.
Attentional control
Anderson, Lau, Segal and Bishop (2007) examined the four attention processes 
proposed in Bishop et al’s., (2004) operational definition of mindfulness, namely 
sustained attention, attention switching, inhibition of elaborate processing and non- 
directed attention. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 8 week MBSR 
course or to a wait-list control. Each of the four attention regulation processes were 
measured using independent tests, pre-and post-treatment. Sustained attention was 
tested using the Vigil Continuous Performance Test (Cegalis & Bowlin, 1991) 
where participants were sat in front of a computer and asked to press a spacebar as 
quickly as possible when the letter K appeared on screen over a 12 minute period. 
Attentional switching was measured using a task designed by the experimenters in
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which participants were required to shift their attention between two stimulus 
responses from trial to trial (mixed block trials) compared to blocks of trials in 
which they were not asked to shift attention (single block trials). The emotional 
stroop paradigm (Fox, 1994) was employed to measure inhibition of elaborate 
processing. Non-directive attention was measured using an object detection task 
designed by the experimenters in which participants were required to identify the 
location of a cued object within the context of a common scene. Anderson et al., 
(2007) hypothesised that MBSR would lead to smaller vigilance decrements 
(improvements in sustained attention), less stroop interference (improvements in 
inhibition), lower attentional switch costs (improvements in shifting) and smaller 
consistency effects in object detection (improvements in non-directed attention) 
across the four tasks. However their results showed that MBSR led to no significant 
improvement in sustained attention, switching or inhibition relative to the wait list 
control. The findings did suggest that mindfulness was associated with 
improvements in non-directive attention and the ability to enhance the awareness of 
present moment experience. This study failed to replicate other findings previously 
presented in this review as to the positive effects of mindfulness on attention. An 
explanation for these null results may well be due to the measures of attention that 
were used by the investigators.
Summary and Future Considerations
Summary and limitations o f research examining the relationship between 
mindfulness and attention
Empirical findings, to date, related to the effects of mindfulness on attention have 
been mixed. Although there is a significant body of work to support the salutary 
effects of mindfulness on specific attentional processes there are also a number of 
studies that have failed to find a relationship between mindfulness and attention. 
Further research is needed in order to clarify the discrepancies as currently no 
conclusion can be drawn about the exact nature of this relationship. However, it is 
possible that these inconsistent findings result from methodological flaws such as 
poor research designs, and a failure of experimental studies to tap into specific 
subsystems of attention.
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For example the task used to measure participants’ ability to switch attention 
between trials in the study by Anderson et ah, (2007), was created by the 
researchers, and had no prior validity or reliability. The task relied upon the 
participant’s internally generated knowledge as to where to shift their attention. No 
external cue was given about where stimuli would appear. Notably, a number of 
recent observations from the task switching literature suggest that task preparation 
based on internally generated knowledge is less effective than task presentation 
based on externally presented information (Barton, Kuzin, Poli and Monarch, 
2006). Therefore participants in Anderson et al’s., (2007) study may have been 
inhibited in shifting attention on the basis of having to rely upon internally 
generated information alone. Furthermore, not providing external information 
about the location of the stimuli the task may have caused participants to employ 
other cognitive abilities, which affected their efficiency to switch between trials.
The emotional stroop task was used by Anderson et al., (2007) to measure 
participant’s cognitive inhibition. In this task the slowing of colour-naming by fear 
words in participants is accounted for by an automatic bias, directing attention 
towards the emotional meaning of the words. However the emotional stroop task 
has been heavily criticised with the argument that delayed response latencies to 
threat related stimuli might be due to later cognitive processes not related to 
attention (Algom, Chajut & Lev, 2004). Theorists have subsequently questioned 
whether the stroop effect of the colour word version of the emotional stroop taps 
into the inhibition function (Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen & Cramer, 2005).
It seems that Anderson et al., (2007) may have employed two impure tasks to 
investigate the effects of mindfulness on shifting and inhibition respectively. 
Participant’s performance on the switching task and the emotional stroop task may 
have involved a number of interrelated cognitive processes that were not 
distinguished by the researchers. Therefore Anderson et al’s., (2007) findings, that 
mindfulness does not have an effect on inhibition and shifting, may be misleading. 
The measurement of the inhibition and shifting may have been confounded by 
other variables. It is possible that other aforementioned studies in this review may 
have also suffered from poor internal validity.
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A more direct measure of attention can be gained by the employment of eye 
tracking technology to record where the eye is looking at any given time 
(Duchowski, 2007). Eye tracking studies in experimental cognitive psychology are 
able to measure both saccadic eye movement and fixations. Saccadic eye 
movement is rapid and abrupt, with the primary focus to keep objects of interest on 
the fovea, whereas fixation involves maintaining the visual gaze on a single 
location. The body of research investigating the relationship between mindfulness 
and attention would be advanced significantly by the addition of empirical findings 
using eye tracking technology.
The possible effect o f mindfulness on executive functions controlling attention
The body of research examining the affects of mindfulness on attention has focused 
efforts primarily on examining the three attentional subsystems proposed in Posner 
and Petersons (1990) model. Many of these studies suggest that mindfulness may 
influence a number of attentional processes thought to be important in the etiology 
and maintenance of emotional distress. However the question of how these 
processes are modified remains unanswered. Little effort has been paid to 
rigorously testing the effects of mindfulness on the executive functions of the 
working memory system (as identified by Miyake et al., 2000) namely the 
inhibition and shifting functions thought to be controlling attention. Future 
research is therefore needed to investigate whether the executive functions of 
inhibition and shifting are mechanisms contributing to the salutary effects of 
mindfulness.
The potential moderating effects o f mindfulness on the relationship between 
anxiety and performance in tasks involving attentional control
Miyake et al’s., (2000) tripartite model of executive functions, developed from 
their latent variable analysis, assessed individual differences in performance on 
several cognitive tasks. What the authors did not identify were the key dimensions 
of individual differences responsible for differing levels of performance on each 
function.
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Recently, Eysenck et al (2007) used Miyake et al’s (2000) tripartite model as the 
basis for their attentional control theory, in order to argue that individual 
differences in anxiety predict performance on tasks involving the attentional 
control functions (inhibition and shifting) of working memory. A question 
therefore arises about the relationship between mindfulness and attention and 
whether executive functions responsible for attentional control can be strengthened 
in order to reduce the adverse effects of anxiety on performance.
The empirical evidence examining the relationship between mindfulness and 
executive attention to date suggests that mindfulness training may lead to the 
development of a more flexible use of attentional control. Recent studies provide 
some evidence that mindfulness may strengthen the attentional control system by 
facilitating top-down emotion regulation, determining which stimuli are granted 
access for future processing.
In contrast, studies examining Eysenck et al’s., (2007) attentional control theory 
suggest that anxiety may cause rigidity and inflexibility of the attentional control 
system most notably in the presence of threat-related stimuli. Mindfulness could 
therefore prove to be a moderating variable impacting upon the effects of anxiety 
on cognitive performance in tasks involving attentional control.
In giving rise to dissolving the adverse effects of anxiety, mindfulness may affect 
the influence of prior conditioning that enslaves many individuals by strengthening 
the inhibition and switching functions controlling attention. Therefore the author 
proposes that mindfulness may be a positive factor moderating the effects of 
anxiety (the independent variable) on task performance (the dependent variable) 
and recommends that future research tests this assumption.
The potential differences between state and trait mindfulness on attentional control
Mindfulness meditation is associated with both state and trait like effects (Davidson 
2010). State effects refer to cognitive and behavioural changes that occur in 
individuals as a result of short term training and are not dissimilar to those 
experienced in response to a phasic elicitor or emotion (Davidson, 2010). Trait
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effects are perceived to occur gradually overtime as a result of sustained practice 
and have been found to reflect more of a frequent and abiding disposition
Research investigating executive attention suggests that both state and trait like 
effects of mindfulness are associated with a variety of affective indicators of 
wellbeing. Individuals higher in dispositional or trait mindfulness appear to 
experience less unpleasant effects on cognitive tasks examining performance 
(Davidson, 2010). Likewise, those individuals high in state mindfulness also react 
with less intensity to emotionally salient stimuli.
However, the term mindfulness within both these cases may refer to different 
processes and have different therapeutic implications. For example, understanding 
state effects may help an individual within a therapy session to deal with a painful 
memory or emotion. Whereas understanding trait anxiety effects may help 
individuals suffering from chronic emotional distress. (Teasdale et al 2005). It is 
important for future research that we do not assume that state like effects and trait 
like effects of mindfulness are the same. Future studies examining whether 
mindfulness is a moderating variable in the relationship between anxiety and 
performance need to test independently for state and trait like effects.
The potential beneficial effects o f the relationship between mindfulness and 
attentional control fo r  clinically anxious and non-clinically anxious individuals
With the growing number of mindfulness-based treatments available for a wide 
variety of concerns, there is now a danger of over-applying mindfulness training as 
a generic intervention as opposed to employing specific mindfulness practices for 
individual clients. By tailoring mindfulness training, it may be possible for 
therapists to more consistently enhance positive outcomes and reduce 
psychological distress, as some aspects of mindfulness training may prove to be 
more relevant for some individuals than others.
An understanding of how specific mindfulness interventions lead to favourable 
outcomes is surely essential for therapeutic practice, as-well as for problem 
formulation. For mindfulness interventions to be successful it is necessary that 
therapists have an understanding of how the specific mechanisms of change being
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targeted are contributing towards a person’s distress. Sharing a clear formulation 
with clients is also important in the client understanding how targeted practice 
might lead to transformation.
It has been suggested throughout this article that the control of one’s attention is 
vitally important to wellbeing, particularly in the face of anxiety. It is assumed that 
mindfulness practice improves attentional control impacting upon emotion 
regulation by inhibiting and shifting attention away from the thoughts, emotions 
and physical sensations associated with anxiety to focus on the broad field of one’s 
present moment awareness (Brantley, 2003). Therefore if state and/or trait 
mindfulness is found to be a moderating variable on the relationship between 
anxiety and attentional control this could have a profound impact for clinically 
anxious individuals as well as for non-clinically anxious individuals.
Future directions
Four important future areas for research have been considered in this review. 
Firstly there is a need to investigate rigorously whether mindfulness has an 
influence on the two cognitive functions identified by Miyake et al., (2000), 
responsible for attentional control. Researchers need to address the question: Do 
individual differences in mindfulness predict performance on cognitive tasks 
involving the inhibition and shifting functions of the central executive component 
of working memory?
Secondly, it has been suggested that anxiety has an aversive effect on the inhibition 
and shifting functions of the central executive. A theoretical assumption requiring 
examination is that mindfulness dissolves aversive affects of anxiety and 
strengthens attentional resources. Future research therefore needs to address the 
following: Is mindfulness a moderating variable in the relationship between anxiety 
and performance on tasks involving attentional control?
Thirdly, theorists have argued that it is important to distinguish between state-like 
and trait-like effects of mindfulness as they may be very different. Therefore a 
further avenue for research worthy of empirical investigation is the question of
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whether performance on tasks measuring the effects of anxiety on attentional 
control differs as a result of state or trait like effects of mindfulness?
Finally, if mindfulness is found to have positive effects in moderating the 
relationship between anxiety and attentional control for non-clinically anxious 
individuals it is important to examine whether findings can also be applied within a 
clinical context. Researchers need to investigate whether there is a difference in the 
relationship between mindfulness and attentional control between clinically 
anxious and non-clinically anxious individuals?
In sum, a large body of research literature on the outcomes of mindfulness-based 
treatments provides substantial evidence for their beneficial effects. However, the 
advancement of science and practice is now best served by investigating not just 
whether mindfulness based treatments work, but how they work. A testable theory 
of the core change processes involved in mindfulness is therefore an essential 
starting point in addressing the question of how mindfulness works. This review 
has proposed that mindfulness strengthens attentional control processes leading to a 
reduction of anxiety and improvements to psychological wellbeing. In the future, 
practitioners will need to make reference to research examining how mindfulness- 
based treatments work in order to tailor specific mindfulness training toward an 
individual’s needs.
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Appendix A. Personal Reflections
The reason I choose mindfulness as the topic for this literature review was as a 
result of my own experience as a mindful therapist. In the summer of 2009, whilst 
working as an Assistant Psychologist at a private mental health hospital, I was 
given the opportunity to assist in an 8 week Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT) program with clients experiencing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). Before beginning the program, I was sceptical about its potential benefits 
for clients. I had no previous experience of meditation and naively perceived it to 
be a way to falsely adopt a Pollyanna attitude to life. My first few weeks in the 
program involved practicing various types of mindfulness meditation including 
sitting, walking, eating, movement and yoga meditation as well as the body scan. I 
soon realised that there was nothing strange about meditation and I found great joy 
and peace in paying attention to my life as it unfolded in the present moment. As I 
progressed, I found myself falling awake, feeling free and liberated, able to 
cultivate a sense of presence in both my personal and professional life. I noticed a 
new ability to pay attention without evaluation or judgment. I became aware of 
attending intently to my outer world, of attending to my relationships with others 
and to attending to aspects of my interior world including thoughts, feelings and 
aspirations. By refocusing my attention I had becoming more patient and 
empowered and felt a reduction in anxiety, stress and unhappiness. Daily practice 
strengthened my attention, enabling me to dissolve negative patterns of thinking 
and behaviour that had in the past held me back from living life to my full 
potential. Mindfulness now allowed me to embark on an adventure towards self- 
discovery. Since this introduction to mindfulness I have seized the opportunity to 
learn more about this phenomenon and to apply it within my therapeutic work.
The ability of a therapist to control their attention is perceived to be essential to 
therapeutic practice and has been addressed by a number of theoretical orientations. 
Sigmund Freud once wrote that the analyst should have ‘an evenly hovering 
attention’ (1912, p . I l l )  during the therapy hour. I believe that being able to 
regulate my own attention in the therapy room is a skill that enables me to be fully 
present, enriching my rapport with clients. I am mindful to direct my attention fully 
towards each client during their therapy session, to listen intently to what they are
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saying so that they are heard and understood. Formal practice enables me to deepen 
my capacity to be attentive to others and also helps me to be more comfortable with 
silences. The strengthening of my attention has given me the flexibility to inhibit 
unpleasant thoughts, feelings and ruminations and to shift the focus of my 
awareness to present moment experience. Having experienced, first-hand, how 
mindfulness can enhance control over how attention is distributed I am surprised 
about the lack of empirical research examining this relationship. A comprehensive 
understanding of how mindfulness affects attentional control is of great important 
to me as a scientific practitioner as it may allow me in the future to identify precise 
mindfulness interventions that can be tailored to specific clients. This review is 
particularly pertinent to the profession of Counselling Psychology as at aims to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of how attentional control impacts 
upon the therapeutic relationship.
Research suggests that the therapeutic relationship is the strongest predictor of 
therapeutic outcome across all types of therapeutic interventions. Mindfulness 
meditation training is now recommended as a way to learn skills that enhance the 
therapeutic alliance (Bruce, Manber, Shapiro & Constable, 2010). My own formal 
meditative practice enables me to cultivate skills fundamental to my own 
therapeutic work. Qualities such as presence empathy and emotion regulation 
allow me to form strong working alliances. During the therapeutic encounter 
mindfulness results in me being fully present, calm and non-judgmental, allowing 
client’s space to disclose even their most shameful thoughts and experiences. 
Attunement with another also allows me to express greater empathy and less 
distraction. Within the context of the therapy room, I am able to regulate my 
emotional reactions and create a space in which emotional content can be held 
safety. I have found that these attitudinal qualities of mindfulness are necessary in 
order to enhance therapeutic relationships and promote positive outcomes.
Whilst training as a psychotherapeutic and counselling psychologist I have found it 
incredibly helpful to maintain a personal mindfulness practice. Devoting time and 
energy to help relieve the suffering of others can be stressful and exhausting. It is 
therefore important for me to set aside time for my own self-care. I too suffer and 
feel pain and so need time to tend to my own stressors that occurs at work and in
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my personal life. I have come to recognise through mindfulness meditation that I 
too am deserving of kindness care and attention in order to manage my own 
difficulties. Formal practice for thirty minutes each day permits me to notice times 
when I am under stress. In addition, being kind and healing myself through 
mindfulness meditation frees me to deliver compassion and care to others. Being 
mindful not only allows me to attend to difficult situations during duress but also to 
appreciate the more joyful moments in my life. Mindfulness meditation is my self- 
care intervention of choice, strengthening my own self-knowledge and assisting me 
in the delivery of empathie client care.
I hope that mental health practitioners reading this literature review will harness 
insight of mindfulness, enhancing their own effectiveness in cultivating the 
objective health and subjective wellbeing of others. Furthermore, I hope that by 
providing an understanding of how mindfulness practice can lead to a greater 
control of attention, the review will also aid mental health practitioners in their own 
self-care, in promoting positive attitudes towards their clients and in becoming 
more mindful in their professional and personal lives.
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Does Dispositional Mindfulness Moderate the Relationship Between Anxiety
and Attentional Control?
Abstract
Mindfulness has been proposed to strengthen the strategic ability of attentional 
control (Bishop et ah, 2004). Conversely, the attentional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) proposes that anxiety impairs the attentional 
control function of inhibition. Effects of mindfulness and anxiety on the inhibition 
function were assessed on the antisaccade task. Replicating and extending upon a 
study by Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker and Eysenck (2009) low and high 
trait mindfulness and low and high trait anxiety groups were required to either look 
directly at or away from blank cues and valenced cues in the form of angry, happy 
and neutral faces. Analysis of first correct saccade latencies indicated contrary to 
our predictions, that low trait mindfulness and high trait anxiety groups did not 
exhibit longer latencies on antisaccade trials when blank stimuli and valenced 
stimuli were presented as cue compared to high trait mindfulness and low trait 
anxiety groups respectively. Also contrary to our predictions, mindfulness was not 
found to moderate the relationship between anxiety and attentional control. The 
findings provide no empirical support for a relationship between mindfulness and 
the inhibition function of working memory. Furthermore the findings bring into 
question assumptions made by the attentional control theory (Eysenck et ah, 2007). 
The potential role of mindfulness upon the mediating mechanisms of attentional 
biases is discussed in order to explain the current findings.
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Mindfulness is widely considered to be a universal human capacity to direct 
attention to the present moment non-judgmentally in the unfolding of experience 
(Baer, 2003). Mindfulness training has been incorporated into a number of third- 
wave cognitive behavioural interventions that have repeatedly been shown to be 
effective in alleviating anxiety (see Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010 for a 
review). Experimental studies continue to examine the effects of mindfulness on 
reducing anxiety across diverse populations using several different methods, adding 
to the growing body of literature in regard to its efficacy. However, few studies 
have examined the mechanisms by which positive outcomes are obtained. It is now 
important for researchers to examine the psychological processes that account for 
the beneficial effects of mindfulness, in order to answer the question how do 
mindfulness-based treatments work?
Several authors argue that mindfulness training may be effective in enhancing 
executive cognition, especially in relation to attentional control (Bishop et al., 
2004, Shapiro, Carlsom, Astin & Freedman 2005 & Brown, Ryan & Cresswell 
2007, Holzel, Lazar, Gard, Schuman-Oliver, Vago & Ott, 2011). Attentional 
control concerns the strategic ability to exert influence over the focus of attention, 
allowing one to choose between which stimuli to attend to and when to attend. 
Attentional control can be contrasted with states of mind in which attention is 
biased towards or away from mental events outside of present experience such as 
worries, memories and fantasies, or with behaving automatically without awareness 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Cognitive theories of anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997, Wells & Mathews, 1994, 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Matthews, 1988) propose that attentional biases 
towards or away from threat play an important role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety. Observable characteristics of attentional biases that have 
been mentioned in the literature include facilitated attention, difficulties in 
disengagement and attentional avoidance (see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a review). 
In an effort to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the observable 
components of attentional bias, investigations have begun to examine whether 
specific cognitive functions related to attention may be affected by anxiety. If 
specific cognitive functions related to attention are found to have a direct, causal or
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contributory role within anxiety then this may have significant implications for 
tailoring future mindfulness based interventions.
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) proposes that anxiety affects 
cognitive performance via its adverse effects on the central executive component of 
the working memory system (Baddeley 1986). The theory, a major development 
from the earlier processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), 
assumes that anxiety impairs the efficiency (but not the effectiveness) of two 
specific attentional control functions of the central executive, namely the inhibition 
and shifting functions (Miyake et al., 2000). The inhibition function is concerned 
with negative attentional control in its ability to deliberately resist disruption or 
interference from task irrelevant stimuli. The shifting function is concerned with 
positive attentional control due to its ability to switch attention between and within 
tasks in order to maximise performance (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Attentional 
control theory also takes the view (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002, Yantis, 1998) that 
there exist two major attentional systems. The first of these systems is voluntary 
and goal-directed (top down control of attention), and the second is involuntary and 
stimulus-driven (bottom up control of attention). The theory argues that anxiety 
disrupts the balance between these two systems, increasing the influence of the 
stimulus-driven system over the goal-directed system, therefore reducing 
attentional control. This in turn has an effect on the efficiency of the inhibition and 
shifting functions performance on cognitive tasks. Eysenck et al., (2007) argue that 
this effect on attentional control is a direct result of anxiety increasing attentional 
resources towards threat-related stimuli, resulting in difficulties disengaging from 
it.
To date there have been approximately 30 studies concerned with the effects of 
anxiety on the inhibition function, and practically no previous research on the 
effects of anxiety on the shifting function (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). The 
emotional stroop task has been the most frequently used paradigm to investigate the 
effects of anxiety on the inhibition function (see Phaf & Kan, 2007 for a review). In 
this task the slowing of colour-naming by fear words in high anxious individuals is 
accounted for by an automatic bias, directing attention towards the emotional 
meaning of the words. However the emotional stroop task has been heavily
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criticised with the argument that delayed response latencies to threat related stimuli 
might be due to later cognitive processes not related to attention (Algom, Chajut & 
Lev, 2004).
Recently, the antisaccade paradigm has been employed to test, more directly, the 
efficiency of attentional control, involving the inhibition and shifting functions 
respectively. Saccadic eye movement tasks are now able to provide a more precise 
assessment of top down cognitive control processes that influence attentional 
allocation (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). The antisaccade task, first introduced by 
Hallett (1978), requires an observer to fixate their gaze on a fixation point in the 
centre of a display and then on presentation of a peripheral stimulus to shift their 
eyes in the opposite direction to it. This task therefore pits a stimulus driven 
influence against the goal of the observer to move their eyes in the desired direction 
(Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). Correct performance on this task requires the observer 
to inhibit a reflexive saccade. Impaired performance is indicated by erroneous 
saccades towards the abrupt stimulus. This task also involves a control condition, 
namely the prosaccade, where observers are simply told to look directly at the 
stimulus where no inhibition is required
Concurrently, with investigations examining the predictions made by the 
attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), researchers have begun to 
examine whether mindfulness interventions may be effective in enhancing 
executive cognition, especially in relation to attentional control. Bishop et al., 
(2004) have offered perhaps the most comprehensive operationalized definition of 
mindfulness in the literature to date, putting forward several testable predictions for 
researchers to validate the constructs specificity. The authors describe mindfulness 
as having two overarching components namely self-regulation of attention 
(attentional control), and the attitude of an open and accepting orientation towards 
current experience. Bishop et al., (2004) hypothesise that the self- regulation of 
attention involves four specific skills; sustained attention, non-directed attention, 
switching and inhibition. Switching (referring to the flexible skill of shifting focus 
from one object to another) and Inhibition (referring to the skill of regulating 
thoughts, feelings and sensations that arise in response to a stimulus) are two of the 
cognitive skills that Eysenk et al., (2007) propose are affected negatively by
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anxiety. According to Bishop et al., (2004) mindfulness training may lead to 
positive improvement in these functions. Bishop et al’s., (2004) operational 
definition allows researchers to identify and test empirically implicated 
psychological processes underlying attentional control.
A small body of quantitative research has emerged investigating the relationship 
between mindfulness and attentional control (See Blake, 2011 for a review). 
Empirical studies have used a variety of methods and populations to examine 
whether mindfulness strengthens the skill of inhibition. Some studies have 
compared long term practitioners of mindfulness meditation with non-meditating 
control groups. In a non-randomised study, Ortner, Kilner & Zelanzo (2007) asked 
meditators and non-meditators to categorize tones as high or low in pitch while 
viewing neutral or emotionally valenced pictures. Meditators showed less 
interference from emotional pictures (shorter response latencies and fewer errors), 
suggesting that they were better able to control their attention when faced with 
emotionally valenced distracters. Chan and Woollacott (2007), and Moore and 
Malinowski (2009), also found that experienced mindfulness practitioners 
demonstrated less interference on the stroop task, providing support that 
mindfulness meditators showed more effective inhibition of task irrelevant stimuli 
compared to controls. However, Lynkins Baer and Gotlib (2012) found no 
significant differences in responses between long term meditation practice and a 
matched sample of non-meditators on an emotional stroop task. In these studies, the 
duration of mindfulness training amongst participants ranged considerably from 1 
month to over 29 years. Belatedly, the type and intensity of training also varied 
tremendously. Given the design of these studies, it is not possible to rule out the 
influence of confounding variables. None of these studies examined the 
relationship between the length of training and various behavioural and biological 
indices therefore the validity of these studies are questionable and may explain 
inconsistent findings.
Other studies have investigated whether performance in the skill of inhibition 
among experienced meditators is enhanced after intensive mindfulness retreats. 
Slagter, Lutz, Greischar, Francis, Nieuwenhuis, Davis and Davidson (2007) 
compared the performance of experienced meditative practitioners to a matched
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control group following an 8 week retreat using an attentional blink paradigm. This 
paradigm involves participants being asked to first notice target stimuli (such as 
letters) presented in close temporal proximity to a second target stimuli (such as 
numbers). The attentional blink deficit refers to the effect whereby the second 
target stimuli are not reported due to the competition for attentional resources from 
the first stimuli. Slagter et al., (2007) found that the experienced meditators showed 
higher detection rates for the second target compared to the control group, 
suggesting that they had increased control over the allocation and distribution of 
attention and that their ability to inhibit was less impaired. Jha, Krompinger and 
Baime (2007) employed the Attention Network Test (ANT, Fan, McCandiss, 
Fosella, Flombaum & Posner, 2005) to investigate how mindfulness training 
influences attention. The ANT task incorporates both spatial cuing and flanker 
paradigms (where a target is flanked by non-target stimuli that corresponds either 
to the same directional response as the target or to the opposite response) to 
manipulate attentional cuing (informative, neutral and no cues) and the type of 
target (the congruent or incongruent flanker). The response times between pairs of 
conditions were used to assess the functioning of orienting, alerting and executive 
attention through the ability to inhibit task irrelevant stimuli. Attentional efficiency 
was assessed before and after an 8 week mindfulness retreat for experienced 
mindfulness practitioners and an 8 week no training control group. Results showed 
that experienced practitioner’s had significant differences in executive attention 
(inhibition skills) compared to the control group before the retreat began but after 
the retreat no significant differences were found between the two groups In these 
studies subject selection variables may have been operating as confounding factors. 
Long term training might have been undertaken by individuals who were 
significantly different to begin with and in not having measures at different points 
along the continuum of training, it is difficult to disentangle training effects.
Two studies have tested whether mindfulness training among novice meditators 
enhances the ability to inhibit task irrelevant stimuli. Anderson, Lau, Segal and 
Bishop (2007) randomly assigned participants to either an 8 week MBSR course or 
to a wait-list control. Following the completion of the 8 weeks, all participants took 
part in an emotional stroop task. The results showed that MBSR did not lead to a 
significant improvement in inhibition relative to the wait list control. Jha et al..
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(2007) also randomly assigned participants to either an 8 week MBSR course or to 
a wait-list control group and tested all participants on the emotional stroop task 
before and after the 8 weeks. Jha et al., (2007) reported that MBSR completers 
showed no significant differences in inhibition on the task compared to the wait list 
control both before and after the MBSR course. Conceptual issues need to be 
considered when examining these studies as the quantity and quality of mindftilness 
training and non-class practice has not been captured by the researchers.
Four studies have tested effects on mindftilness on attentional control in much 
briefer mindftilness training in non-meditating student samples. Arch and Craske
(2006) assigned participants to one of three experimental conditions for a fifteen 
minute period. The first experimental group took part in a breathing exercise while 
the other two experimental control groups received inductions of unfocused 
attention and worrying respectively. Relative to the controls, those in the 
mindftilness breathing group showed significantly less negative affect when asked 
to shift their attention to negative picture slides and were significantly more willing 
to remain in contact with this aversive stimuli. In sum. Arch and Craske (2006) 
found that emotion regulation capacities were enhanced in the experimental group 
after only a brief exposure to the practice of mindftilness. Erisman and Roemer
(2010) used a multi-modal assessment to examine the effects of a brief mindfulness 
intervention on executive attention in response to distressing, positive and 
affectively mixed film clips. Participants were first randomly assigned to either 
mindfulness or a control condition and were asked to individually watch a set of 
three film clips lasting approximately 12 minutes in duration. Participants in the 
mindfulness condition then took part in a 10 minute mindfulness exercise. The 
control group were required to complete a word-search puzzle. Participants then 
watched another set of three film clips similar in content to those of the first and 
completed a series of self-report measures. The results indicated that the 
mindfulness group reported significantly greater positive affect in response to the 
positive film clip, and in regard to the affectively mixed clip, had significantly less 
negative affect compared to controls. However there were no significant between 
group differences in emotional responses to the distressing film clip. Tang, et al.,
(2007) found improvements in inhibition skills among participants assigned to five 
days of 20 minute meditation training compared to a control group assigned to five
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days of 20 minute progressive muscle relaxation when they were measured on the 
ANT. The experimental group demonstrated increased conflict monitoring as well 
as a greater ability to prioritize among competing tasks. Wenk-Sormaz (2005) also 
demonstrated that a brief mindfulness induction among a group of novice 
meditators led to improvements in their inhibition skill, observing less interference 
on a stroop task post induction compared to a control group. In each of the above 
studies, where significant results were found, rigorous comparison conditions in 
which participants were randomly assigned were employed. This was not possible 
for the aforementioned studies investigating effects among long term mindfulness 
practitioners.
It can be seen that the empirical evidence examining the relationship between 
mindfulness and attentional control to date has been mixed. However, there is some 
evidence from experimental studies to assume that mindfulness training may lead 
to the development of a more flexible use of attentional control and enhancement in 
inhibition skill (Arch & Craske 2006, Erisman & Roemer 2010, Tang 2007, Wenk- 
Sormaz 2005). These experimental studies suggest that mindfulness may strengthen 
the attentional control system by facilitating top-down emotion regulation, 
determining which stimuli are granted access for future processing. Studies 
examining Eysenck et aTs., (2007) attentional control theory suggest that anxiety 
may cause rigidity and inflexibility of the attentional control system most notably 
in the presence of threat-related stimuli. Mindfulness could therefore prove to be a 
moderating variable influencing the effects of anxiety on cognitive performance in 
tasks involving attentional control.
Further research is needed in order to clarify the discrepancies in the literature in 
regard to the relationship between mindfulness and inhibition. Inconsistent findings 
may have resulted from methodological flaws such as weak research designs in 
which random allocation of participants did not occur as well as a failure of 
experimental studies to tap into the inhibition function. The emotional stroop task 
employed by Anderson et al., (2007) and Lynkins et al., (2012) has been heavily 
criticised with the argument that delayed response latencies to threat related stimuli 
might be due to later cognitive processes not related to attention (Algom, Chajut & 
Lev, 2004). Theorists have subsequently questioned whether the stroop effect of the
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colour word version of the emotional stroop taps into the inhibition function 
(Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen & Cramer, 2005).
A more direct measure of attention can be gained by the employment of eye 
tracking technology to record where the eye is looking at any given time 
(Duchowski, 2007). The body of research investigating the relationship between 
mindfulness and attentional control would be advanced significantly by the 
addition of empirical findings using a design employing eye tracking technology to 
test whether specific executive functions (such as inhibition) can be strengthened, 
reducing the adverse effects of anxiety on performance.
The current research, in line with attentional control theory (Eysenck et al. 2007), 
examines whether trait mindfulness moderates the relationship between anxiety and 
the inhibition function of working memory. Specifically, the study intends to 
demonstrate whether trait mindfulness allows an individual to develop and harness 
top-down attentional control, in order to moderate inhibition in anxiety. This 
research is particularly pertinent to the discipline of Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology as it intends to impact on the friture direction of initiatives 
designed to tackle problems related to the escalating levels of anxiety in our 
society. In giving rise to dissolving the adverse effects of anxiety, mindfulness may 
affect the influence of prior conditioning that enslaves many individuals by 
strengthening the inhibition functions controlling attention. Therefore we propose 
that mindfulness may be a factor moderating the effects of anxiety on task 
performance
The current research intends to replicate and extend upon a previous study by 
Derakshan et al., (2009) where the antisaccade task was employed to investigate 
the inhibition of neutral stimuli and emotional stimuli (angry, neutral and positive 
faces) respectively. The significant dependent variable in Derakshan et al.’s (2009) 
study was the latency of the first correct saccade which measured processing 
efficiency among participants. Firstly, Derakshan et al., (2009) found that 
participants high in trait anxiety had longer correct antisaccade latencies than 
participants low in trait anxiety when neutral stimuli served as cue. Secondly, 
Derakshan et al., (2009) found that participants high in trait anxiety had longer 
correct antisaccade latencies than participants low in trait anxiety when exposed to
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threatening cues compared with neutral or positive cues. These findings support the 
assumptions made by attentional control theory (Eysenck et al. 2007) that anxiety 
impairs processing efficiency of the inhibition function on cognitive tasks, and that 
in the presence of threat related cues, the stimulus driven system (bottom-up) 
prevails over the goal directed system (top-down).
We replicate and extend upon Derakshan et al.’s (2009) study going a step further, 
investigating whether there is a relationship between trait mindfulness and the 
inhibition function and also examining whether trait mindfulness moderates the 
relationship between anxiety and inhibition. Our hypotheses are divided into four 
sets. Firstly we expect participants to display significantly longer first correct 
saccades on the antisaccade task compared to the prosaccade task. Secondly, we 
expect individuals high in trait anxiety to display significantly longer first correct 
antisaccade latencies than individuals low in trait anxiety and that this effect will be 
greater when exposed to threat related cues in the form of angry faces. Thirdly we 
expect individuals low in trait mindfulness to display significantly longer first 
correct antisaccade latencies than individuals high in trait mindfulness and that this 
effect will be greater when exposed to threat related cue in the form of angry faces. 
Finally we expect that individuals high in trait mindfulness will moderate the 
relationship between anxiety and the first correct saccade latency and that this 
effect will be greater when exposed to threat related cues in the form of angry 
faces.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twelve participants (83 women) were recruited by means of an 
advertisement posted on the university’s Research Participation Scheme (RPS) 
website (mean age =24.66, SD =.86). All participants had normal to corrected-to- 
normal eyesight and were able to wear glasses but not contact lenses. All 
participants wearing mascara were required to remove all traces of it before the 
experiment began so as not to interfere with eye tracking. Each participant was 
tested in a separate laboratory session lasting approximately 45 minutes and was
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reimbursed with either RPS credits going towards their degree program or £4 for 
their contribution.
Design
Six mixed factorial designs were employed in order to test our four sets of 
hypotheses. Firstly, a 2 (anxiety grouptype; high trait anxiety vs. low trait anxiety) 
X 2 (task type; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) design examined whether participants 
displayed significantly longer first correct saccade latencies on the antisaccade task 
compared to the prosaccade task and whether there was a relationship between 
anxiety and the latency of the first correct saccade when blank stimuli served as 
cue. The independent variables were high trait anxiety, low trait anxiety, the 
antisaccade task, and the prosaccade task. The dependent variable was the latency 
of the first correct saccade.
Secondly a 2 (anxiety grouptype; high trait anxiety vs. low trait anxiety) x 2 
(tasktype; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) x 3 (cue type; angry vs. happy vs. neutral) 
design examined the relationship between anxiety and first correct saccade latency 
within the anti and prosaccade tasks when valenced stimuli (in the form of faces) 
served as cue. The independent variables were high trait anxiety, low trait anxiety, 
the antisaccade task, the prosaccade task and angry, happy and neutral cues. The 
dependent variable was the latency of the first correct saccade
Thirdly, a 2 (mindfulness grouptype; high trait mindfulness vs. low trait 
mindfulness) x 2 (tasktype; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) design examined the 
relationship between mindfulness and first correct saccade latency within the anti 
and prosaccade tasks when blank stimuli served as cue. The independent variables 
were high trait mindfulness, low trait mindfulness, the antisaccade task and the 
prosaccade task. The dependent variable was the latency of the first correct saccade
Fourthly, a 2 (mindfulness grouptype; high trait mindfulness vs. low trait 
mindfulness) x 2 (tasktype; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) x 3 (cue type; angry vs. 
happy vs. neutral) design examined the relationship between mindfulness and first 
correct saccade latency within the anti and prosaccade tasks when valenced stimuli 
served as cue. The independent variables were high trait mindfulness, low trait
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mindfulness, the antisaccade task, the prosaccade task and angry, happy and neutral 
cues . The dependent variable was the latency of the first correct saccade
Fifthly, a 2 (anxiety groupetype; high trait anxiety vs. low trait anxiety) x 2 
(mindfulness grouptype; high trait mindftilness vs. low trait mindftilness) x 2 
(tasktype; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) design examined whether mindfulness 
moderated the relationship between anxiety and the first correct saccade latency 
within the anti and prosaccade tasks when blank stimuli served as cue. The 
independent variables were high trait anxiety, low trait anxiety, high trait 
mindfulness, low trait mindfulness the antisaccade task and the prosacade task. The 
dependent variable was the latency of the first correct saccade.
Finally, a 2 (anxiety groupetype; high trait anxiety vs. low trait anxiety) x 2 
(mindfulness grouptype; high trait mindfulness vs. low trait mindfulness) x 2 
(tasktype; antisaccade vs. prosaccade) x 3 (cuetype; angry vs. happy vs. neutral) 
design examined whether mindfulness moderated the relationship between anxiety 
and the first correct saccade latency within the anti and prosaccade tasks when 
valenced stimuli served as cue. The independent variables were high trait anxiety, 
low trait anxiety, high trait mindfulness, low trait mindfulness the antisaccade task 
the prosacade task and angry, happy and neutral cues. The dependent variable was 
the latency of the first correct saccade
Stimuli
A  square shaped object subtending 4.6° (50mm x 50mm in dimension) that was 
either blank or contained one of three line drawn faces (angry, happy, neutral taken 
from the Parke-Waters face model database, 1996, see appendix A) served as cue. 
The stimulus serving as target was an arrow subtending 2.8° (2mm x 30mm in 
dimension) pointing either up or down. This stimulus were created using Microsoft 
Photoshop graphics application.
Eye tracking device and controlling software
Eye movements were recorded at 60 Hz with a viewpoint eye tracking system 
(Arrington Research. Inc., 2003) and PC-60 software (version 2.7. 1.55) for
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detecting pupillary position. The left eye was lit by an infrared source and recorded 
via a remote camera mounted approximately 50mm away from the participant’s 
pupil. A gaze point (the intersection of the optic axis with the screen) was estimated 
from the pupil image, in conjunction with the reflection of the light source. The eye 
tracker was calibrated using nine fixation points providing an indication as to 
whether or not valid gaze points could be obtained. A separate computer controlled 
the presentation of the stimuli using E prime software (version 1.2), which was 
automatically synchronized to the eye tracking system at the beginning of each 
trial. The stimuli were presented in 32-bit colour on a 1280 x 1024 LCD monitor.
Measures
1. The Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 
2003, see Appendix B) measured levels of mindfulness among participants. The 
MAAS consisted of 15 statements intended to evaluate core characteristics of 
dispositional mindfulness. Statements included T find it difficult to stay focused 
on what’s happening in the present’ and T find myself doing things without paying 
attention’. Truth towards these statements was recorded on a 6 point likert scale 
ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never).
The MAAS has been validated in student, working adults and cancer populations. 
MAAS construction, factor analysis and reliability assessment received an internal 
consistency alpha (reliability) of .82 with a student population and .87 with a 
general adult population (Brown & Ryan 2003). Furthermore, Brown and Ryan
(2003) conducted a test-retest reliability and agreement on 60 psychology students 
over a 4 week period and found the intraclass correlation (validity) was .81 (p < 
.0001). Construct validity of the MAAS has also been examined within a clinical 
population using exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modelling to 
assess the criterion validity of the scale. The MAAS yielded an internal consistency 
alpha (reliability) of .87 and a correlation of .70 p < 0.001 (Brown and Ryan, 
2003). Full details on the validation and reliability of the MAAS are available in 
Brown and Ryan (2003)
2. The trait component of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983, See Appendix C) measured trait anxiety
126
among participants. The trait anxiety consisted of twenty statements that intended 
to assess how participants felt generally. Statements included T am a steady 
person’ and T lack self-confidence’. The intensity of feeling towards these 
statements was recorded on a 4 point likert scale from, 1 (almost never) to 4 
(almost always) (see appendix C). Strong evidence exists for the validity and 
reliability of the trait component of State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Test re-test 
reliability ranges from .73 to .86 for the trait scale (Speilberger, Auerbach, 
Wadsworth, Dun & Taulbee, 1975). Concurrent validity studies have also shown 
that the trait scale correlates well with other measures of trait anxiety such as the 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (.75) and the Institute for personality and ability 
testing (IPAT) scale (.85) respectively. Full details for the validity and reliability of 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory are available in Speilberger et al., (1975).
Eye tracking task
Participants were required to complete 120 prosaccade and 120 antisaccade trials 
respectively presented in 12 single trial blocks. The first six single trial blocks 
comprised of 48 prosaccade trials and 48 antisaccade trials where a blank square 
served as cue. The next six single trial blocks comprised of 72 prosaccade and 72 
antisaccade trials where angry, happy and neutral faces served as cue
Figure 1 illustrates both the anti and prosaccade trials. Each trial began with a 
fixation cross (subtending 0.94°) in the centre of the screen for 2000ms. In the 
prosaccade condition this fixation cross was coloured green and in the antisaccade 
condition it was red. Participants were instructed to fixate on the cross until it 
disappeared. After fixation cross offset and a 200ms black interval, a cue then 
appeared with equal probability either to the left or the right side of the screen at 
12.46° for 600ms. Participants were required to direct their gaze either towards the 
cue if the fixation cross was green (prosaccade), or away from the cue in the 
opposite location without looking at it if the fixation cross was red (antisaccade). 
At cue offset, an arrow (the target) facing up or down at random either replaced the 
cue (on prosaccade trials) or appeared on the side of the screen opposite the cue (on 
antisaccade trials) at 12.46° from the fixation cross. Participants were then required 
to identify the direction of the arrow by pressing the relevant key on a button press 
box. The arrow appeared for 100ms.
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Prosaccade task Antisaccade task
2000ms
200ms
600ms
100ms
Time
Figure 1. The antisaccade and prosaccade tasks 
Procedure
Upon arrival, all participants were seated outside of the laboratory. Participants 
were then informed that the experiment was to be made up of two tasks. The first 
task intended to examine their perception towards a set of stimuli presented on a 
computer screen, which included images of faces (Parke & Waters, 1996). The 
second task required participants to make their responses to questions presented on 
two questionnaires. After completing the relevant information sheet (see appendix 
D) and consent forms (see appendix’s E & F) the participants were lead into the 
dimly lit laboratory and seated in front of the eye gaze system. An overview of the 
eye tracking equipment and response button box was given before participants were
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asked to place their chin on a chin rest (located 62cm from the screen) with their 
foreheads resting against a forehead bar. The calibration was the run. Screen 
instructions were then presented which the experimenter emphasized. Participants 
were instructed as follows:
“First you will be presented with either a red or green cross in the 
centre o f the screen, you must fixate your gaze on this point. It is 
important to keep still and maintain your position. The cross will 
subsequently disappear to be replaced by an image, either to the left 
or the right o f the screen. A green cross requires you to look at the 
image, a red cross requires you to look away from the image, 
towards the opposite side o f the screen. The image will then 
disappear, and will be replaced by an arrow, either occupying the 
same point as the image, or on the opposite side o f the screen. Press 
the key on the button box to indicate the direction o f  the arrow, 
either up or down. "
Speed and accuracy of response were again emphasised before 12 practice trials 
were completed (6 prosaccade, 6 antisaccade). At the end of the practice trials 
participants were asked if they had understood all of the instructions and whether 
there were any further questions related to the task. The experiment itself 
compromised of 12 blocks, half of which were antisaccade and half were 
prosaccade making 240 trials in total. Of these total trials participants were first 
exposed to 96 trials within six blocks (three antisaccade, three prosaccade) where a 
blank square served as cue. After a short interval participants were then exposed to 
the remaining 144 trials in six blocks (three antisaccade, three prosaccade) where 
angry neutral and happy faces served as cue. The order in which the anti- and 
prosaccade trials were presented was counterbalanced across participants using a 
Latin square design.
Following the completion of the eye tracking task participants completed the 
MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), as well as the trait component of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983). Finally participants were thanked and 
debriefed (see appendix G).
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Ethical considerations
The present study complied with guidelines laid out in the British Psychological 
Societies BPS code of conduct, ethical principles and guidelines, and the 
university’s research ethics handbook. The research at all times considered the 
ethical implications and psychological consequences of all participants involved. 
Furthermore, approval from the universities Ethics committee was essential before 
proceeding with the experiment (See Appendix H.) The study itself was justified 
on the basis that the findings should provide some empirical support towards the 
notion that mindfulness moderates anxieties effects on attentional control and how 
this is relevant to the maintenance of anxiety disorders.
To ensure for a reasoned and balanced treatment of ethical issues participants were 
informed that the experiment involved exposure to angry faces and that they had 
the right to withdraw from the study at any time. In the event that any personal 
concerns were raised as a result of the experiment contact details for the 
counselling services team at the university were also provided.
Results
Due to a computing error, eye tracking data from 4 participants was lost. Of the 
remaining 108 participants, one participant was excluded due to a large number of 
errors in target responses and three due to 45% or more of their total trials 
producing no saccade latencies. This resulted in 104 participants in the final data 
set.
Analysis o f questionnaires
Mean trait Mindfulness score as measured by the Mindfulness Attention Awareness 
Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) for the sample was 56.93 {SD = 11.08). Mean trait 
anxiety as measured by the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielbeger 
et al., 1983) for the sample was 42.29 {SD = 10.87).
A median split was performed on each questionnaire to produce low and high 
group classifications. For the MAAS, The high trait mindfulness (HTM)
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individuals (n=53) included those scoring 59 or higher, and low trait mindfulness 
(LTM) individuals («=53) included those scoring 58 or lower on the questionnaire. 
Mean Trait Mindfulness for the HTM group was 65.47 (SD = 6.25) and for the 
LTM group it was 48. 31(SD = 7.81). The high trait anxiety (HTA) individuals 
(n=52) included those scoring 41 or higher on the questionnaire. The low trait 
anxiety (LTA) individuals (n=53) included those scoring 40 or lower on the 
questionnaire. Mean trait anxiety for the HTA group was 51.35 (SD = 7.19) and for 
the LTA group it was 33.40 (SD = 4.81).
Data preparation
The latency of the first correct saccade was computed for every trial completed by 
each participant. A saccade was defined as an eye movement with a velocity >307s 
and amplitude >3° that was made after the onset of the cue and before the onset of 
target. The latency of the first correct saccade was defined as the elapsed time 
between the onset of cue and the beginning of the saccade towards the correct 
direction before the onset of target. Saccades with an onset shorter than 83ms after 
stimulus onset were classified as anticipatory and were thus excluded. We also 
excluded latencies occurring more than 600ms after stimulus onset. The 
percentage of data lost due to errors was 5.2%. A further .01% of the data was 
classified as outlying. Of the remaining data set the mean first correct saccade 
latency for the sample was 291.88 ms (SD = 53.55). Histograms indicated that the 
raw data approximated normal distribution.
Analysis o f latency o f the first correct saccade
Hypothesis 1: Participants will display significantly longer first correct saccade 
latencies on the antisaccade task compared to the prosaccade task.
Hypothesis 2.1: Participants high in trait anxiety will display significantly longer 
first correct antisaccade latencies than individuals low in trait mindfulness when 
exposed to blank stimuli.
A 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA with trait anxiety (HTA or LTA) as the between subject 
factor and task (anti or prosaccade) as the within subject factor revealed a
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significant main effect of task (F(l,100) = 398.79, MSE = 707.477,/? < .001, rjp  ^= 
.800). Participants displayed longer first correct saccade latency on the antisaccade 
task compared to the prosaccade task.
No significant main effect of group (F(l,100) = .689, MSE = 4206.351,/? = .406, 
qp  ^= .007), or group x task interaction (F(l,100) =.257, MSE = 707.477, /? =.614, 
T|p^  = .003) were found suggesting that high trait anxiety individuals did not have 
significantly longer first correct saccade latencies when exposed to blank stimuli 
(see Table 1).
Table 1.
Mean first correct saccade latency (msec) for high trait anxiety and low trait 
anxiety individuals where blank stimuli served as cue within the anti and 
prosaccade tasks.
Task Group Mean a?
Antisaccsde HTA
LTA
307.00
31&46
58.44
55.84
Prosaccade HTA
LTA
23A50
240.19
37.53
43.42
Hypothesis 2.2: Participants high in trait anxiety will display significantly longer 
first correct antisaccade latencies than individuals low in trait anxiety when 
exposed to angry faces compared to happy and neutral faces.
A 2 X 2 X 3 mixed ANOVA with anxiety (HTA or LTA) as the between subject 
factor, task (anti or prosaccade) and cue type (angry, happy and neutral faces) as 
the within subject factors revealed a significant main effect of task (F(l,98) = 
390.468 , MSE = 1841.823,/? < 0.001, r|p  ^= .799), and a significant task x cuetype 
interaction (F (1,198) = 6.203, MSE= 536.211,/? = .002., rjp  ^= .060). No
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significant main effect of group (F(l,98) = .164, MSE = 14983.506,/? = .686, qp  ^= 
.002), group X cuetype interaction (F(l,98) = 1.269, MSE = 473.227 ,/? =.283, rjp  ^
= .013), or group x cuetype x task interaction (F(l,196) = 1.254, MSE = 536.211, 
p  =.288 , Tjp^  = .013), was found suggesting that the groups did not differ in regard 
to their first saccade latencies when exposed to valenced stimuli (see Table 2).
The main effect of task revealed that participants had longer antisaccade latencies 
(M= 332.52 msec, SD = 65.09) than prosaccade latencies (M= 263.28, SD = 
44.67). The task x cuetype interaction revealed that participants when exposed to 
happy faces had longer antisaccade latencies (M= 338.89, SD = 67.53) than when 
exposed to angry faces (M= 325.99, SD = 64.18).
Table 2.
Mean first correct saccade latency (msec) for high trait mindfulness and low trait 
mindfulness individuals where blank stimuli served as cue within the anti and pro 
saccade tasks.
Task Group Mean (msec) 5D
Antisaccade HTM
LTM
319.45
301.51
53.12
59.12
Prosaccade HTM
LTM
238.62
236,13
41,40
39.35
Hypothesis 3.2: Participants low in trait mindfulness will display significantly 
longer first correct antisaccade latencies than individuals low in trait anxiety when 
exposed to angry faces compared to happy and neutral faces
A 2 X 2 X 3 mixed ANOVA with mindfulness (HTM or LTM) as the between 
subject factor and task (anti or prosaccade) and cue type (angry, happy and neutral 
faces) as the within subject factors revealed a main effect of task (F(l,99) = 
398.467, MSE = 1790.799, p  <0.001, rjp  ^ = .801), as well as a significant task x 
cuetype interaction (F(l,99) = 5.627, MSE = 535.873, p  =.004, pp^ = .054) and
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near to significant task x cuetype x group interaction (F(l,198) = 2.717 , MSE = 
535.872,/? =.069, r|p  ^= .026). No main effect was found for group (F(l,99) = .248, 
MSE = 14853.585, /? = .619, rjp  ^ = .002). Low trait mindfulness individuals did 
display significantly longer antisaccade latencies compared to high trait 
mindfulness individuals when exposed to valenced cues (see Table 3).
The main effect of task revealed that participants had longer antisaccade latencies 
(M= 332.043 msec, SD =65.07) than prosaccade latencies (M = 262.41 msec, SD = 
44.48). The two way task x cuetype interaction revealed that participants when 
exposed to happy faces had significantly longer antisaccade latencies {M= 338.14 
msec, SD = 67.29) than when exposed to angry faces (M =  326.18 msec, SD = 
63.89).
Table 3.
Mean first correct saccade latency (msec) for high trait mindfulness and low trait 
mindfulness individuals where valenced stimuli (in the form of faces) served as cue 
within the anti and pro saccade tasks.
Task Group Cue Mean SD
Ântisaccade HTM Angry
Happy
336.36
343.18
60.51
67,37
62 81
LTM Angry 316,20 66.10
Prosaccade HTM
Happy
Neutral
Angry
333.19
328.65
260.32
6749
65.67
42.62
LTM
Neutral
262.10
264,51
266,79
42J2
43.97
46.39
Happy
Neutral
259.52
267.21
47,21
44.82
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Hypothesis 4.1: High trait mindfulness will moderate the relationship between 
anxiety and the first correct saccade latency when blank stimuli serve as cue.
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA with anxiety group (HTA or LTA) and mindfulness 
group (HTM or LTM) as the between subject factors and task (anti- or prosaccade) 
as the within subject factor revealed a highly significant main effect of task 
(F(l,95) = 362.258, MSE = 686.508, p  <.001. r|p  ^ = .792). No significant main 
effects of anxiety group (F(l,95) = .308, MSE = 4299.150, p  = .580 ,ppf = .003), 
mindfulness group (F(l,95) = 1.014,MS!£’ = 4299.150,/? = 316, r\p  ^= .011), anxiety 
group X task interaction (F(l,95)=.001, MSE = 686.508, p =.976, rjp  ^ = .000) 
mindfulness group x task interaction (F(l,95)= 3.832, MSE = 686.508, p =.053, 
Tjp^  = .039) or anxiety group x mindfulness group x task type interaction. 
(F(l,95)= .136, MSE = 686.508, p =.713, r|p  ^= .001) were found. No moderating 
relationship was found.
Hypothesis 4.2: High trait mindfulness will moderate the relationship between 
anxiety and the first correct saccade latency and this effect will be greater when 
angry faces serve as cue compared to happy and neutral faces.
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3  mixed ANOVA with anxiety group (HTA or LTA) and mindfulness 
group (HTM or LTM) as the between subject factors and task (anti- or prosaccade), 
cue type (angry faces, happy faces, neutral faces), as the within subject factors 
revealed a highly significant main effect of task (F(l,94) = 378.985, MSE = 
1817.363, p  <.001, qp^ = .801) a significant main effect of cuetype, (F(1.94 ) = 
1594.904, MSE = 477.931, p  =.038, r|p  ^= .034) and a task x cue type (F(l,94) = 
5.187, MSE = 541.208,/? =.006, r|p  ^= .052) interaction. No significant main effects 
of anxiety group (F(l,94) = .173, MSE = 15295.513, p  = .679, rjp  ^ = .001), 
mindfulness group (F(l,94) = 356,MSE = 15295.523,/? =.552, r\p  ^= .003), anxiety 
group X cuetype x task interaction (F(l,188)=.741, MSE = 541.208,/? =.478, r|p^ = 
.009), mindfulness group x cuetype x task interaction (F(l,188)= 2.081, MSE = 
541.208, p  =.128, T|p^  = .020) or anxiety group x mindfulness group x cuetype x 
task type interaction (F(l,188)= .271, MSE = 541.208, p  =.763, r|p  ^ = .003 were 
found). Groups did not differ in regard to their first saccade latencies when exposed 
to valenced stimuli suggesting that mindfulness did not moderate anxieties effects 
on task performance.
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The main effect of task showed that participants had longer antisaccade (M = 
332.59 msec, SD = 65.37) than prosaccade (M = 262.34 msec , SD = 44.92) 
latencies. The main effect of cuetype showed that participants when exposed to 
happy faces took significantly had longer first correct saccades (M=339.42 msec 
SD = 67.71) than when exposed to angry faces (M= 326.41 msec, SD = 64.42).
Discussion
The results of the present study support our first prediction that the latencies of the 
first correct saccades were longer on the antisaccade task than on the prosaccade 
task. However, more importantly in regard to the aims of the present study, the 
results do not confirm our predictions about the relationship of anxiety and 
mindfulness respectively to the inhibition function of working memory.
In regard to anxiety, we did not replicate Derakshan et aTs., (2009) findings of poor 
inhibitory control and processing inefficiency amongst high trait anxiety 
individuals. No significant differences were found in regard to first correct saccade 
latency between high trait anxiety individuals and low trait anxiety individuals 
within the antisaccade condition as a result of both blank stimuli and valenced 
stimuli (in the form of faces) being presented as cue. In the presence of angry faces, 
high trait anxiety individuals did not take significantly longer to make saccades 
away from the cue compared to low trait anxiety individuals as hypothesised. Thus, 
threatening cues did not seem to result in high trait anxiety individuals displaying 
difficulties with inhibition compared to low trait anxiety individuals. Both groups 
were able to shift attention to the target location in the antisaccade task relatively 
quickly.
In regard to mindfulness, we did not find poor inhibitory control and processing 
inefficiency amongst low trait mindfulness individuals as predicted. No significant 
differences were found in regard to the first correct saccade latency between high 
trait mindfulness individuals and low trait mindfulness individuals within the 
antisaccade condition as a result of both blank stimuli and valenced stimuli (in the 
form of faces) being presented as cue. In the presence of angry faces, low trait 
mindfulness individuals did not take significantly longer to make saccades away 
from the cue compared to high trait mindfulness as hypothesised. The threatening
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cue did not seem to result in low trait mindfulness individuals displaying 
difficulties with inhibition compared to the high trait mindfulness individuals. 
Again both groups were able to shift attention to the target location in the 
antisaccade task relatively quickly. Furthermore we did not find that mindfulness 
had a moderating effect on the relationship between anxiety and performance on 
the antisaccade task when both blank and valenced stimuli served as cue as 
predicted.
The effects o f anxiety upon attentional control
The current findings do not provide evidence in support of attentional control 
theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). Anxiety did not increase the allocation of attention 
towards stimuli as expected, or impact upon difficulties disengaging from threat. In 
stark contrast to our predictions, anxiety did not seem to have an adverse effect on 
the inhibition function of working memory as was reported by Derakshan et al., 
(2009).
The task used in the present study was a replication of Derakshan et al’s., (2009) 
antisaccade task and was chosen due to its efficacy in measuring inhibition and top- 
down regulation. The fact that we used a larger sample (V=108) compared to 
Derakshan (V=61) suggests that the present study had greater statistical power and 
there was less chance of a Type II error occurring. Our results call into question the 
reliability of Derekshan’s et aTs., (2009) findings that anxiety impairs processing 
efficiency on the antisaccade task.
The effects o f mindfulness upon attentional control
The results of the present study do not provide support for Bishop et afs., (2004) 
operational definition of mindfulness, specifically in regard to self-regulation of 
attention. Mindfulness did not decrease the allocation of attention towards stimuli 
or impact upon difficulties disengaging from threat. In stark contrast to the findings 
of Arch & Craske (2006), Chan and Woollacott (2007), Erisman & Roemer (2010), 
Jha et al. (2007), Moore & Malinowski (2009), Slagter et al. (2007), Tang (2007) 
and Wenk-Sormaz (2005) mindfulness did not seem to have a positive effect on 
the inhibition fiinction of working memory.
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The lack of group differences in the present findings are probably not attributed to 
insensitivity to the selected task, lack of statistical power or the task instructions. It 
may however be possible that tasks requiring speed, accuracy and disengagement 
(such as the antisaccade task) are not where dispositional mindfulness exerts its 
largest effects. Although it has been argued that dispositional mindfulness is 
correlated with greater skill in inhibition (Bishop et al., 2004) it has also been 
argued that dispositional mindfulness is concerned with taking time to observe 
present moment stimuli carefully as well as refraining from reacting to stimuli until 
non-judgmental acceptance has been explored (Bishop et al., 2004). The lack of 
significant findings therefore raises the question as to whether mindfulness may 
infact be impacting upon other mediating mechanisms of attentional bias other than 
attentional control at later stages of processing.
The potential role o f mindfulness upon the mediating mechanisms o f attentional 
bias
The present research focused its efforts upon investigating the role of mindfulness 
as a mediating mechanism of attentional control in attentional biases. Attentional 
control refers to the ability to regulate attentional allocation and is constructed as a 
top down regulatory ability. Recent research has demonstrated that the ability to 
regulate attention allocation may mediate the degree to which attention can be 
disengaged fi*om threatening stimuli (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Attentional 
control has subsequently become regarded as a higher order regulatory mechanism 
controlling disengagement. However, two further observable characteristics of 
attentional bias other than disengagement have been mentioned in the literature, 
namely facilitated attention and attentional avoidance (Roster et al., 2006). 
Facilitated attention refers to the relative ease or speed with which attention is 
drawn to a threat stimulus. Attentional avoidance refers to the phenomenon in 
which attention is preferentially allocated towards locations opposite the location of 
the threat cue.
Little theoretical agreement has been reached as to which of the components 
(facilitated attention, disengagement, attentional avoidance) attentional bias 
comprises, what mechanisms mediate these components and at which stage of 
processing (automatic vs. strategic) these mechanisms operate. In a recent review.
138
Cisler and Roster (2010) argue that three different mechanisms mediate the three 
different components of attentional biases. A threat detection mechanism operating 
at an automatic stage of processing is proposed to mediate facilitated attention to 
threat. Attentional control operating at a strategic stage of processing is proposed to 
mediate disengagement from threat and emotion regulation goals operating also at a 
strategic level mediate attentional avoidance away from threat.
Recent research is providing empirical support for emotion regulation strategies 
mediating attentional biases (Cisler and Roster, 2010). Emotion regulation refers to 
“the process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they 
have them and how they experience and express these emotions.” (Gross, 1998, p 
275). It is likely that the strategic mechanisms of attentional control and emotion 
regulation are likely to be separate mechanisms that mediate attentional biases in 
distinct manners. Cisler and Roster (2010) propose that attentional control is a 
regulatory ability as individuals with better attentional control can disengage 
attention from threatening stimuli. In contrast emotion regulation may not be an 
ability but reflective of a strategy for coping with negative emotion modulating 
attentional avoidance.
Perhaps, instead of dispositional mindfulness having a role in mediating attentional 
control, effecting disengagement from threat, it may have a greater role on the 
mediating mechanism of emotion regulation reducing attentional avoidance away 
from threat. Future research is needed in order to test this prediction.
Limitations
An important question arising from the present research is whether it is possible for 
participants to reliably report on the quality and the magnitude of their 
mindfulness? The present study may therefore be limited in its reliance upon a self- 
report instrument as an objective measure of trait mindfulness. The MAAS relies 
on self-reports made during ordinary states of awareness by individuals who have 
not necessarily acquired any form of mindfulness training. The MAAS may 
therefore not reflect the richly nuanced nature of the mindfulness construct.
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Methodologically, self-report measures such as the MAAS may muddy the 
mindfulness phenomenon by applying impoverished and over simplified indicators. 
Grossman (2011) argues that the assessment of mindfulness through self-report 
measures has distorted, denatured and cheapened the mindfulness construct. 
Whether mindfulness is an inherent capacity, available to people without training 
or can be understood only by those extensively and traditionally trained continues 
to be debated within the literature. It is however possible that using a student 
samples untrained in mindfulness may have impaired external validity. It would 
also have been beneficial before interpreting the data to have measured the 
participant’s direct experience of mindfulness training such as their type and 
amount of daily training and their length of practice. The MAAS may have been 
interpreted differently by those with and without mindfulness experience.
Although construct validity has been carefully explored by developers of the 
MAAS, little concern appears to have been given to the central aspect of content 
validity. It is likely that definitions of mindfulness based interventions emphasize 
qualities that are not well represented in the MAAS’s quantification of 
mindfulness. Furthermore, responses on the MAAS may also have been biased by 
participants own desire for gains in performance in the task. Participants may well 
have been aware of the “correct” response to most of the items of the MAAS and 
may have been likely to endorse statements indicating the experience of fewer 
lapses of attention.
The duration of mindfulness training as demonstrated from previous research 
mentioned, ranges considerably from minutes to years. The intensity and mode of 
training also appears to vary tremendously. It is potentially problematic to assume 
that effects of these variable lengths in training periods are only quantitative. The 
present research only examined trait mindfulness by employing self-report 
measures. It is important that this study is extended by comparing an experienced 
mindfulness meditation group with a non-experienced control group perhaps using 
a randomised control design to compare findings after an 8 week mindfulness 
training group to a no training control group.
The median split design employed by the researchers has its own limitations. Most 
notably a median split may have led to variability within the data being lost. This
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lack of variability may have resulted in a general loss in power. Despite the loss of 
variance between individuals, a median split was considered the best option for the 
purposes of the present study due to benefits of replicating and extending upon 
Derakshan et aTs (2009) study. There is considerable methodological literature 
examining and demonstrating negative consequences of dichotomization, firmly 
favouring the use of regression methods on undichtominized variables. Negative 
consequences include loss of information about individual differences, loss of 
power the occurrence of spurious main effects or interactions, risks of overlooking 
nonlinear effects and problems in comparing and aggregating findings across 
studies. In order to confirm that potential negative consequences of employing a 
median split design were insignificant to the present findings we also conducted a 
regression analysis on the data.
Summary and future directions
Although dispositional mindfulness was not found be related to attentional control, 
this non- significant result has led the researchers to consider whether dispositional 
mindfulness may in-fact be reducing the need to control or change experience 
resulting in increased adaptive behaviour. Mindfulness interventions aim at 
altering ones relationship to negative or threatening events and are thus response 
focused. This relationship may therefore be altered via learning to accept rather 
than reflexibly act upon thoughts and emotions. While cognitive reappraisal 
involves changing ones thinking regarding emotional stimuli, (a common approach 
in second wave cognitive behavioural therapy) mindfulness can be best described 
as engendering changes in how one relates to emotional perceptions, that is to 
appraisals in general. Future studies need to examine whether mindftilness plays a 
role upon cognitive reappraisal at a process rather than a content level.
Further research is required in order to ascertain whether mindfulness based 
treatments are useful for enhancing emotion regulation strategies and facilitating 
the development of more adaptive ways of responding to emotions. Few studies 
have examined whether a mindful stance towards emotions facilitates acceptance 
and increases emotional willingness. Dispositional mindfulness may increase 
exposure to unpleasant emotional states such as anxiety that would otherwise 
engender cognitive and behavioural defences. Conversely, it may also lead to a
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decrease in experiential avoidance that occurs when one is unwilling to remain in 
contact with what one is experiencing. Dispositional mindfulness may also alter the 
form and frequency of events, reducing experiential avoidance strategies such as 
distraction, rumination suppression and reappraisal allowing the opportunity for all 
thought processes to be examined in a less biased manner and for naturally 
accompanying emotional and physiological responses to diffuse. The exact 
relationship between mindfulness and emotion regulation strategies remains
unclear. It is important that future studies examine whether mindfulness does 
indeed facilitate a healthy engagement with difficult emotions allowing individuals 
to employ emotion regulation strategies in order to reduce experiential avoidance. 
Eye tracking tasks such as the dot probe task, the visual search task and the spatial 
cuing task would provide suitable measures for testing such predictions.
Mechanism research into mindfulness has great potential to link psychotherapy to 
basic psychological research, build theoretical models that bridge
psychotherapeutic modalities and improve clinical efficacy. The current study has 
aimed to contribute towards the new body of literature investigating the
mechanisms by which beneficial outcomes are obtained by mindfulness however 
more empirical research is required. The advancement of science and practice will 
be better served in the future with studies investigating not just whether
mindfulness based treatments work, but how they work
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Appendix A. Valenced stimuli serving as cue taken from Parke-Waters face model (Parke 
and Waters, 1996).
148
Appendix B. TTze mvargMgj  ^^ca/g (3mwM <& T^ ya» 200jy)
Mindfal AtfentiûP Awareness Scale
Ikschpdon:
The MAA9 ïs a 15-i#em scale designed to assess a core cbaractcnstk of di^x)shioaal 
miadMnes& namely, open or receptive awareness of and attenbon to what is taking place 
inthepresenî Tbescale shows strong ;»ydKMne#icprppertiesandhas teen validated 
widi college, cmnnmmty. and cancer palKOt samples. Gorrelahonal, quaË-experimental 
and WxKatoiysWies have shown that Ae MAAS taps a umqocqnality of cox^doosne^ 
thatisrdaitedto,andpre(hctiveo^ avanety of self^r^dationaMwdl-bemg constructs. 
The measure takeR 10 minutes or less to conqilete
Day t^o^Day Experiences
histnictioos: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday eapeiience. Using 
the 1-6 scakbdow,pleasc indicate howûeqpeady or m&M%uendyyoucurienndy have 
each cq)eneiice. Plea% answer accrmiing to what really reflects your experience rather 
than what you think your e^erience should be. PtMsetneat each item separately &om 
every odier item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Almost Very Somewhat Somewhat Viery Almost
Always Frequm% frequently Inûequeiüly Inhrequently Never
IcouWbeexperîerKingsomeemotKmaridnotbe 1 2 3 4 5 6
of it until some time later.
I break or spill things because of carelessnes not 1 2 3 4 5 6
paying attention, or thinking of smnethm% else
Ihnditdifhculttostayfbcusedonwhafshi^pening 1 2 3 4 5 6
m the present
Itemdtowalkqaicldytogetwbeiel'mgoingAithout 1 2 3 4 5 6
payingaWerdiKmtowhatleqxrience along the A3
I tendnottonr^ke&elings of physical tension or 1 2 3 4 5 6
discomâ)rt until real^ grab my ittentrcn
IA»getaperson'sB%Dealmostasso(masrveb%n 1 2 3 4 5 6
told A for the Srsttime.
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Itseemslam'^nmnmgmiaiitomatic," 
awareness ofwbatTm&MDg.
1 2 3 4 f> 6
IioAllm)i]^mWtieswd*bWbeing really attentive 
to them
1 2 3 4 f> 6
IgetsofbcQsedonfiiegoallwanttoacbievediatl 
lose touch now to get tl%re.
1 2 3 4 f> 6
I do Jobs or tasks automatical^ WÎ&OUÊ being aware 
of what Fm doing.
I. 2 3 4 :> 6
Ifindn^lflisteningtosomBoaew#(»Kear,doing
something else at the same time.
I 2 3 4 fÏ 6
I drive places (m**auh)maticpiIof anddien womkr
why I went there.
1 2 3 4 fÏ 6
I find myself preoco^ned with die future or the past. 1 2 3 4 fÏ 6
Ifindng^selfdmngdnn^withompzg^mgaKeation. 1 2 3 4 fi 6
I srm± without being aware that rmeatii^. I 2 3 4 fi 6
Scming infoimation:
To score tie scale, singly coxipife a mem of fiie 15 items. Hi^ier scores lefiect 
levels of disposttlooal nnndâ&mss.
Re&ience:
Blown, KM.. & Rym, îLM. (2003). Hie benefits of being prient: MnKÜdne  ^and its 
îoîeinp^dK 
84,822-848.
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Appendix C. The state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et a l, 1983)
University of
State-Trai
Student number:
Kent email address:
Paiticip^at number:
Gender. = Male Female
Age:
QMS
School of Psychology
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University of QMS
School o f Psychology
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults
Page 2  of3 
STAIFomiY-i
mdimte how yon feel right now, that is, at this moment.
There are no right or wrong answers.
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which 
seenis to describe your pr#entfeelihgs best.
1, Not at all 2. Somewhat 3. Moderately so 4. Very much so
1.....1................................... ...... . ' . .........................1 i 2  1 3 1 4
1. I feel cairn
2. Ifeel secure
3. I am tense
4. Î feel strained
5. I feet at ease
6- I feel upset
7. I am presently wonyiog over p q s# lc  msibriimes
8. 1 feel satisfied
9. I feel fiightened
10 Ifee! comfditable
11. I feel seif-confidept
12. f feel nervous
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13. I am jittery
14. I feelindecish'e
15. I am relaxed
16. I feel content
17. lam  worried
18. I feel confused
19. I feel steady
20. I feel pleasant
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U n iv e rs ity  o f QMS
School o f Psychology
STAIFormY-2
Â niuribm’ of statements which people have used to describe themselves will 
be presented.
indicate how you generally feel.
There are no right or wrong answers.
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which 
seems to describe your present feelings best.
1. Not at all 2. Somewhat 3. Moderately so 4. Very much so
1/ :2 ■ 3 1 4
21. I feel pleasant
22. I feel nervous and restless
23. I feel satished, with myself
24. I wish I could be as happy as ptbers seem to be
25. I feel like a failure
26. Ifeei rested
27, I am "calm, cool and collected”
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so feaf i  cannot Oyercpme 
them
29. I worry too much over something tlmt really dpesrft matter
30. I am happy
31. |l hâve disltirbirig thoughts
32. ji lack self-cotifidence
154
33. I feel secure
34. I make decisions easily
35. I feel inadequate
36. I am content
37. Some unimportant Àougbt runs through my mind and 
bothers me
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of 
my mind
39. I am a steady person
40. I get in a state o f tension or tuimoil as 1 think over my recent 
concerns and interests
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Appendix D. Participant information sheet
Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory 
Control Moderated by Mindfulness?
Who is Organising This Study?
This research is organised by the Psychology Department of the University of Kent. 
The researchers are Dinkar Sharma, a member of staff and Stewart Blake, a trainee 
counselling psychologist at the University of Surrey.
What Are the Aims of the Study?
This study will examine how emotions affect attention on a cognitive task. An eye- 
tracking device will be used to record eye movements whilst pictorial stimuli are 
presented on a computer screen. The pictorial stimuli will be presented in the form 
of faces. Participants will be required to either look directly at or way from the 
stimulus cue presented. After the eye-tracking task has been completed participants 
will be required complete three questionnaires.
What Happens to the Information I Provide?
Participation in this study guarantees confidentiality of the information you 
provide. No one apart from the researcher and research supervisor will have any 
access to the information you provide. Your name and any other identifying 
information will be stored separately from your data in a securely locked filing 
cabinet. Questionnaires will be stored in a securely locked room for as long as is 
required by the Data Protection Act, and then they will be destroyed by our 
confidential shredding service. The data collected for this study will form part of a 
student dissertation. Once the data is analysed a report of the findings may be 
submitted for publication. Only broad trends will be reported and it will not be 
possible to identify any individuals. A summary of the results will be available 
from the researcher on request.
Contact for Further Information
If you require any further information or have any queries about this study please 
contact the researcher: Dinkar Sharma, Stewart Blake 
email: D.Sharma@kent.ac.uk, stewart_blake@hotmail.com 
phone: 01227 823084
If you wish to withdraw your data from this study, please contact the Psychology 
Department Office on: Tel: 01227 823699
If you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please 
inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the Psychology 
Department Office) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.
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Appendix E. Informed consent form for the participant
Consent Form - copy 1 (for participant)
Title of project: Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory Control Moderated 
by Mindfulness?
Name of Researchers: Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma
1.1 Confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have the opportunity to ask questions.
2 .1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.
3.1 agree to take part in the above study
Name of the Participant:
Signature:__________________________Date:
Please retain this copy for your records
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Appendix F. Informed consent form for the researcher
Consent Form - copy 2 (for researcher)
Title of project: Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory Control Moderated 
by Mindfulness?
Name of Researcher: Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma,
1.1 Confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have the opportunity to ask questions.
2 .1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.
3 .1 agree to take part in the above study
Name of the Participant:
Signature:__________________________Date:
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Appendix G. Debrief form
Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory 
Control Moderated by Mindfulness?
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. We would like to provide 
some further information about the purpose of the study and what we expect to find.
The current study investigates how trait mindfulness can affect the processing of emotional 
images. We predict that negative images will increase the influence of the stimulus driven 
bottom-up attentional system whilst decreasing the effect of the goal driven top-down 
attentional system. In each trial you were required to either look towards or away from the 
stimulus presented. Each time you were instructed to look away it was necessary to exert 
top-down attentional control to avoid looking at the stimulus. This study compares whether 
the errors in directional gaze are related to trait mindfulness. The questionnaires completed 
at the end of the task enable the researchers to measure your trait mindfulness.
If you have any queries about this research or would like to ask any further questions, 
please contact the researcher or research supervisor using the contact details below.
If you would like to withdraw your data at any point, please contact the Psychology 
departmental office on 01227 823961. If you have been given a participant code you need 
to cite this. You do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.
Once again, we would like to thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. 
Your participation is greatly appreciated.
Yours sincerely.
Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma
Researcher contact details;
Dinkar Sharma 
D. Sharma@kent.ac.uk 
phone: 01227 823084
If you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the 
Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the Psychology Department Office) in 
writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.
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Appendix H. Ethical approval by the university research ethics committee.
APPROVAL BY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
The following research project has been approved by
The Psychology Research Ethics Committee
Date: 10:05 03-02-2012
Code: 20122269
Applicant details:
Name: Stewart Blake 
Status: Student
Email address: sb714@kent.ac.uk 
Title of the research:
Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory Control Moderated by Mindfulness? 
When carrying out this research you are reminded to
* follow the Departmental Guidelines for Conducting Research with Human Participants
* comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
* refer any amendments to the protocol to the Panel
Please keep this form in a safe place. You may be asked to present it at a later stage of your 
study for monitoring purposes. Final year project students and MSc students will need to 
submit a copy of this form with their project.
You can log in at http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php to copy or 
print pregenerated handouts for this study.
Applicant Details:
Name of the researcher Stewart Blake
Name of the supervisor Dr Dinkar Sharma
Status Student
Email address sb714@kent.ac.uk
rp., Is The Relationship Between Anxiety and Inhibitory
 ^  ^ Control Moderated by Mindfulness?
Summary No summary available
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Appendix I. Personal reflections
This research considers the way we pay attention in the present moment, 
specifically when we are faced with threat. As a counselling psychologist in 
training the present research ■ has been important to me both personally and 
professionally. Understanding how specific mechanisms mediate mindfulness may 
directly improve the functioning of brain and body, subjective mental life with its 
thoughts and feelings and also interpersonal relationships. Having had the 
opportunity to immerse myself into researching the topic of mindfulness, it has 
reinforced how, in being fully present of my own awareness, I can open up my own 
life to new possibilities of wellbeing.
Formal practice throughout the year has enabled me to deepen my capacity to be 
attentive to the participants that have taken part in this research and has 
strengthened my capacity to write up this report. For over 6 months, I have spent up 
to an hour with over one hundred and twelve people individually and have been 
privileged to hear their stories concerning mindfulness meditation and their 
personal battles with anxiety. I have noticed myself becoming excited in sharing 
my experience and knowledge of mindfulness meditation with others. However, I 
have also been taken aback by the amount of people that have been open in 
disclosing how their lives are defined by anxiety, stress and exhaustion. Many 
participants have subsequently been fascinated by the experimental procedure and 
have requested guidance in starting their own mindfulness practice.
Formal practice for thirty minutes each day has focused my attention when writing 
each section of this research report. Mindfulness meditation has allowed me to 
notice times throughout the year when I have been under stress and has helped me 
to control my attention and regulate my emotions. Mindfulness has developed into 
my self-care intervention of choice, strengthening my own self-knowledge and 
assisting me in the delivering this report. Mindfulness meditation has also 
encouraged me to become patient and compassionate in regard to my schedule 
throughout the year. When I have experienced difficulties such as a computer 
malfunction that resulted in data being lost, I have maintained a sense of open 
awareness and gentle persistence in order to free me from the gravitational pull 
towards anxiety stress and unhappiness. Throughout the year mindfulness has
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allowed me to pay attention to my goals without evaluation or judgment. Mindful 
awareness has resulted in me being patient and empowered, working often in the 
absence of anxiety. Mindfulness has also enabled me to dissolve any negative 
patterns of thinking and behaviour that during past projects have held me back from 
producing work that I believed I was capable of.
The strengthening of my attention has given me the flexibility to inhibit unpleasant 
thoughts, feelings and ruminations and to shift the focus of my awareness to 
present moment experience. Having experienced, first-hand, how mindfulness can 
enhance control over how attention is distributed, I am surprised about the lack of 
empirical research examining this relationship. A comprehensive understanding of 
how mindfulness affects attentional control is of great important to me as a 
scientific practitioner as it may allow me in the future to identify precise 
mindfulness interventions that can be tailored to specific clients.
This research therefore integrates my subjective experience of mindfulness, with 
modem science in order to aid professional application. I have been thrilled to have 
the opportunity to empirically explore the mediating effects of mindfulness on 
attentional control. The present research has also lead me to believe that 
controlling attention and being present can also be seen as one of the most 
important elements to help others heal. The research process has also enhanced my 
control of attention in the therapy room, a skill that enables me to be fully present, 
enriching my rapport with clients. I am mindful to direct my attention fully towards 
each client during their therapy session, to listen intently to what they are saying so 
that they are heard and understood. Formal practice enables me to deepen my 
capacity to be attentive to others and also helps me to be more comfortable with 
silences
My hope is that the present research will have an impact by stimulating dialogue 
about how mindfulness and acceptance based interventions work. The research is 
aimed at examining what is changing when people participate in mindfulness based 
interventions and explain why they lead to reduced distress and improved well­
being. The process of change addressed in this research is personally exciting to me 
as mediational studies of mindfulness based treatments are new to the literature and
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should make a substantial contribution to our understanding of how mindfulness 
based treatments work.
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Does State Mindfulness Moderate the Relationship Between Threat and
Attentional Bias?
Abstract
Mindfulness has been proposed to regulate emotional responses to threating 
stimuli, strengthening the strategic ability of attentional control (Bishop et al, 
2004). Conversely, the cognitive motivational model of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998) proposes that deficits in attentional control are influenced by the emotional 
connotation of threatening stimuli resulting in biases in attention towards 
emotionally aversive stimuli and away from non-emotionally aversive stimuli. In 
this study, we employed the emotional dot probe task to examine the effects of a 
brief mindfulness induction and a brief story-listening induction on emotional 
responding in the presence of highly threatening and mildly threatening picture 
scenes. Participants randomly assigned to a brief story-listening induction group 
demonstrated a significant attentional bias of vigilance towards highly threatening 
picture scenes but not a significant attentional bias of avoidance away from mildly 
threatening picture scenes, post-induction. An observable pattern of avoidance from 
mildly threatening scenes shifting to a pattern of vigilance towards highly 
threatening scenes was significant for this group. In contrast, participants randomly 
assigned to the mindfulness induction group did not demonstrate a significant 
attentional bias of vigilance towards highly threatening picture scenes or a 
significant attention bias of avoidance away from mildly threatening picture scenes 
post-induction. Participants in the mindfiilness induction group did not respond 
differently as a result of stimulus threat value. Findings are discussed in terms of 
the psychotherapeutic impact that brief mindfulness interventions may have in 
moderating the relationship between threat and attentional bias.
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Mindfulness based treatments have repeatedly been shown to reduce anxiety across 
diverse populations, adding to a growing body of literature in regard to their 
efficacy (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010). However, few studies have 
examined the mechanisms by which such positive outcomes are obtained. 
Mechanism research into mindfulness has great potential to link psychotherapy to 
basic psychological research, build theoretical models that bridge 
psychotherapeutic modalities and improve clinical efficacy. It is now important for 
researchers to examine the psychological processes that account for the beneficial 
effects of mindfulness in order to answer the question: how do mindfulness-based 
treatments work?
Bishop et al., (2004) have offered perhaps the most comprehensive operational 
definition of mindfulness, proposing how it may act as a moderating mechanism in 
reducing attentional biases towards or away from threat. The authors have put 
forward several testable predictions for researchers in order to validate the 
mindfulness constructs specificity in relation to attentional bias. Bishop et al., 
(2004) describe mindfulness as having two overarching and interrelated 
components, namely self-regulation of attention (impacting upon attentional control 
mechanisms), and the attitude of an open and accepting orientation towards current 
experience (impacting upon emotional regulation mechanisms).
However, currently there is little consensus within the literature as to how 
mindfulness practice might help to regulate disruptive emotions reducing 
attentional bias towards or away from threat. Two research groups have recently 
put forward contrasting theories as to how mindfulness may be helpful in 
enhancing emotion regulation: (1), limiting emotional reactivity and (2), 
strengthening attentional control in the face of negative affect (Chambers, Gullone 
& Allan, 2009; Garland, Gaylord & Park, 2009). Chambers et al., (2009) argue that 
mindfulness involves a systematic retraining of awareness and non-reactivity, 
leading to defusion from whatever is experienced, allowing individuals to more 
consciously choose those thoughts, emotions and sensations to identify with rather 
than habitually react towards them. According to Chambers et al., (2009), 
mindfulness should be considered a bottom-up emotion regulation strategy, 
involving the development of a greater ability to ‘stay in touch’ with whatever is
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experienced within the phenomenological field with no need to actively regulate or 
reappraise what is experienced. In contrast, Garland et al., (2009) argue that 
mindfulness may be an intrinsic and central element within meaning based coping 
strategies that facilitate positive reappraisal. According to Garland et al., (2009), 
mindfulness should be considered a top-down emotion regulation strategy where 
through cognitive reappraisal individuals are better able to actively reinterpreted 
emotional stimuli in a way that modifies their emotional impact.
Although few empirical studies currently exist, researchers are increasingly 
investigating the relationship between mindfulness interventions and emotional 
regulation. Results from several studies indicate a correlational relationship 
between self-reports of mindfulness and emotional regulation (Baer, Smith, & 
Allen, 2004; Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson & Laurenceau 2007). In one study, 
Coffey and Hartman (2008) found that emotion regulation mediated the 
relationship between mindfulness and distress in a sample of undergraduate 
students. In regard to experimental research, efforts to date have been focused on 
examining the relationship between short-term mindfulness interventions and 
emotion regulation. Arch and Craske (2006) conducted an analogue study 
examining the effects of a 15 minute focused induction on emotional intensity and 
willingness to tolerate emotion during a slide-viewing task. In this study, 
participants were randomly assigned to a mindfulness (focused breathing), worry, 
or a control (unfocused breathing) condition. Participants were then required to 
view negative, positive and neutral pictures. Results indicated that participants in 
the mindfulness condition were more willing to remain in contact with negative 
slides and reported less emotional volatility and negative reactivity across the task 
compared to participants in the worry and control conditions. Erisman and Roemer 
(2010) recently studied the effects of a 10 minute mindfulness intervention on 
participant’s ability to regulate their emotions by having them watch positive, 
negative or affectively-mixed emotion provoking film clips. Participants randomly 
recruited to a mindfulness condition reported an increase in positive affect in 
response to positive film clip and a decrease in negative affect in response to mixed 
film clips compared to the controls. No significant differences were observed 
between groups on negative affect in response to the distressing film clip. In a 
correlational study Ortner, Kilner & Zelazo (2007) had experienced mindfulness
166
practitioners categorise tones that were presented 1 or 4 seconds after the onset of 
pictures with emotional content versus neutral pictures over a 15 minute period. 
Reaction times to tones following the emotional pictures versus the neutral pictures 
revealed that participants with greater meditation experience showed less 
interference from the emotional pictures and reported lower levels of emotional 
reactivity. In conclusion, although studies on short-term mindfulness interventions 
have yielded mixed results, there is some available evidence to suggest an 
association between mindfulness and emotion regulation (Arch & Craske, 2006; 
Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Coffey & Hartman, 2008; Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, 
Greeson & Laurenceau 2007; Ortner, Kilner & Zelazo, 2007). More research is 
now needed on this topic (especially experimental studies and randomized control 
trials) exploring how mindfulness might minimise the impact of negative emotion 
on cognitive performance. For if specific cognitive functions related to emotion 
regulation are found to be moderated by mindfulness practice, then this may have 
significant implications for tailoring future mindfulness based interventions for 
those suffering anxiety.
Cognitive theories of anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997, Wells & Mathews, 1994, 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Matthews, 1988) suggest that anxious individuals 
demonstrate an attentional bias of selectively attending towards threatening stimuli. 
An extensive literature suggests that attentional bias results from deficits in 
attentional control and is influenced by the emotional connotation of to-be- 
processed information. Emotional events, especially negative emotional events 
have repeatedly been shown to orient, attract and or capture attention more so than 
neutral events (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & Van 
Ijendoom for a review). Evidence for these effects come from laboratory studies 
employing the stroop task (Stroop 1935), the emotional dot probe paradigm 
(MacLeod, Matthews, Tata, 1986), the antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978), the visual 
search task (e.g. Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001), and the spatial-cueing task 
(Posner, 1980). These tasks measure selective attentional biases towards emotion 
relative to neutral stimuli. Results have consistently demonstrated that attention 
towards threatening stimuli is strongly prioritised over neutral or positive stimuli 
(see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a review). This phenomenon has been labelled
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‘vigilance’ and has been assigned a prominent role in the etiology and maintenance 
of anxiety disorders.
Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational model of anxiety assumes that 
emotion regulation strategies moderate the attentional bias of vigilance towards 
threating stimuli. According to their cognitive motivational model (1998), stimuli 
are first evaluated in terms of valence, via a rapid analysis of the stimulus 
characteristics, along with information about current state of anxiety and anxiety 
vulnerability. Output from this valance evaluation system feeds into a goal 
engagement system, which determines the allocation of resources for cognitive 
processing and action (see Figure 1). If a stimulus is evaluated with high threat 
value then on-going activities are interrupted and processing resources are allocated 
to the threatening stimulus. Thus attentional responses to emotional stimuli are 
largely determined by the subjective appraisal of stimulus threat value
Stimulus input ^
Stimulus context ->•
State anxiety ^
Prior learning ^
Biological
Preparadness ->
Valance High
Evaluation Threat
System
No
Threat
Goal Engagement system
Interpret current goals 
(‘danger mode’) Orient to 
threat
Pursue current goals 
(default ‘safety’ mode) 
Prioritise positive stimuli 
Ignore minor negative 
stimuli
Trait anxiety reflects reactivity of 
Valance evaluation system to aversive stimuli
Figure 1. Cognitive-motivational view of the mechanisms underlying biases in 
initial orienting to threat in anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).
Mogg and Bradley (1998) propose that the relationship between subjective stimulus 
threat value and attentional biases is not linear but curvilinear in nature (see Figure 
2). In their shifted function account of attentional bias the authors assume that
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when stimuli have no threat value then no attentional bias should occur as there is 
no affect. However when stimuli are evaluated as being mildly aversive, having 
low subjective threat value, then the focus of attention should be directed away and 
an avoidance pattern should be observable. As subjective appraisal of threat 
increases as a function of increasing objective stimulus threat value and/or 
individual differences in anxiety attention is more likely to be allocated to the 
salient stimulus and a vigilance pattern should be observable.
Bias in initial 
Orienting to threat
Vigilance
Avoidance
Mild Moderate HighNone
Figure 2. Hypothetical relationship between attentional bias and the objective 
threat value of stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).
As threat value of aversive stimuli increases from the mild to the high range, 
individuals experience more aversive emotion and should become increasingly 
more likely to orient their attention towards, rather than away from, the location of 
the threat. Individuals varying in anxiety should also differ in terms of when they 
shift from attentional avoidance to attentional vigilance. The threshold for shifting
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from avoidance to vigilance is lower among high trait anxiety individuals than 
among low trait anxiety individuals. In sum, Mogg and Bradley (1998) postulate 
that biases in evaluation of threat cues underlie vulnerability to attentional bias.
Empirical support for Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational model of 
anxiety stems from research using the emotional dot probe task. In this task 
participants are shown a pair of stimuli for a short time (e.g. 500ms) at two spatial 
locations on a computer screen. One of the stimuli is threatening the other is 
neutral. After the offset of these stimuli a dot probe emerges at the location of the 
threatening stimulus (a congruent trial) or at the location of the neutral stimulus (an 
incongruent trial). The allocation of attention is measured by the reaction time (RT) 
needed to respond to the dot probe. It is reasoned that the response to the probe will 
be faster when attention is already allocated to the spatial location where the probe 
appears. Attentional biases are inferred from attentional bias scores calculated by 
subtracting RTs on congruent trials from RTs on incongruent trials. A positive 
attentional bias score indicates vigilance towards threat. A negative bias score 
indicates avoidance from threat
Studies directly testing the predictions made by the cognitive motivational model of 
anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) have been limited but supportive. Mogg, 
McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer & Bradley (2000), employing two 
experiments, examined the effects of manipulating stimulus threat value on the 
direction of attentional biases among high and low trait anxious individuals. The 
stimuli included high threat and mild threat pictorial scenes presented in a dot 
probe task. In experiment 1, the pictorial scenes were presented in black and white 
taken from a variety of sources (e.g., medical and legal texts, video stills) and in 
experiment 2 they were presented in colour, taken from the International Affective 
Picture System (lAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999). Results from both studies 
indicated significant attentional biases towards high threat pictorial scenes and 
significant attentional biases away from mild threat pictorial scenes. These effects 
were found irrespective of trait anxiety levels but were more pronounced for high 
anxious individuals, supporting their theory. In a further study directly examining 
the effects of varying levels of threat intensity on attentional bias, Wilson and 
Macleod (2003) compared probe reaction times of high and low trait anxious
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individuals to very low, low, moderate, high and very high anger facial expressions 
paired with a neutral face. In line with the authors’ hypotheses results showed that 
all individuals failed to demonstrate attentional bias to the very low threat stimuli, 
demonstrated attentional bias of avoidance away from mildly threatening faces, and 
demonstrated attentional bias of vigilance towards the most intensely threatening 
stimuli. Interestingly, group differences in attentional bias were only apparent when 
moderately threatening faces served as cue as the high trait anxious group 
demonstrated a significant attentional bias towards them whereas the low trait 
anxious group did not. Wilson and Macleod (2003) concluded that their pattern of 
results fully supported and lent credence to the cognitive motivational model of 
anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). On the basis of Mogg et al., (2000) and Wilson 
and MacLeod’s (2003) findings of a shifted attentional function account of 
attentional bias, Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer (2006) employed the 
dot probe paradigm to examine whether high trait anxious and low trait anxious 
individuals differed in responding to highly threatening pictures and mildly 
threatening pictures respectively taken from the lAPS (Lang et al., 1999). Results 
provided further support for the cognitive motivational model of anxiety (1998) as 
both groups demonstrated attentional biases of avoidance away firom mild threat 
pictures and attentional bias of vigilance towards high threat pictures. High trait 
anxious individuals oriented significantly more strongly towards both high threat 
and mild threat pictures compared to low trait anxious individuals. Furthermore, 
low trait anxious individuals avoided the mild threat pictures to a significantly 
greater extent than high trait anxious individuals.
In accordance with the empirical evidence supporting the effects of mindfulness 
upon emotion regulation and the empirical evidence in support of the cognitive 
motivational model of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), the present study 
investigates whether mindfulness-based meditation will have a moderating effect 
upon the relationship between stimulus threat value and attentional biases. We 
propose that a mindfulness meditation practice may negate the shifted function 
account of attentional bias consistently found within both non-anxious and anxious 
populations changing the typically observed curvilinear relationship between 
stimulus threat value and attentional bias (see Figure 2) to a non-correlated 
relationship (see Figure 3). By regulating emotion and emotional responses it is
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expected that mindfulness-based interventions may reduce the effect of attentional 
avoidance away from mildly aversive stimuli and also reduce any increase in 
attentional vigilance towards high threat stimuli, enhancing attentional control. The 
tenets of the cognitive motivational model of anxiety provide a theoretical 
framework to explain underlying mechanisms responsible for potential changes in 
the relationship between stimulus threat value and attention bias. More specifically 
it is reasonable to posit that mindfulness may induce changes to the valance 
evaluation system in the assessment of stimulus threat value thereby regulating 
emotion and strengthening attentional control
Bias in initial 
Orienting to threat
Vigilance
Avoidance
None Mild Moderate High
Figure 3. Hypothetical relationship between attentional bias and the objective 
threat value of stimuli when moderated by mindfulness
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The main objective of this study is therefore to determine whether mindfulness has 
a moderating effect upon the relationship between stimulus threat value and 
attentional bias. This research is particularly pertinent to the discipline of 
Psychotherapeutic and Counselling psychology as it intends to impact on the future 
direction of initiatives designed to tackle problems related to the escalating levels 
of anxiety in our society. In giving rise to dissolving the adverse effects of anxiety, 
mindfulness may affect the influence of prior conditioning that enslaves many 
individuals by strengthening emotion regulation capabilities.
The current research examines the nature of attentional biases in line with the 
cognitive motivational model of anxiety (1998) using the emotional dot probe 
methodology (cf. Koster, Verschuere, Crombez & Van Damme, 2005) with mildly 
and highly threatening picture cues. Our procedure was largely similar to the one of 
Koster et al, (2005) employing three presentation conditions (100, 500 and 
1250ms) in order to examine whether attentional biases to threat cues change as a 
result of duration exposure. There were however some differences. We randomly 
assigned participants to a mindfulness or an active control group and all 
participants were then exposed to emotionally evocative pictures shown within the 
dot probe task twice - once (at baseline) before the mindfulness or control induction 
and once (post induction) after the induction to examine the causal effects of 
mindfulness.
Several hypotheses were formulated based upon the cognitive motivational model 
of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and the effects of mindfulness on emotion 
regulation. Post manipulation, we expected to find a three-way interaction of 
congruency x cue type x group. We hypothesised that an analysis of bias scores 
(i.e. incongruent RTs minus congruent RTs) would reveal a significant attentional 
bias of avoidance away from mild threat cues and an attentional bias of vigilance 
towards high threat cues within the control group. In line with the shifted function 
account of attentional bias (Mogg and Bradley, 1998) we hypothesised that 
attentional bias scores would once more shift in a positive direction to indicate 
increased vigilance and reduced avoidance as cue type threat value increased from 
the mild to the high threat range. In contrast, we hypothesised that participants in 
the mindfulness group would not display significant attentional biases towards high
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threat cues or attentional biases away from mild threat cues. We hypothesised that 
attentional bias scores would not shift in a positive direction to indicate increased 
vigilance and reduced avoidance of threat as stimulus threat value increased from 
the mild threat to the high threat range in the mindfulness group. We therefore 
predicted that the mindfulness group would react in a similar fashion to all cue 
types irrespective of threat value.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty eight participants (98 women, 77%) were recruited by 
means of an advertisement posted on the university of Kent’s Research 
Participation Scheme (RPS) website (mean age = 20.07 years SD = 2.87) Each 
participant was tested in a separate laboratory session lasting approximately 45 
minutes and was reimbursed with either RPS credits going towards their degree 
program or £4 for their contribution.
Sixty-four participants were randomly allocated to the mindfulness group with a 
mean age of 20.16 years {SD = 3.05) Sixty-four participants were randomly 
allocated into the control group with a mean age of 19.98 years {SD = 2.70). The 
Mindfulness group did not differ significantly with respect to age or gender 
compared to the control group {F = (1,127) = .114, /> = .7.36. and (1, N=128) = 
2.788 ,p  = .095 , respectively).
Design
Two identical mixed factorial designs were employed. The first was applied to the 
baseline (pre-manipulation) data as a check of randomisation. The second mixed 
factorial design examined reaction times post-induction as a test of hypotheses. The 
ANOVA’s consisted of a 2 (group type; mindfulness vs. control) x 2 (cue type; 
high threat (HT) vs. mild threat (MT)) x 2 (Congruency; congruent vs. incongruent) 
X 3 (duration; 100ms, 500ms, 1250ms) design. The independent variables were 
group (mindfulness, control) cue type (HT, MT), congruency (congruent.
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incongruent) and duration (100ms, 500ms, 1250 Ms). The dependent variables 
were the RT to the target displayed and attentional bias scores.
Materials
We selected the same 16 neutral (N; E.g. household object), four HT (e.g., 
mutilated body) and four MT (e.g. man with a knife) pictures used in the study by 
Koster et al., (2005) to form picture set 1. These pictures were taken from the lAPS 
(Lang et al., 1999) on the basis of their normative valance and arousal ratings. HT 
pictures were selected on very negative valance and high arousal value, MT 
pictures on mildly negative valance and average arousal level. We then created four 
different picture pairs for each trial type (HT-N, MT-N, N-N). Pictures were 
roughly matched for colour, brightness and content.
We then created picture set 2 by matching each picture in picture set 1 to a picture 
taken from the lAPS (Lang et al., 1999) on the basis of their valence and arousal 
ratings. We then created four further picture pairs for each trial type (HT-N, MT-N, 
N-N). Pictures were once more roughly matched for colour brightness and content. 
Additionally, 20 nonthreatening pictures were selected for use in the practice trials. 
Pictures were presented with a mean height of 4.6 cm and a mean width of 6.5 cm 
(see Appendix A).
The probe detection task was programmed and presented by the EPRIME software 
package on a S710 Compaq Deskpro computer with a 72HZ, 17-in colour monitor. 
The EPRIME software package provides a sensitive measure for reaction times
Measures
1. The Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 
2003, see Appendix B) measured levels of mindfulness among participants. The 
MAAS consisted of 15 statements intended to evaluate core characteristics of 
dispositional mindfulness. Statements included T find it difficult to stay focused 
on what’s happening in the present’ and T find myself doing things without paying 
attention’. Truth towards these statements was recorded on a 6 point likert scale 
ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never).
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The MAAS has been validated in student, working adults and cancer populations. 
MAAS construction, factor analysis and reliability assessment received an internal 
consistency alpha (reliability) of .82 with a student population and .87 with a 
general adult population (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Furthermore, Brown and Ryan
(2003) conducted a test-retest reliability and agreement on 60 psychology students 
over a 4 week period and found the intraclass correlation (validity) was .81 (p < 
.0001). Construct validity of the MAAS has also been examined within a clinical 
population using exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modelling to 
assess the criterion validity of the scale. The MAAS yielded an internal consistency 
alpha (reliability) of .87 and a correlation of .70 p < 0.001 (Brown and Ryan, 
2003). Full details on the validation and reliability of the MAAS are available in 
Brown and Ryan (2003)
2. The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Riebel, Greeson, Brainard & Rosenzweig, 
2001, see Appendix C) measured the attainment of a mindful state immediately 
following the audio induction. The original 13 item scale is refined to a two factor 
model that defines mindfulness within factor 1 as curious awareness and within 
factor 2 as decentring. Statements include T experience myself as separate from my 
changing thoughts and feelings’ and T was receptive to observing unpleasant 
thoughts and feelings without interfering with them. Truth towards these statements 
was recorded on a 5 point likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much)
The Toronto mindfulness scale has been validated in working adults. The scales 
construction, factor analysis and reliability assessment received an internal 
consistency alpha (reliability) of .88 for factor 1 labelled curiosity and .84 for factor 
2 labelled decentring (Lau, Bishop, Segal, Buis, Anderson, Carlson, Shapiro & 
Carmody 2006).
Procedure
Upon arrival all participants were seated outside of the laboratory and were 
randomly assigned using a double blind method to one of two groups (the 
mindfiilness group or the control group.) Participants were informed that the 
experiment would comprise of five tasks. An information sheet (see Appendix D) 
was then administered informing participants about the unpleasant nature of some
176
of the pictures and their right to withdraw at any time. After completing the 
relevant consent forms (see Appendix E & F) participants were required to make 
their responses on the MAAS.
Participants were then led into a dimly lit laboratory and were asked to take a seat 
at a desk approximately 60cm in front of a computer screen. Participants then 
performed a probe detection task that consisted of 20 practice trials and 144 test 
trials. Each trial began with a fixation cross (subtending 0.94°) in the centre of the 
screen for 1000ms. Then, two pictures with margins 2.2cm from the centre of the 
screen appeared for either 100, 500, or 12500ms at an upper and lower location. 
Immediately (1 refresh rate) after the onset of the two pictures, a small dot probe 
(5mm width) was presented at the spatial location of one of the pictures. 
Participants were asked to press one of two buttons on a standard AZERTY 
keyboard as quickly and as accurately as possible to indicate the probe position. 
Participants pressed the R key with their left index figure when the probe was 
presented at the upper location and the M  key with their left index figure when the 
probe is presented in the lower location. Every picture was presented 12 times with 
an equal number of congruent vs. incongruent probe presentations and with an 
equal number of probe presentations at the lower and upper location. The trials 
were presented in a new random order for each participant
Following completion of the first probe detection task participants were instructed 
to place a set of headphones upon their ears and listen to 2 audio recordings, the 
first of 8 minutes in duration and the second of 10 minutes of duration with a 30 
second interval in between. Participants assigned to the mindfulness group listened 
to mindfulness meditation number one and number six taken from Mindfulness; A 
practical guide to finding peace in a frantic world (Williams & Penman, 2011). 
Participants assigned to the control group listened to extracts from JRR Tolkien’s 
the Hobbit (BBC audiobooks Ltd., 2000) taken from the start and end of the story. 
Following completion of the audio recordings, participants were then required to 
make their responses on the Toronto Mindfulness scale to ascertain whether a 
mindful state had been attained.
Participants then performed a second probe detection task formed of 144 test trials 
with a different picture set presented than the set presented in the first probe
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detection task. The order in which picture sets and test trials were presented was 
counterbalanced across participants for both dot probe tasks. Once participants 
competed this task they were instructed to inform the experimenter that they have 
finished the experiment and were given a debrief form (see Appendix G).
Ethical considerations
The present study complied with guidelines laid out in the British Psychological 
Societies BPS code of conduct, ethical principles and guidelines, and the 
universities research ethics handbook. The research at all times considered the 
ethical implications and psychological consequences of all participants involved. 
Furthermore, approval from the universities Ethics committee was essential before 
proceeding with the experiment (see Appendix H). The study itself was justified on 
the basis that the findings should provide some empirical support towards the 
notion that mindfulness moderates the relationship between threat and attentional 
bias and how this is relevant to the maintenance of anxiety disorders.
To ensure for a reasoned and balanced treatment of ethical issues participants were 
informed that the experiment involved exposure to threatening stimuli and that they 
had the right to withdraw fi*om the study at any time. In the event that any personal 
concerns were raised as a result of the experiment contact details for the 
counselling services team at the university were also provided.
Results
Analysis o f questionnaires
Mean trait mindfulness score at baseline as measured by the Mindfulness Attention 
Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) for participants was 3.68 {SD = .72). 
Within the Mindfulness group the mean trait mindfulness score was 3.64 {SD = 
.70) and within the control group (n= 64) the mean trait mindfulness score was 3.73 
{SD = .75). An independent samples Mest revealed no significant differences in 
trait mindfulness between groups (^(126) = .68, p  = .496)
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Post-intervention mean state mindfulness score as measured by the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale (Riebel, Greeson, Brainard & Rosenzweig, 2001) for 
participants was 30.28 (SD = 9.00). Within the Mindfulness group the mean state 
mindfulness score was 32.23 (SD = 8.42) and within the control group the mean 
state mindfulness score was 28.33 (SD = 9.20). The mean of the facet of curiosity 
for the Mindfulness group was 15.42 (SD = 5.15) and for the control group was 
12.66 (SD = 5.35). The mean of the facet of decentring for the Mindfulness group 
was 16.81 (SD = 4.61) and for the control group was 15.67 (SD = 4.99). 
Independent sample t tests revealed a significant difference in state anxiety (t(\26) 
= 2.51, jo = .013) as well as a significant difference in the facet of curiosity (/(126) 
= 2.98, p  = .003) between groups. No significant differences were found between 
groups for the facet of decentring (r(126) = 1.34, p  = .181).
Preparation o f reaction time data
Errors (M  = 2.04 , SD = 2.02) were excluded from analyses. Next, individual 
outliers were defined as RT’s that deviated more than three 5!D’s from the 
individual mean RT. Errors and outliers accounted for only 3.18% of the data and 
were not further analysed. Mean RT’s to congruent and incongruent trials for 
participants in the mindfulness group and the control group both at baseline and 
post induction are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1.
Mean reaction times (in Ms) on the neutral, congruent and incongruent threatening 
trials for the mindfulness and control groups at baseline and post-intervention.
Mindfuiiiess Group Control Group
Duration Cue type Congruency Baseiine
M
Post
M
Baseline
M
Post
M
Î00 N-N 507 464 501 473
HT-N Congruent 515 471 513 479
Incongruent 514 472 513 479
MT-N Congruent 506 463 516 484
Incongruent 511 476 514 477
500 N-N 508 474 507 482
HT-N Congment 523 491 521 500
Incongruent 530 493 520 514
MT-N Congruent 518 480 521 502
Incongruent 518 488 518 498
1250 N-N 490 466 488 470
HT-N Congruent SOI 480 500 484
Incongruent 516 489 506 495
MT-N Congruent 501 485 509 491
Incongruent 500 477 502 480
Analysis o f reaction times at baseline (check o f randomisation)
RT’s at baseline were subjected t o a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2  mixed design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with duration (100/500/1250ms), cue type (HT/MT) and congruency 
(congruent/incongruent) as within subjects variables and group as the between- 
subject variables. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of duration (F(2, 
252) = 11.87, MSE = 2980.59, p  < .001, pp^ = .086) and a significant two way 
interaction of cue type x group (F(l, 126) = 3.95, MSE = 1206.73 , p  = 0.049, pp^ = 
.030). All other effects were not significant. We did not find a two way interaction 
of congruency x cue type as hypothesised (F(l,126) =2.25, MSE = 1206.733 , p  = 
.136, rjp  ^ = .018). However in line with our predictions there was no significant 
three way interaction between cue type x congruency x group (F(l,126) .977, MSE 
= 1244.373,/» = .210, rjp  ^ = 000).
The main effect of duration revealed that participants had longer reaction times at 
500ms (M = 521.13, SD = 174.91) compared to the 100ms (M = 512.66, SD 
=188.26) and 1250ms (M = 504.51, SD = 168.12) conditions. The congruency x
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group interaction revealed that participants in the mindfulness group took longer to 
respond to congruent trials (M = 516.59, SD =242.79) compared to incongruent 
trials (M= 509.03, SD = 248.01) at baseline.
In order to clarify whether participants attended away from mild threat stimuli and 
towards high threat stimuli attentional bias indices were calculated by subtracting 
RT’s on congruent trials from RT’s on incongruent trials (Macleod & Matthews, 
1988). A positive attentional bias score indicates attending to threatening pictures. 
A negative attentional bias index score indicates avoidance of threat. Bias scores 
were calculated separately for HT-N and MT-N picture pairs across all time 
durations. Attentional bias scores revealed that participants attended towards the 
HT cue types (M = 4.29, SD = 28.65) and avoided the MT cue types (M = - 1.19, 
SD = 28.04). The pattern of attentional bias index scores for participants at 
baseline are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Mean attentional bias scores on the mild threat and high threat trials for 
all participants at baseline.
Hypothesis testing - analysis o f post-intervention reaction times
Reaction Times at time 2 were subjected t o a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2  mixed design analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with duration (100/500/1250ms), cue type (HT/MT) and
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congruency (congruent/incongruent) as within subjects variables and group as the 
between-subject variables. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
duration (F(2, 252) = 25.104, MSE = 2237.471, p  <.001, pp^ = .166), and a 
significant three way interaction of cue type x congruency x group interaction (F(l, 
126) = 4.077, MSE = 1613.826,/» = .046, rjp  ^= .031). All other effects were non­
significant.
The main effect of duration revealed that participants overall had longer reaction 
times at 500ms (M= 495.93, SD = 171.29) compared to the 100ms (M =474.98, SD 
= 152.05) and 1250ms conditions (M =485.28, SD = 174.68).
In order to clarify the significant three way interaction, individual attentional bias 
indices were calculated by subtracting RTs on congruent trials from RTs on 
incongruent trials (Macleod & Matthews, 1988). A positive attentional bias score 
indicates attending to threatening pictures. A negative attentional bias index score 
indicates avoidance of threat. Bias scores were calculated separately for HT-N and 
MT-N picture pairs across all time durations. The mindfulness group attended 
towards both HT cue types (M = 3.75, SD = 22.95) as well as MT cue types (M = 
4.32, SD = 33.66) The control group attended towards the HT cue types (M = 8.57, 
SD = 32.76) and avoided the MT cue types (M = -7.42, SD = 36.76). The pattern of 
attentional bias index scores for the mindfulness and control groups are depicted in 
Figure 5. As a result of cue type exposure the control groups attentional bias scores 
behaved in opposite directions, in line with Mogg and Bradley’s model (1998). 
Whereas the mindfulness groups attentional bias scores did not.
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Figure 5. Mean attentional bias score on the mild threat and high threat trials for 
the control group and the mindfulness group post-induction.
In order to examine for attentional biases within the groups we carried out a series 
of post hoc ?-test. A paired samples Mest examined whether there were significant 
differences in attentional bias scores within groups as a result of cue type exposure. 
The control group demonstrated significant differences in bias scores as a result of 
cue type exposure (7(63) =2.87, p  = .006), showing that there was a significant 
difference in their vigilance towards HT cue types and avoidance of MT cue types. 
The mindfulness group did not demonstrate significant differences as a result of 
cue type exposure (7(63) = .094, p  = .925) showing no significant differences in 
bias towards MT and HT cue types.
To test further for predicted patterns of attentional bias within groups we compared 
mean attentional bias scores for HT and MT cue types with zero (0= no attentional 
bias). A one-sample 7-test showed that the mean attentional bias scores for the 
control group when exposed to HT cue types differed significantly from zero (7(64) 
= 2.092, p  = .040). The mean attentional bias score for the control group when 
exposed to MT cue types did not differ significantly from zero (7(64) = 1.616, /» = 
.111). The mean attentional bias score for the mindfulness group did not differ 
significantly from Zero when exposed to both HT cue types 7(64) = 1.307,/» = .196
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and MT cue types (7(64) = 1.026,/» = .309 respectively), indicating no bias towards 
high-threat or mild-threat stimuli.
Discussion
This study investigated whether participants exposed to a short mindfulness 
induction (the mindfulness group) would fail to show a usual pattern of attentional 
bias in response to threat stimuli. An analysis of attentional bias scores post­
manipulation revealed that the control group demonstrated a significant attentional 
bias of vigilance towards high threat cue types, however no significant attentional 
bias of avoidance away from mild threat cue types was demonstrated. However a 
difference was found in avoidance away from mild threat cue types and vigilance 
towards high threat cue types in the control group partially supporting the shifted 
function account of attentional bias (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Differences in 
attentional bias scores between the mild threat and the high threat cue types within 
the control group were significant. In contrast, the mindfulness group did not 
demonstrate a significant attentional bias of vigilance towards high threat cue types 
or a significant attentional bias of avoidance away from mild threat cue types as 
hypothesised. No observable pattern of avoidance from mild threat cue types 
shifting to a pattern of vigilance towards high threat cue types was observed. 
Differences in attentional bias scores between the mild threat and the high 
threat cue types within the mindfulness group were not significant. In summary, the 
mindfulness group did not appear to react differently to cue types as a result of 
threat value.
The moderating effect o f mindfulness on the relationship between threat and 
attentional bias
This laboratory study provides initial data that are consistent with a profile of 
emotion regulation capacities under conditions of mindfulness strengthening 
attentional control capacities. Specifically, participants who took part in a short 
mindfulness induction did not display the usual attentional biases in relation to high 
threat stimuli, whereas individuals in the control condition did display the usual 
attentional biases towards high threat stimuli. Furthermore, participants in the
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mindfulness group did not demonstrate a shifted function account of attentional 
bias (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) that was demonstrated by participants in the control 
group (see Fig 3). As the threat value of aversive stimuli increased from the mild to 
the high range, participants in the mindfulness group did not become increasingly 
more likely to orient their attention towards rather than away from the location of 
threat. Instead participants in the mindfulness group appeared to regulate emotion 
and control their attention to respond consistently to task demands irrespective of 
the presentation of high threat and mild threat stimuli acting as cue type.
The present findings provide support for our principle hypothesis that mindfulness 
moderates the relationship between stimulus threat value and attentional bias. The 
findings appear to suggest that participants in the control group demonstrated 
deficits in orienting attention (how attention is placed) and in conflict attention (the 
process of inhibiting an automatic response to threat) during the dot probe task. 
These biases in information processing might be conceptualized as mindfulness 
deficits. In fact, by definition, mindfulness is a state of mind in which individuals 
pay attention in a particular way to the present moment, on purpose and without 
judgment (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). This definition allows us to understand how the 
mindfulness induction may have intervened to change how participants paid 
attention to their internal and external experiences allowing them to control and 
direct attention in a productive and efficient way.
Implication fo r  wellbeing
The present findings have important implications for wellbeing as they provide 
empirical support for the positive effect of mindfulness in modulating attentional 
biases to threat. Several cognitive theories of anxiety (Beck & Clark 1997, Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998, Wells & Matthews, 1994, Williams Watts, Macleod & Matthews, 
1988) propose that attentional biases to threat cues play an important role in the 
development and maintenance of emotional distress. Persistent attentional biases to 
threat cues in the environment have typically been found to result in increased 
perception of danger, hyper-vigilance and often frequent or intense experiences of 
anxiety.
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Although there has been increasing interest in targeting attentional biases and 
emotion regulation strategies using cognitive behavioural therapy interventions, 
with some evidence supporting the hypothesis that CBT reduces biases for threat in 
anxiety disorders (Tobon, Ouimet & Dozois, 2011), little attention has been paid 
towards investigating the effects of mindfulness upon attentional bias. The current 
study provides important support for the role of mindfulness in ameliorating 
individual’s propensity towards hyper-vigilance and avoidance of threat. These 
effects may have a mediating role on symptom reduction and suggests a further 
need for research along such lines.
The findings also indicate that even a one-session mindfulness intervention is 
capable of changing the usual pattern of attentional bias towards high threat stimuli 
and away from mild threat stimuli. We do not suggest that one session of 
mindfulness training is as effective as extensive training. It is well documented that 
extensive mindfiilness training promotes lasting changes in cognition and wellbeing 
(Cahn & Polich, 2006). Our findings do however show that there are immediate, 
short-term benefits to practicing mindfulness. These benefits may have 
psychotherapeutic implications. For instance if a meditative state can be 
experienced after brief mindfulness training then individuals may feel more 
inclined to continue practice, which may lead to better health outcomes. Moreover 
mindfulness training may be more attractive and easily disseminated if  it can be 
shown to be effective without extensive training.
The influence o f mindfulness upon the valance evaluation system
According to the cognitive motivational model of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) 
the subjective threat value of a stimulus is the key determinant as to whether 
emotion-linked response tendencies are employed, orientating attention towards or 
away from threat. Mogg and Bradley (1998) propose that the primary factor 
responsible for mediating allocation of attention towards or away from threat is the 
reactivity of the valance evaluation system, responsible for the evaluation of 
stimulus threat value. If a stimulus is evaluated as having little or no threat value by 
the valance evaluation system then non-aversive emotional arousal is experienced 
and attention should be orientated away from it. If a stimulus is evaluated as having 
high threat value by the valance evaluation system then aversive emotional arousal
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is experienced and attention should be oriented towards it. Output from the valance 
evaluation system then feeds into the goal engagement system determining the 
allocation of cognitive processing and action.
Conceptual tenets of the cognitive motivational model of anxiety (Mogg and 
Bradley, 1998) can help to explain the observable differences between the 
mindfulness group and the control group in their relationship between stimulus 
threat value and attentional bias in the present study. We speculate from the current 
findings that the mindfulness induction may have acted to either modify cognitive 
reappraisal of stimuli within the valance evaluation system (through top-down 
emotion regulation) or negate the employment of the valance evaluation system in 
evaluating stimuli for their subjective threat value allowing all stimuli to pass 
through awareness without engendering any judgment or evaluation (through 
bottom-up emotion regulation).
In accordance with the cognitive motivational model of anxiety (1998) we propose 
that the participants in the control group employed the valance evaluation system in 
evaluating the mild threat stimuli as trivial and non-threatening leading to non- 
aversive emotional arousal. Output from the valance evaluation system may have 
fed into the goal engagement system to direct participant’s attention away from the 
stimuli. As the threat value of the stimuli increased, participants in the control 
group may have employed the valance evaluation system in evaluating high threat 
stimuli as aversive and highly threatening leading to aversive emotional arousal. 
Output from the valance evaluation system may then have fed into the goal 
engagement system to direct participants’ focus of attention towards the stimuli.
In contrast, participants in the mindfulness group appeared better able to 
emotionally regulate their response tendencies to both high threat and mild threat 
stimuli resulting in no attentional biases. The mindfulness group facilitated a 
healthy engagement with threating stimuli without over-engagement (vigilance 
towards threat leading to worry and rumination) and without under-engagement 
(avoidance away from threat leading to experiential avoidance) with them. We 
speculate that mindfulness either engaged top-down emotional regulation to 
cognitively reappraise the emotional stimuli in an adaptive manner within the 
valance evaluation system, modifying their emotional impact or mindfulness
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engaged bottom-up emotional regulation, negating the tendency of the valance 
evaluation system to actively appraise stimulus for their threat value.
If top-down emotion regulation was employed then reappraisal would have led to 
cognitive transformation of emotional experience allowing individual to reconstruct 
the meaning of the threatening stimuli in more objective terms to strengthen 
attentional control, allowing task demands to be unaffected. If bottom-up emotion 
regulation was employed then each stimulus irrespective of threat value may have 
been accepted as “just what is” unfolding within present moment experience in a 
more detached manner without the need for it to be assessed through means of top- 
down control.
Limitations
The current findings should be interpreted with consideration of the following 
limitations. One explanation for a failure to find attentional biases of avoidance 
away from mild threat cues may have been due to the normative valance and 
arousal levels of the stimuli selected from the I APS (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 
1999). The mean valance rating of the mild threat stimuli was 3.05 (SD = 0.63) and 
the mean arousal rating of the stimuli was 5.62 (SD = 0.84). These ratings were 
based upon ratings used in a study by Koster et al., (2005). Other studies using mild 
threat stimuli within the emotional dot probe have employed mean valance ratings 
ranging from 2.00 to 4.00 and mean arousal ratings ranging fi*om 4.00 to 6.00 
(Mogg et al, 2000, Mogg, et al 2004, Koster et al 2006) It is possible that the mild 
threat stimuli selected in the present study were too salient to be ignored by 
participants and from receiving further processing resulting in no significant 
avoidance bias.
Moreover, although story listening was chosen as a control condition, controlling 
for important potential confounds such as format, time duration and repeated 
exposure to threatening stimuli it did not control for expectancy and control effects. 
For instance, the mindfulness manipulation included instructions about ways to 
respond to difficult emotions that could have led to responses resulting from social 
desirability rather than actual effects in practice. A distinction is therefore 
warranted in future studies employing a short-term mindfulness based intervention
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between control and comparison conditions. A comparison condition should imply 
a condition that is structurally comparable to the mindfulness intervention and that 
is matched on the many nonspecific factors that have been found to produce 
beneficial change. Future studies could implement alternative comparison tasks 
such as listening to educational texts or music.
The experimental manipulation of mindfulness did have a significant effect on the 
self-report of curiosity, a central element of mindfulness as shown by scores on the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale. However the mindfulness manipulation did not have a 
significant effect on the decentring dimension of the scale. This suggests that the 
brief intervention most likely did not reproduce the full experience of mindfulness 
among participants. It is therefore possible that the production of mindfulness in the 
present study is a modest representation that is better achieved through more 
extensive practice. As such findings should be considered an underestimate of the 
potential effects of practice during longer durations.
Conclusions that can be drawn are also limited by the nature of the sample. We 
used a student sample of individuals. Findings may have been more pronounced in 
a clinical sample or, conversely a clinical sample might not have been as affected 
by the mindfulness manipulation. We were also unable to determine whether 
demographic variables such as gender, race or ethnicity played a role in the effects 
observed here, thus future studies should use larger diverse samples and explore the 
potential moderating roles of these variables.
Summary and future directions
This study provides important preliminary support for the role of mindfulness in 
emotion regulation and in the ways in which mindfulness may ameliorate 
attentional biases to threat. The present findings regarding the effects of 
mindfulness on attentional bias illuminate an exciting new avenue of research 
suggesting that even brief mindfulness training may change the way threat is 
experienced and responded to even in the laboratory. Existing research has 
indicated a relationship between mindfulness and emotion regulation impacting 
upon attentional control and results from this study support a causal relationship 
between these constructs.
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Presently there is little consensus within the literature as to how mindfulness 
practice helps to regulate disruptive emotions strengthening attentional control 
capacities. The present study speculates that mindfulness may enhance emotion 
regulation, strengthening attentional control by modifying the valance evaluation 
system within Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational model of anxiety, 
however whether this is achieved by a top-down or bottom-up strategy remains to 
be seen.
A more comprehensive understanding of whether mindfulness involves a top-down 
or bottom-up emotion regulation strategy could have important psychotherapeutic 
implications. For if mindfulness training is primarily a bottom-up process 
mindfulness based interventions might be effective for individuals not responding 
to traditional psychotherapies. Psychotherapy customarily relies upon top-down 
mechanisms such as cognitive reappraisals to regulate disruptive emotions however 
the possibility to reappraise emotions can often be impaired in individuals 
experiencing emotional distress. Therefore the effects of mindfulness-based 
interventions might be more efficacious to the effects of traditional talking 
therapies for individuals with an impairment in their ability to reappraise disruptive 
emotions. Future research is required in order to investigate whether mindfiilness 
impacts upon top-down or bottom-up emotion regulation mechanisms to modulate 
attentional biases to threat.
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Appendix A. Example o f picture pairs serving as cue taken from the international 
affective picture system (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999)
High Threat -  Neutral Picture Pair
Mild Threat -  Neutral Picture Pair
Neutral -  Neutral Picture Pair
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Appendix B. The mindfulness attention awareness scale (Brown & Ryan 2003)
Mmüiil Atteation. Awartsess Seal#
Descnpdon:
The MAAS r  a l^îÈaascaledesîgiiedto^sessacoiedKgactensËcofdi^siliœial 
mmdâünes naiiKly,opœarfecepü\eawaieaessofamda#eaüoatDWiatîstakîagpIace 
m±eprescoî Tbescalcslx>wsstrongpsychome&icpK%)erti^amiha5bcfBvalidated 
T%idb43oIkggf^ (3BEacnuiu1y: jandlcsKBDeijpatBamtsKBiqikss. {jDireLahkMiatfpiasLisxgNaningaiBdL 
and laboratory studies hai% shown that # e  MAAS t3g% a unique quality of consciousness 
that is related to, andpmhctivi of a of sclf r^egulatioa and weU-being constmcts
The measure takes lOnunutes or less to minplete
Day^tonDay Expenemees
Dishuctioos: Below is a coBKtion of statements about your ewoyday eiq)enence. Using 
the W scak bc§ow,pkase indicate how Êequcntly Of h#eqocndyyoucu[ieit% have 
each eaqÿcnence^  Please answer according to udat leaHy reflects your ea^ericnce rather
every other item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
AloKKt \%3ry S<nnewbat Swaonevwhad \fcry Almost
yilMMrys IFreqpaaof^ r fiRxiueidly Infrcqpaaodhr Wnequently Never
l4^ouldbe€3q)erk3&cingsoageeiBiüioriarMii)otl%e 1 31 3 4 5 <;
conscious of it until some üfw laber.
Itmcak or iq3Ülldiüu25l>»caiKx;cd^ carelessaes@t]Qot 1 2^ 4 5 i6
mg attenhon. or thinking of something else.
I fund ddbfEuz ih to stay &cused on t^iafs happening 1 2 3 ft
m the present
ldk3ad1k*tvalkquàckl]rto^ gettRdMaR;I%ngp%ry?T«idiotd 1 2 3 & ft 6
payiiig attention to what leaperieoce along Ae way.
IterwiiüottcrcKWicefbelBigs otidbtsâcaltCrKüCMiixt 1 2^ :* 5 6
d&sccKidcüt uoüüfbeyrealhrjgGdbiiryidteidiorL
I]RaqgEt;*txan%]n%5%%aBme:ËbiK%staBso<Mi:isI5fe been 1 2 3 1 <5
told it &)T the grst time.
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It s%ms I am "running on automatic." without much 
awarene  ^of what fm doing.
1 2 3 4 5 6
IiuAthroE^ activities without being really attenth  ^
to them
l 2 3 4 5 6
Igetsofixms«icm#egoallwant to achieve that I 
lose touch wi&whatDndoiign^now to get there.
l 2 3 4 5 6
I do jobs or task autonmticaBy, without being aware 
of what Fm doing.
1 2 3 4 5 6:
I find n^'self listemng to sonœœie wifii one ear. &nng 
something else at the same time.
I 2 3 4 5 6
I driie places on "aWoma&:]^ 1" amd#gm wonder 
uhylwentdieie.
I 2 3 4 5 6
Ifindag^selfpBBoaaqMedwifii&efiitureortl^past. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I find myself doing things wifimut paying attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I snack widiout being aware fimtPm eating 1 2 3 4 5 6
Scoring ioformalion;
To the scale, ccmpite a nmas of the 15 items, ffigher semes reflect M i^er 
levels of dispositiosM jaaadMœss.
Inference:
Brown, K.W. & Rym  RM. (2003). The benefits of being pieseot: M ndiilae^ and its 
role m |]^diolopcal wdî-beiog. Journal of %rsomlity and SmiM Psycbolo^ 
84.822-S4&
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Appendix C. The tornoto mindfulness scale (Lau et a l, 2006)
Toronto Mindfulness Scale
Instructions: We are interested in what you just experienced. Below is a 
list of tilings that people sometimes experience. Please read each statement. 
Next to each statement are five choices; "not at all,” "a  little,” "moderately,” 
“quite a bit,” and “very much.” Please indicate the extent to which you agree 
witli each statement. In other words, how well does the statement describe 
what you just experienced, just now?
*«'
»
e
% <
t
E
i
Z
ss
1
"SI
1
1. I  experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts 
and feelings. 0 1 2 3 4
2. I  was more concerned with being open to my experiences than control­
ling or changing them. 0 1 2 3 4
3. I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of 
how I react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations. 0 1 2 3 4
4. I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a neces­
sarily accurate reflection of the way filings ‘really’ are. 0 1 2 3 4
5. I was curious to see what ray raind was up to from moment to moment 0 1 2 3 4
6. I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 0 1 2 3 4
7. I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without 
interfering with them. 0 1 2 3 4
8. I was more invested in Just watching my experiences as they arose, 
than in figuring out what they could mean. 0 1 2 3 4
9. I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether 
it was pleasant or unpleasant. 0 1 2 3 4
10. I reraained curious about the nature of each exf^rience as it arose. 0 1 2 3 4
11. I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without overidentifying 
with them. 0 1 2 3 4
12. I was curious about my reactions to things. 0 1 2 3 4
13. I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking 
notice of what my attention gets drawn to. 0 1 2 3 4
Scoring:
Key: AH items were written in the positively keyed direction, so no reverse scoring of items is required.
Curiosity score: The following iteim are summed: 3,5, 6, 10, 12, 13
Decentering score: The following items are summed: 1, 2, 4, 7 ,8 ,9,11
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Appendix D. Participant information sheet
The Effects of Emotion on Attention: A Dot 
Probe Study
Who is Organising This Study?
This research is organised by the Psychology Department of the University of Kent. The 
researchers are Dinkar Sharma, a member of staff and Stewart Blake, a trainee counselling 
psychologist at the University of Surrey.
What Are the Aims of the Study?
This study will examine how emotions affect attention on a cognitive task. A probe 
detection task will be employed to examine reaction times to pictures presented on a 
computer screen. The pictorial stimuli will be presented in the form of threatening and 
neutral stimuli. Participants will be required to respond to the presentation of a dot on the 
screen as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants will also be asked to listen to 
two audio recordings and will be required to engage fully with this task. Participants will 
also be asked to fill out three questionnaires.
What Happens to the Information I Provide?
Participation in this study guarantees confidentiality of the information you provide. No 
one apart from the researcher and research supervisor will have any access to the 
information you provide. Your name and any other identifying information will be stored 
separately from your data in a securely locked filing cabinet. Questionnaires will be stored 
in a securely locked room for as long as is required by the Data Protection Act, and then 
they will be destroyed by our confidential shredding service. The data collected for this 
study will form part of a student dissertation. Once the data is analysed a report of the 
findings may be submitted for publication. Only broad trends will be reported and it will 
not be possible to identify any individuals. A summary of the results will be available from 
the researcher on request.
Contact for Further Information
If you require any further information or have any queries about this study please contact
the researcher: Dinkar Sharma, Stewart Blake
email; D.Sharma@kent.ac.uk, stewart_blake@hotmail.com
phone: 01227 823084
If you wish to withdraw your data from this study, please contact the Psychology 
Department Office on: Tel: 01227 823699
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Appendix E. Informed consent form for the participant
Consent Form - copy 1 (for participant)
Title of project: The Effects of Emotion on Attention: A Dot Probe Study 
Name of Researchers: Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma
1.1 Confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have the opportunity to ask questions.
2 .1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.
3 .1 agree to take part in the above study
Name of the Participant:
Signature:__________________________Date:
Please retain this copy for your records
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Appendix F. Informed consent form for the researcher
Consent Form - copy 2 (for researcher)
Title of project: The Effects of Emotion on Attention: A Dot Probe Study 
Name of Researcher: Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma,
1.1 Confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have the opportunity to ask questions.
2 .1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.
3 .1 agree to take part in the above study
Name of the Participant:
Signature:__________________________Date:
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Appendix G. Debrief form
The Relationship between Mindfulness and 
Attentional Bias.
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. We would like to provide 
some further information about the purpose of the study and what we expect to find.
The current study investigates how mindfulness can affect the processing of emotional 
images. We predict that negative images will increase the influence of the stimulus driven 
bottom-up attentional system whilst decreasing the effect of the goal driven top-down 
attentional system and that state mindfulness will moderate this effect. In each trial you 
were required to respond to a target circle presented. Each time you were instructed to 
respond to a target circle in the opposite location to the threatening stimulus it was 
necessary to exert top-down attentional control.
If you have any queries about this research or would like to ask any further questions, 
please contact the researcher or research supervisor using the contact details below.
If you would like to withdraw your data at any point, please eontact the Psychology 
departmental office on 01227 823961. If you have been given a partieipant code you need 
to cite this. You do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.
Once again, we would like to thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. 
Your participation is greatly appreciated.
Yours sincerely.
Stewart Blake & Dinkar Sharma
Researcher eontact details:
Dinkar Sharma 
D. Sharma@kent.ac.uk 
phone: 01227 823084
If you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the 
Chair of the Psyehology Researeh Ethics Panel (via the Psychology Department Offiee) in 
writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.
202
Appendix H. Ethical approval by the university research ethics committee.
APPROVAL BY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
The following researeh project has been approved by 
The Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
Date: 13:56 16-01-2013 
Code: 20132801 
Applieant details:
Name: Stewart Blake 
Status: BSc Student 
Email address: sb714@kent.ac.uk 
Title of the researeh:
The effect of emotion on attention
When carrying out this research you are reminded to
* follow the Departmental Guidelines for Conducting Research with Human Participants
* comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
* refer any amendments to the protocol to the Panel
Please keep this form in a safe place. You may be asked to present it at a later stage of your 
study for monitoring purposes. Final year project students and MSc students will need to 
submit a copy of this form with their project.
You can log in at http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php to copy or 
print pregenerated handouts for this study.
Applicant Details:
Name of the researcher 
Name of the supervisor 
Status
Email address 
Title
Stewart Blake 
Dinkar Sharma 
Student
sb714@kent.ac.uk
The effect of emotion on attention
Summary
The experiment will involve particpants carrying out a 
dot probe task with two audio recordings either from the 
book the Hobbitt or two mindfulness mediatations being 
played half way through the task. Partieipants will also 
be required to complete two questionairres.
203
Appendix I: Personal reflections
This research considers how mindfulness may act to moderate the relationship 
between threat and attentional bias. Specifically, this study examines whether state 
mindfulness influences emotion regulation, strengthening attentional processes 
thought to be important in the persistence of emotional disorders. Although a great 
deal of empirical evidence is now available emphasizing that mindfulness based 
treatments reduce symptoms and distress, fewer studies have examined the 
processes and mechanisms by which beneficial outcomes are obtained. As a 
counselling psychologist, I believe that the advancement of science and practice is 
now better served by investigating not just whether treatments work but how they 
work. By understanding how treatments work it may be possible to increase their 
effectiveness by refining components that are responsible for therapeutic change.
Mindfulness-based treatments may be particularly useful for promoting emotion 
regulation and facilitating the development of a more adaptive way of responding 
to emotions. Mindfulness practices have traditionally been taught as a method for 
compassionately calming the mind in the face of negative affect. The act of 
watching one’s own experience with equanimity rather than attempting to control 
one’s experience is also central to mindfulness practice. My own formal 
mindfulness practice has allowed me to regulate my own emotions and has offered 
me inner resilience throughout my third year of study. This period of my life has 
proved to be particularly challenging as while navigating my way towards the end 
of my training I have also had to contend with a personal crisis that has arisen 
within the context of my own psychotherapy. At times I have experienced anxiety 
and depression that has proved to be debilitating, however through practising 
mindfulness I have embraced a caring and compassionate side of my-self that has 
assisted me in enhancing my mental, physical and social wellbeing. I am now 
aware that mindfiilness has improved my capacity to regulate emotion, to combat 
emotional dysfunction, to improve patterns of thinking and to reduce negative 
mind-sets. The present research is therefore important to me both professionally 
and personally as I am fascinated to see how mindfulness achieves beneficial 
change to our mental health.
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As I have been working from a cognitive behavioural approach to psychotherapy 
this year I have also been able to incorporate mindfulness practice into my 
therapeutic repertoire. Mindflilness-based treatments mark an important departure 
from the more traditional cognitive behavioural treatments in that they promote 
changing one’s relationship to thoughts and feelings rather than trying to directly 
change the content of thoughts per se. Moreover, mindfulness training emphasizes 
developing greater awareness and acceptance of emotions rather than teaching 
methods to change emotional experience. Working with a number of clients this 
year that have struggled with obsessional thoughts and regulating their emotions I 
have encouraged them to engage in mindfulness meditation to facilitate a greater 
awareness of their present moment experience. Through the practising of formal 
meditation, clients have taken part in body scans, mindfulness of the breath, 
mindfulness of the body and mindful yoga both inside and outside the therapy 
room. Furthermore, I have taught clients informal mindfulness practices in which 
they have been encouraged to be attentive to seemingly routine activities in their 
day-to-day lives such as eating and walking, and to monitor their thoughts, 
emotions and body sensations during pleasant and unpleasant activities. I have 
found that as clients have progressed towards cultivating a state of mindful 
awareness this has often been associated with a greater ability to tolerate negative 
emotions and has led to a reduction in emotional reactivity. The present research 
examines whether mindfulness meditation has immediate, short-term benefits in the 
ability to tolerate negative emotions leading to a reduction of emotional reactivity 
within the context of the laboratory. The results of this study may have significant 
psychotherapeutic implications.
Mindfulness has also allowed me to develop a more attentive, balanced and 
compassionate presence during therapy sessions. Research suggests that the 
presence of the therapist and how the therapist forges a connection with the client 
in therapy are the most critical factors affecting the clients healing process. Being 
an engaged, committed, and caring therapist, who is mindful of his own self and 
how that self relates to others, appears to have been a key determinate in how 
clients have responded in therapy. Being mindful has enabled me to be flexible, 
receptive and have presence in my therapeutic work.
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For 6 months I have also had the privilege of spending over an hour with one- 
hundred-and-twenty-eight undergraduate and postgraduate students at the 
University of Kent as part of the research process. I have been encouraged by the 
amount of students that have taken a real interest in the methods and results of the 
current research and I have been honoured to share my growing knowledge of 
mindfulness meditation with them. As a result of my collaborations with the 
University of Kent a number of other studies examining the effects of mindfulness 
on cognition are currently being undertaken at the university. I fully intend to 
maintain my interest in researching the processes and mechanisms of mindfulness 
post training in order to further inform both theory and practice.
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